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ABSTRACT 
 
THE PROMISE OF MOURNING 
 
FEBRUARY 2015 
 
SAMANTHA ROSE HILL, B.A., ALBION COLLEGE 
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor NICHOLAS XENOS 
 
 
This dissertation project offers a critique of the ethical turn within contemporary 
political theory through the Frankfurt School tradition of critical thought. While many 
contemporary political theorists rely upon Freud’s distinction between mourning and 
melancholia in order to argue for forms of democratic political action, I examine the 
relationship between loss, mourning, melancholy, and temporality in the works of Hannah 
Arendt, Walter Benjamin, Sheldon Wolin, and Theodor Adorno in order to think about the 
relationship between critical thinking and political action. Focusing on their different 
approaches to time, history, and loss in relationship to politics demonstrates how concepts 
like mourning and loss can be opened up in new and interesting ways.  
Chapter one focuses on the work of Hannah Arendt and offers an account of her 
writings and reflections on the emergence of totalitarianism and the relationship between 
thinking and action. In thinking about the future of political resistance, Arendt turns towards 
the works of Franz Kafka and the French poet René Char in order to conceptualize the 
spirit of resistance in what she terms the lost treasure of the revolution. Her reflections on 
resistance, time, and the loss of tradition in modernity turn us towards the breakdown 
between language and thought.    
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 Chapter two explores Benjamin’s conceptions of history and time through his 
discussion of Trauerspiel and sovereignty. Turning to Benjamin’s work in “Theses on The 
Philosophy of History”, The Origins of German Tragic Drama, and his reflections in Berlin 
Childhood Around 1900, I examine how he helps us to think about the relationship between 
our understanding of history, a critical temporality, and the politics of mourning.    
  Chapter three explores Wolin’s conceptions of democracy, democratic time, and his 
move from vocation to invocation in order to think about the ethical turn in contemporary 
political theory. In “Political Theory: From Vocation to Invocation” Wolin offers a critique 
of what he calls the “systematization of loss” that illustrates how theorists have conformed 
to rhythmic cycles of capitalist production and consumption. Wolin’s turn towards Adorno 
in his essay on invocation is a rejection of demands for democratic political action. Wolin’s 
understanding of invocation is akin to Adorno’s understanding of melancholia in Minima 
Moralia, which refuses what he calls a “vain hope” for redemption.  
 In the Conclusion, I return to the problem of the ethical turn within contemporary 
political theory, exploring how this reading of loss and mourning in relation to politics 
affects the way contemporary political theorists think about questions of political action.   
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 “There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of 
barbarism. And just as such a document is not free of barbarism, barbarism taints also the 
manner in which it was transmitted from one owner to another. A historical materialist 
therefore dissociates himself from it as far as possible. He regards it as his task to brush 
history against the grain.” Walter Benjamin, On the Concept of History 
 
 
 
“If Benjamin said that history had hitherto been written from the standpoint of the victor, 
and needs to be written from that of the vanquished, we might add that knowledge must 
indeed present the fatally rectilinear succession of victory and defeat, but should also address 
itself to those things which were not embraced by this dynamic, which fell by the wayside – 
what might be called the waste products and blind spots that have escaped the dialectic. It is 
in the nature of the defeated to appear, in their impotence, irrelevant, eccentric, derisory. 
What transcends the ruling society is not only the potentiality it develops but also all that 
which did not fit properly into the laws of historical movement. Theory must needs deal 
with the cross-grained, opaque, unassimilated material, which as such admittedly has from 
the start an anachronistic quality, but is not wholly obsolete since it has outwitted the 
historical dynamic.” Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia 
 
 
 
“To survive, the idea of vocation might have to be revoked and replaced by the sobrieties of 
method or invoked: Invocation as vocation’s conscience recalling it to the cross-grained.” 
Sheldon Wolin, “Political Theory: From Vocation to Invocation” 
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PREFACE 
 
 I began thinking about the relationship between loss and the work of political theory 
while reading Hannah Arendt’s essay “What is Authority?” in Between Past and Future. She 
begins: “In order to avoid misunderstanding, it might have been wiser to ask in the title: 
What was — and not what is — authority?”1 Arendt’s simple admission is telling. Her essay 
is not meant to offer an account of authority, but rather an account of what authority was 
and how it has changed over time. This slippage demonstrates how we often ask what 
something is in order to excavate what something was and how it came to be the way it is. 
This what was assumes a passage of time, a transformation, and for Arendt points us towards 
something that has been lost. Arendt’s work often takes the form of thinking through 
something that once was but is no longer: The loss of the public sphere to the social, the loss 
of culture, the loss of work, the loss of freedom, the loss of tradition, the loss of authority, 
the lost treasure of the revolution, and so on. For Arendt, loss is not so much a conceptual 
category as it is a place from which she begins her work of political theory. Loss for Arendt 
becomes a means to understanding the world, and a central theme throughout her work. 
 The what was also reflects Arendt’s own methodology in doing the work of political 
theory. Her work often claims a premise or authoritative voice to only transform it into her 
own. She does damage to the text and that is the consequence of her thinking process — 
that is the conversation between herself and others.2 On the one hand the disregard with 
which she treats others in writing demonstrates her methodology, and on the other it 
becomes easy fodder for undoing her work. I don’t offer this as an apology for Arendt’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin Classics, 2006), 91. 
2 For example with Kafka to think about time, or for Cicero to think about “the Greeks” and thinking. 
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methodology, but as an explanation of my own thought process in approaching her work 
and beginning the project. It would be easy to argue, for instance, that Arendt hides in the 
cloak of Kafka to talk about temporality and subjectivity, but I think it is more important to 
acknowledge her methodology and treat her argument about temporality as her own, 
because it is. Kafka is her interlocutor, and we can ask what has been lost in her 
manipulation of his work, and what has been gained. Beyond this, given that thinking as a 
conceptual category in itself plays a principal role in this work, I think it is more helpful to 
be an interested observer in Arendt’s thinking process and see how that comes through her 
writing.  
 I began my own writing focused on the concept of loss, broadly conceived. Arendt’s 
claim that authority and tradition have been lost to modernity seemed to point towards a 
loss of a more essential kind. Loss not so much as a conceptual category that could be 
treated in any certain sense, but loss as a form of experience that takes many forms. Loss 
leads to the process of mourning, which can lead to melancholia, which creates a sense of 
longing and absence. Each author I encountered approached loss differently. In reading 
Wolin, loss often means a form of attenuation or erosion, and is a claim to something like 
democratic powers in the Constitution or the vocation of political theory. In reading 
Benjamin, loss came to signify the pile of debris left at our feet by the forces of progress and 
historical time. For Adorno it is the rejection of return and the claim that we can no longer 
ask the philosophical question “What is the good life?” because the good life is no longer 
possible. The word ‘loss’ in-and-of-itself often provides a conceptual frame or starting place 
from which we can approach our object of consideration.  
 As such, there is no singular loss I am responding to, but rather a sense of loss that 
occupies the center of our contemporary condition. This was my suspicion, and while this is 
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where I began, I realized that loss is not so easy to come to terms with. Oftentimes, while I 
was using the word ‘loss,’ I was referring to a moment of crisis that was perhaps or perhaps 
not indicative of an experience of loss, but seemed to signify a greater cultural, or political 
break. Change produces losses, and we live in a society that thrives off of constant change. 
Or, as Wolin notes, “Perhaps, however, there is something paradigmatic left: the domination 
of the world by change, by changes that are, to a significant degree, premeditated, however 
imperfect the grasp of unintended consequences.”3 The only thing certain is that we are 
always losing something. This idea that the world is always changing and that we are always 
losing something cannot be untwined from the materiality of life. Attempts to dominate the 
unwieldiness of nature through technological rationality, or homogenous, empty time, or the 
systematization of loss signify claims to power.4 These methodologies claim that we can 
somehow know the world. At the same time there is a push forward. The logical domination 
that enabled material domination has created this world governed by change. 
 Thinking about the relationship between constant change and the condition of loss 
lead me to Adorno’s Minima Moralia. His critique of petit-bourgeois culture, knowledge, and 
possessive love through the philosophical language of immediacy provided a counter-point. 
A claim to tradition or fidelity, to any one thing over a period of time, can be seen as a form 
of resistance to the dominant cultural mode. Benjamin documents this in his Arcades, where 
the industrialization of Paris and the influence of capitalist culture demanded the world be 
run on what he calls ‘homogenous, empty time.’ In this spirit, the quotations I’ve laid out at 
the beginning are meant to serve as a kind of lineage. Benjamin, Adorno, and subsequently 
Wolin call upon us to attend to the cross-grained, to brush up against this homogenous, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Sheldon Wolin, “Political Theory: From Vocation to Invocation”, 15. 
4 Respectively, I am referring to Adorno and Horkheimer’s The Dialectic of Enlightenment, Benjamin’s conception 
of homogenous, empty time, and Wolin’s argument that contemporary political theory has systematized loss. 
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empty time, to challenge the dominant cultural norms of the day. This seems especially 
challenging in our world today that is continuously erupting with political movements, 
leaving the appearance of tiny fissures which perhaps articulate new democratic boarders. 
This, perhaps, is a lingering reluctance. What does it mean to attend to the “cross-grained” 
today, where even political and social movements seem to have become part of the 
domination of the world by change? I’m not sure what is meant by democracy; I’m not sure 
that ‘democracy,’ as a conceptual category, hasn’t entirely fallen in with the rhetoric of 
progress and the need for change. With these hesitations and suspicions, the question of loss 
became the question of political action, and how political action arose out of our historical 
and temporal positions in the world.  
 In reading, the problem of loss became the problem of the ethical turn within 
contemporary political theory that posits an “I” at the center of world, along with the 
rejection of metaphysics. I could not escape the question of moral philosophy, and so Kant 
is the not-so-silent interlocutor that I deal with here. The problem of loss became the 
problem of the ethical turn because contemporary theorists treat experiences of loss as 
opportunities for political action through a Freudian form of mourning. Grieving becomes a 
way to express political grievances, and collective traumas become opportunities for a form 
of left-wing action. In other words, mourning becomes a site of political promise. 
 I also came to loss from a general frustration with the American left, or lack thereof. 
Having engaged in various forms of political action, responding to the critical political events 
of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, I feel myself at a loss. My critique of 
thinkers like Judith Butler who calls for resistance or Jodi Dean who calls for communist 
revolution comes from a place of political sympathy — of being discontented with how 
things are and how they are going. How do we conceptualize new forms of political action? 
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Why do political theorists rely so heavily on categories like mourning and melancholy to 
argue for democracy? How do we ask these questions in a time when it is self-defeating to state 
the obvious facts of our political reality: September 11th, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, 
severe economic disparity, NSA surveillance, gun violence, rape culture, genocide, hunger, 
homelessness, wars, and revolutions. The list goes on and on, and it is not new. As Benjamin 
so eloquently wrote, “The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ 
in which we live is not the exception but the rule.”5 
 In The Ethics Aristotle draws a distinction between “accounting” and “offering an 
account.”6 We can account for what is happening - we can make lists, and treat events and 
ongoing political conflicts as policy problems to be solved and managed - but there’s no 
reason to be hopeful that this will do anything. Or, we can at least try to begin to offer an 
account, to understand, and to think about what we are doing. Americans can “Occupy Wall 
Street,” but as long as they are replicating the institutions of neo-liberalism they aren’t going 
to change the system. But, it’s not clear what ‘change’ means here either. What strikes me in 
reading Arendt, Adorno, Benjamin, and Wolin is a sense of metaphysical certainty, and a 
reading or critique of Kantian ethics that somehow draws us closer to answering these 
questions. Or, perhaps at the very least, will give us new frameworks for thinking about our 
contemporary condition. 
 So instead of calling for immediate action, or asking what can be done in the face of so 
much, this project attempts to move against the grain, turning simultaneously towards and 
away from the ethical turn which seems to direct current discourse in political theory. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections (New York: Schocken, 1969), 248. 
6 Aristotle writes, “Evidently, then, the irrational part of the soul also consists of two parts.  The vegetative has 
no association at all with reason, but the desiderative and generally appetitive part does in a way participate in 
reason, in the sense that it is submissive and obedient to it (this is the sense of logon echein in which we speak 
of ‘taking account’ of one’s father or friends, not that in which we speak of ‘having an account’ of mathematical 
propositions.’” Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (New York, N.Y: Penguin Classics, 2003), 30. 
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doing so, I look towards those theorists that address the relationship between temporality 
and history, and the classic philosophical distinction between thinking and action. 
 In this spirit, this dissertation offers a critique of how contemporary political theorists 
deal with questions of loss and mourning, focusing on the Frankfurt School tradition of 
critical theory. While many contemporary thinkers focus on questions of loss and mourning 
in order to politicize mourning as an opportunity for democratic political action, the 
tradition of critical theory approaches moments of loss and mourning differently. Focusing 
on the works of Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin, Sheldon Wolin, and Theodor Adorno, I 
explore how moments of loss and mourning can be opened up in different ways that don’t 
give way to a form of systematization or reinforce a false sense of hope for left-wing 
struggles, or democracy. 
  
 8	  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 For many political theorists, the work of political theory is born from a place of loss. 
Loss has a rich history within the tradition of western political thought. From Thucydides’ 
telling of Pericles’ “Funeral Oration” and Plato’s loss of Socrates, to contemporary 
reflections on sovereignty and rights, theorists have laid claim to loss as a political concept. 
Peter Euben writes, “I want to argue that while philosophy may begin in wonder that things 
are the way they are (Aristotle), or may be a preparation for death (Plato), or the acceptance 
of finitude, much political theory begins with loss. Loss animates it as an enterprise and 
forms its problematic.”7 At the outset of The Presence of the Past, Sheldon Wolin tells us that 
his work is “in one way or another . . . concerned with a particular kind of loss, the loss of 
democratic values, the constriction of democratic hopes, the attenuation of the democratic 
element in institutions not otherwise conspicuous in their constraint to democratic ends.”8 
In “Hannah Arendt: Democracy and the Political” Wolin writes: “The loss of the political 
[which is the orientating experience governing Arendt’s entire project] is a clue to its nature: 
it is a mode of experience rather than a comprehensive institution such as the state. The 
thing about experience is that we can lose it and the thing about political experience is that 
we are always losing it and having to recover it.”9 For these thinkers, and many others, loss 
does not so much become a theme or central concept as a place or disposition from which 
their inquiry begins.10 The losing of something, or the apparent loss of something or 
someone, is a form of experience that shares an intimacy with the act of thinking and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Peter Euben, Vocations Of Political Theory, (Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2000), 61. 
8 Sheldon S. Wolin, The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1990), 4. 
9 Sheldon Wolin, “Hannah Arendt: Democracy and the Political,” 1983.  
10 In the brief essay “Evening Land” on Wolin and Theodor Adorno, Anne Norton writes: “ [t]he practice of 
democracy is the practice of loss.” She later amends her claim to read, “[d]emocracy, then, is the long practice 
of loss, practical discipline in the being toward death.” 
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practice of theory. For others, loss becomes an object, detached from experience, and 
something that can be used to reach political ends.  
 
The Promise of Mourning in Contemporary Theory  
  Within contemporary political theory there is a predominant trend towards thinking 
about loss as ‘that which we lose.’ Loss in this way most often takes on the work of 
mourning — a working through of lost loved-objects. How do we treat moments of loss? In 
Freudian terms we can either turn to mourning or melancholia from a place of loss. 
Mourning requires reattachment to new love-objects in the world, whereas melancholia 
rejects or cannot form (new) attachments. Because processes of mourning require new 
attachments, mourning opens up space and requires reattachment, it requires having a form 
of hope in the world and future. Understood in this way, loss as a kind of break becomes the 
impetus for a means to political action, the discovery of new humanisms in Antigone, an 
opening of space for democratic opportunities after 9/11, a site for political resistance after 
the Financial Collapse of 2008. It is something to be recognized and taken advantage of, 
memorialized and reflected upon; it is a space that can be opened up. This idiosyncratic 
understanding of loss that reduces Freud’s distinction between mourning and melancholia 
into a useful conceptual framework dominates contemporary discourse. Perhaps this is a 
product of our methodological inclinations as political thinkers to think through themes, or 
our reliance upon conceptual categories and divisions to approach problems. Perhaps it is 
more skeptically what Sheldon Wolin calls the “systematization of loss,” where theorists take 
to moments of loss like ambulance chasers to crime scenes. These are not losses that are 
understood politically, but rather losses rendered as politics.  
 10	  
 Loss and experiences of loss are not necessarily political. In trying to understand or 
comprehend the experiences of the past century––wars, revolutions, genocides, terrorism, 
HIV/AIDs––contemporary political theorists have rendered these events as political losses 
that need to be worked through. The transformation of experiences of loss into spaces for 
politics or political action illustrates the ethical and aesthetic turn in political theory. For 
example, Judith Butler’s reading of American politics post-9/11, or Jodi Dean’s idea of 
communism and the Occupy Movement conceptualize moments of collective loss and crisis 
like 9/11 and the Financial Collapse of 2008 as an opening of space for radical political 
action. These renderings emphasize loss as the loss of something, which then leaves space for 
something new for us to attach to and hope for. What is not asked is whether or not these 
losses are real to begin with. In “Mourning and Melancholia” Freud emphasizes that the 
losses we experience might be real and or imaginary, but either way we move through the 
process of mourning. So, reading political events as losses creates a framework that demands 
mourning and reattachment, or in political terms, action. It seems obviously questionable 
that such events might be thought through in these terms of loss, but this methodological 
impulse allows us to speak to the affective experience of such collective events, and render 
from them something that can be utilized for political purposes.  
 Thinking about collective economic or political crisis, the lost love-object appears to 
be a form of rupture or break that opens up space for thinking about the institutions and 
conditions that govern daily life. This loss doesn’t really seem to be loss at all, except that we 
talk about it in familiar terms, something has been eroded or taken away, or we’re made to 
feel like or believe we’ve lost something. In some respects this is true. In the event of the 
financial crisis, these conceptual losses translated into very real losses — the loss of homes, 
retirement plans, communities, and so on. If we’re going to think about it this way, though, 
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the supposed democratic losses, seemed to have already occurred — the privatization of 
public institutions, the creation of an “economic polity” (to use Wolin’s phrasing). Our 
attendance to these losses seems a little too late. 
Many contemporary political theorists who approach questions of loss and mourning 
use Freud’s dichotomy between mourning and melancholia in order to talk about democratic 
political action. The Freudian framework demands reattachment to the world, which means 
that we can lose and re-attach to as many objects as we like, but we are never actually 
changing our framework for thinking about the world, or for approaching the world in a way 
that is guided by principles of historical materialism and so critical of the way things are. 
Mourning and melancholia in these terms are restricted to a delimited Freudian frame that 
appears to not only be a misreading of Freud, but more problematically a foreclosure of 
other and perhaps more interesting ways of thinking about loss, mourning, and melancholia 
in relationship to politics. The promise of mourning is a kind of political hope that sees 
opportunity in moments of political crisis that are called to our attention. 
For theorists like Judith Butler reading Antigone, mourning is seen as an opportunity 
to retrieve or claim democratic goods that have been lost in struggles of power. The primary 
problem with this model of democratic mourning, however, is that it presupposes that one 
can re-attach to some form of original loved-object that has been lost without considering 
the possibility that these objects were real, or in what ways they might have existed. Or, 
whether or not they are desirable in the first place. Wolin is not exempt from this 
problematic either: for him it is the attenuation of democracy, it is the sense of collectivity in 
politics.11 The question that we must ask is: Did the loved-object ever exist? Did democracy 
ever exist? Or equality? And so on. The lost loved-object in the case of contemporary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Wolin, The Presence of the Past, 1. 
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political theory is the claim to democratic goods. If we assume that it did exist then at best 
we are only re-attaching ourselves to an idealized notion of something that is no longer what 
we desire to bring forth into the present. This is not mourning at all, it is a form of 
melancholia. It is what Walter Benjamin described as the melancholic form, those once rich 
political concepts that we hold on to, but have lost all content.12  
Butler’s argument for democratic mourning rests on the claim that Freud “softened 
the distinction between the states of grief and melancholia.” In Precarious Life, Butler writes 
“he (Freud) suggested that successful mourning meant being able to exchange one object for 
another; he later claimed that incorporation, originally associated with melancholia, was 
essential to the task of mourning.”  Freud’s earlier claim that attachment might be formed 
anew implied a “certain interchangeability of objects as a sign of hopefulness.”13  Butler is 
not wrong in her reading of mourning, citing Freud’s movement between “Mourning and 
Melancholia” and his later work in The Ego and The Id, but her conflation of mourning with 
melancholia is misplaced. Instead of thinking about melancholia as a rich mental state that 
enables thinking, reflection, the work of memory, and ultimately mourning, Butler places 
melancholy within the work of mourning as an aggressive state that needs to be overcome.  
In making this claim, Butler dismisses melancholia as a pathological form of 
mourning, as a kind of “uncompleted grief.” Butler’s account of “Mourning and 
Melancholia” in The Psychic Life of Power and Antigone’s Claim stretches Freud’s distinction to 
consider the original lost loved-object, to think about what she calls “gender melancholy.” 
For Butler, melancholia is understood as an inability to mourn. She offers the example of 
AIDS in the nineties and the inability to publicly grieve the seemingly endless loss of life. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Walter Benjamin, Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 2: Part 1: 1927-1930 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap 
Press, 2005), 423–27. 
13 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London  ; New York: Verso, 2006), 20–21. 
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The Psychic Life of Power, she turns towards Melanie Klein’s work to buttress her reading, but 
fails to acknowledge the dynamic relationship between the two states, which are given weight 
by both Freud and Klein. Using Klein, Butler argues that “melancholy is the limit of the 
subject’s sense of power,” and causes a rift in subjectivity. The claim that melancholy as a 
form of uncompleted grief causes a split in the subjective consciousness is a misreading of 
both Freud and Klein. Melancholy doesn’t cause the “rift” it is a symptom of the already 
fragmented subject. This is more apparent in Klein than it is in Freud, who argues that the 
original loss, which causes dissociation from the bad loved-objects, can never be mourned. 
The individual with no good attachments is forever condemned to a fractured existence 
hence the title Psychogenesis of Manic-depressive States. In returning to the work of mourning, 
Freud continually seeks to better understand the melancholic state. Freud identifies 
melancholy as part of the work of mourning, acknowledging that mourning does not cease 
as he claimed in his early work, and he doesn’t subsume melancholia within mourning. 
Mourning is a continual and persistent state that is characterized by melancholia; it is not a 
process with a clear end. As a result the lost loved-object is not released from the subject’s 
psyche, and instead is incorporated and preserved in the mourner.14  
There is a clear drive to hold mourning over melancholia in contemporary theory 
because melancholia is still considered a pathological affect. Butler goes so far as to say that 
the “socially instituted foreclosure of the intelligible” political institution’s unwillingness to 
offer recognition through speech and acts is “socially instituted melancholia.” She likens the 
melancholic state itself to Antigone’s tomb.15 For Butler melancholy is not a viable political 
state, it is one that illustrates political oppression and is posed counter to the promise of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Derrida and Kierkegaard, whom Derrida draws from, attain to a similar understanding of mourning. See: The 
Work of Mourning, The Gift of Death, and The Work of Love.  
15 Judith Butler, Antigone’s Claim (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 80–81. 
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what she sees as the democratic work of mourning. Mourning and melancholy are drawn 
together only insofar as we try to move from melancholia to mourning, and in Butler’s work, 
from specific instances of mourning to what Stephen K. White calls a “persisting 
disposition, within which one attends more consciously to the kind of being one is.”16 The 
emphasis on mourning over melancholy is telling. The perceived pathological state of 
melancholy is seen as something to be overcome through its productive counterpart 
mourning. Melancholy is seen as the destructive, aggressive part of the process of mourning, 
which offers reconciliation and reparation. What world is it that we seek to be recognized 
by? What are we trying to repair? Is it not the state of things as they are? Is it not the vision 
of utopia that Wolin fears we have fallen into lock step with?  
In a similar vein, Wendy Brown’s essay “Resisting Left-Melancholia,” works through 
Freud’s essay via Walter Benjamin’s “Left Wing Melancholy.” Brown almost steps away 
from the idealization of mourning in her reflection on left wing politics in America, but she 
too calls for another form in arguing for a rich political vision of the future. Contrary to 
Butler, for Brown hope manifests as the ability to re-attach oneself to a new loved-object 
altogether, but one that still attains to an existent conception of democratic politics. Citing 
Freud she argues that meditation on melancholia represents a loss of a more ideal kind than 
mourning, where the object has not necessarily died, but has been lost as an object of love.  
She further reiterates Freud’s argument that we will often not know what has been precisely 
loved about the lost object, but that it is part of the subject transposing the love of the 
object onto oneself, and then losing it.17   Brown argues that the collective losses of the left 
—  without a viable political alternative to the capitalist system, and without a conviction of 
truth about the social order and a “rich moral political vision” to guide and sustain political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Stephen K. White, Sustaining Affirmation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 102. 
17 Wendy Brown, “Resisting Left Melancholy,” Boundary 2 26, no. 3 (October 1, 1999): 19–27. 
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work —  have left us in a state of disorder, lost without a way of life and course of pursuits. 
Brown’s conceptualization is politically problematic, because to say that we must have a 
visible alternative to capitalist politics charged with a rich moral vision is to reinstall through 
lamentation the same formula of hope that has left left-activists where they are while calling 
for a collective ethos to action. She forgoes Freud’s later work on mourning altogether, and 
suggests that we must look back in some new way and find what else was left behind without 
asking whether these losses are real, what we lost, and who has suffered the loss. Instead 
Brown asks, “Now our challenge would be to figure out who or what is this substitutive 
object. What do we hate that we might preserve the idealization of that romantic left 
promise? What do we punish that we might save the old guarantees of the Left from our 
wrathful disappointment?”18  These questions are misguided and are representative of her 
framing of citizenship and resistance in the language of hatred and injury. Instead of asking 
what the present looks like, Brown returns us to the question: What will the new love-object 
appear as? whereas Butler’s question at least asks how mourning enable solidarity and 
empower political action.  
Tom Dumm, contrary to Brown, turns back towards Wolin’s invocation of Adorno 
— arguing that memorializing the past does not necessarily mean dwelling on it. Rather, it is 
possible in the daily life of politics to carry the past with us while reconsidering it.  The space 
between past and present, which Wolin argues is compressed by time, Dumm sees as an 
opportunity for political theory to do the work of mourning while not turning away from 
melancholy altogether. “The turn towards the world from a place of loss is the turn towards 
politics, towards constructing common and uncommon spaces of agnostic exchange and 
misunderstanding, of revelation and projection, of new coinages and destructions, partial and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ibid., 22. 
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fragmentary, neither utopian nor dystopian, but, as Wolin to seems to suggest, and Emerson 
would endorse, encompassing both.”19  This is consistent with Freud’s own expansion on 
the states of mourning and melancholy, and it does not entirely foreclose the importance of 
melancholy. For those who experience a loss of a more profound kind, as Freud later 
realized, mourning never ceases. It is tempered through the passage of time and the 
reattachment to new loved-object, but the gap created by the original lost loved-object is 
only ever filled by others. The persistence of mourning is a form of melancholia; it is the 
persistence of the trace of the lost loved-object that can never fully be lost. The aggressive 
tendencies of melancholy that present during stages of mourning, that engage the destructive 
impulse and could lead to suicide, eventually subside. The individual is able to attach to new 
loved-object, but not without the trace of the other, and in some cases not without the 
narcissistic impulse that can drive individuals to attach to others in the first place. That is, 
attach in a way that allows us to see the other as another, as opposed to as an extension of 
oneself.  
 On the other hand, for Hannah Arendt and Walter Benjamin loss is a question framed 
within the language of temporality and history. It’s not simply a recovery of something that 
has been lost — to violence, to the world, to the passage of time — but rather an ontological 
imperative that shapes the way we conceive the world as it is, what it has become, and how it 
might be. The drive towards making sense of human experience and actions through reason 
and a form of moralized ethics leads us towards a faulty ontological device that masks 
moments of loss and mourning with a process of systematization by focusing on action. This 
faulty logic tells us that moments of collective loss like The Holocaust, for instance, are 
knowable in a way that allow us to believe we’ve mastered history and move forward justly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Thomas Dumm, “Political Theory for Losers,” in Vocations Of Political Theory (Minneapolis: Univ Of 
Minnesota Press, 2000), 161. 
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or democratically. This reasoning is the result of a conflation between morality and ethics 
that pushes us towards a superficial understanding of historical events and lived experiences 
by pushing us past them, assuming a shallow understanding that forces one to ask: “What 
can I do?” Many thinkers have paradoxically turned to a moralized ethical frame, which calls 
for some form of political action, imposing the same rational logic that enabled such events 
to occur in the first place. At the end of On Totalitarianism, when Arendt turns to the concept 
of loneliness to understand the rise of Third Reich, she captures the totalizing effect loss can 
have upon an individual, a community, a country. Loss and mourning are provocative 
conceptual categories to contemporary theorists, because they offer the illusion of intimacy 
through the construction of community, erasing the loneliness or individuating sentiments 
that we often associate with them.  
In contrast to much of the work being done around loss which focuses on 
democratic political action, in the chapters that follow I turn to the works of Hannah 
Arendt, Walter Benjamin, Sheldon Wolin, and Theodor Adorno to argue that experiences of 
loss do not necessarily open up space for democratic political action, nor should they. My 
work turns towards the tradition of critical theory in order to emphasize the need for 
contemplation and thinking, while questioning what is meant by democratic political action. 
I argue that moments of individual and collective loss historically have not opened up space 
for democratic resistance, but rather are utilized by institutions of power to maximize 
sovereign authority. The tradition of critical theory that informs my work illustrates how 
loss, mourning, and melancholia can be utilized conceptually to critique normative narratives 
around loss and mourning.  
Chapter one focuses on the work of Hannah Arendt. While Arendtian scholars have 
focused on Arendt as a theorist of beginnings, natality, promise, and forgiveness, I argue that 
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her work is primarily concerned with loss. For Arendt, a radical form of loss that she 
conceptualizes as worldly alienation defines modernity. This form of loss reflects several 
elements in the development of postmodernity. The first is the loss of tradition, which for 
Arendt was preceded by the breakdown between language and thought, as she lays out in the 
beginning of The Human Condition. With the loss of tradition came the loss of authority. In a 
lecture on the history of political theory delivered in 1955 Arendt said,  “The thread of 
tradition is broken. And in this field of theory, there can be no authority without tradition.” 
She argues, “The breakdown came about in stages, but really in the political sense only with 
the appearance of totalitarian regimes.”20  For Arendt there is a direct relationship between 
the two-fold loss of tradition and authority within the modern world, and the work of doing 
political theory.  
Central to Arendt’s conceptualization of totalitarianism is a discussion of the 
functionality of despair and hope in response to the losses that occurred during the Second 
World War. This language of despair and hope is found throughout Arendt’s writings, 
beginning with her early work on the Jewish question in the 1940s. Arendt understood the 
condition of despair to be at the root of both political theory and totalitarianism. 
 In thinking about the future of political resistance, Arendt turns towards the works of 
Franz Kafka and the French poet René Char in order to conceptualize the spirit of resistance 
in what she terms the lost treasure of the revolution. Her reflections on resistance, time, and 
the loss of tradition in modernity turn us towards the breakdown between language and 
thought, which Arendt returned to throughout her career. Here we see her conceptualizing 
the Gap-Space, which represents a radical break with the tradition of linear temporality in 
order to think about how we might repair the loss of authenticity that accompanied the rise 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Hannah Arendt, “The History of Political Theory” (LOC Archives), 1955. 
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of fascist authority and modernity. Her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy further illustrate 
the relationship between the Gap-Space and a form of present politics, which refuses both 
modernity’s futurism and the moralization of ethics by turning towards what she calls critical 
thinking.  
 In Chapter two I turn from the work of Hannah Arendt to the writings of Walter 
Benjamin. In this chapter I explore Benjamin’s conceptions of history and time through his 
discussion of Trauerspiel and sovereignty. Turning to Benjamin’s essays “Theses on The 
Philosophy of History”, The Origins of German Tragic Drama, and his reflections in Berlin 
Childhood Around 1900, I examine how he helps us to think about the relationship between 
our understanding of history, a critical temporality, and the politics of mourning. Moving to 
Benjamin’s conception of Messianic time in his works on history, we see an alternative 
understanding of loss and mourning open up, which is bound to his understanding of 
historical materialism and historicity.  
 Benjamin’s refusal to accept a linear temporality offers a counter-argument to 
contemporary theory’s politicized mourning, which relies upon a Freudian notion of 
mourning and linear progression. Benjamin’s work dismembers this constellation, and while 
Adorno might have seen this as a move motivated by materialism, for Benjamin it was a 
rejection of time’s order and the march of progress. It is also a critique of crude Marxian 
methods, which willfully accepted narratives of progress while ignoring humankind’s decent 
into barbarism. For Benjamin the question wasn’t one of mourning or moving past loss, it 
was one of redemption. 
Chapter three offers a reading of Sheldon Wolin and his turn towards Theodor 
Adorno. Wolin offers a different perspective on the relationship between loss and political 
theory in turning towards Adorno’s Minima Moralia. 
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 Instead of calling for a new form of resistance or political action, Wolin turns us 
towards Adorno’s Minima Moralia in order to invoke or re-call the theorist back to the 
vocation of political theory as a historically grounded practice, emphasizing the need for a 
critical vantage point, while calling attention to systemic political problems as opposed to 
technical ones. “Invocation” he writes, “is vocation’s conscience recalling it to the cross-
grained.” Wolin’s argument implies that something has been lost, that the world has been 
diminished in some way and he is unsure as to whether or not we can reclaim the vocation 
of political theory. Wolin’s understanding of invocation is akin to Adorno’s understanding of 
melancholia in Minima Moralia, which refuses what he calls a “vain hope” for redemption. In 
this way, Wolin and Adorno allow us to break apart the constructed relationship between 
mourning and melancholia. 
  In the conclusion, I will return to the problem of the ethical turn within 
contemporary political theory, exploring how this reading of loss and mourning in relation to 
politics affects the way contemporary political theorists think about questions of political 
action. In no way is this meant to be a conclusive study of loss or mourning in contemporary 
political theory. There are many primary and secondary authors I have been unable to 
address. I am working with a small segment of the ethical turn in contemporary political 
theory, which remains absently present. 
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CHAPTER I 
HANNAH ARENDT: LOSS AND TOTALITARIANISM 
 
Human history knows no story more difficult to tell. The monstrous equality in innocence that is its inevitable 
leitmotif destroys the very basis on which history is produced — which is, namely our capacity to comprehend 
an event no matter how distant we are from it.  
                           —  Hannah Arendt 
 
There can be little doubt that the experience of the loss of what was most familiar to her lay close to the root 
of what later became central to her understanding of the political: her sharp, firm, unwavering distinction 
between the private and the public realms of human existence. 
                       —  Jerome Kohn 
 
In this chapter I explore why we should resist the urge to focus on Arendt as a 
theorist of democratic political action, and instead turn to her as a theorist of loss in order to 
see how experiences of loss can open up space for critical thinking and understanding. 
Arendt’s work turns from the experiences of The Holocaust to a place of critical thinking 
and present politics that asks us to reckon with the losses of the twentieth century. While 
many contemporary theorists have recognized the significance of the losses experienced in 
the twentieth century, and have tried to deal with the fall-out of the twentieth, many 
conceptualize loss as an opportunity for democratic political action. The desire to find a 
space for democratic political action during and after moments of loss and crisis illustrate a 
desire to get past loss and move forward. This desire to get past, as we will see in Arendt’s 
writing on Thinking and her lectures on Kant, is part of the philosophical turn towards 
futurist thinking, which relies upon a kind of mastery of history and moralization of ethics.  
Introduction 
Hannah Arendt is usually characterized as a theorist concerned with the public 
sphere and political action. A stringent divide between public and private drives much of her 
work; and yet, there is a dimension to her work, an undercurrent that is concerned with the 
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problem of loss. It is out of the experiences of loss in the twentieth century that Arendt’s 
first major themes as a political theorist emerges, addressing the Jewish Question at the 
onset of World War Two. It is from the experience of totalitarianism that Arendt begins to 
conceptualize what she thinks is a necessary framework for understanding the terror of The 
Holocaust. Arendt did not draw an explicit connection between The Origins of Totalitarianism 
and The Human Condition, but there can be little doubt that she was directly addressing the 
horrors of the twentieth century in both works. In order to offer an account of the rise of 
totalitarianism, modernity, and the human condition Arendt moved from a place of loss to 
the relationship between thinking and action in order to develop a conceptual framework for 
understanding that relies upon strict divisions between the public, private, and social 
spheres.21 
While some have tried to explicate the relationship between Arendt’s earlier works 
on The Holocaust that directly deal with loss and totalitarianism, others have focused on her 
later more developed works which rely upon these conceptual divisions between public, 
private, and social. In recent years many have turned away from Arendt as a critic of 
modernity and theorist of the twentieth century to think about how her theoretical categories 
of natality, the public sphere, plurality, promise, and political action might be applicable to 
democratic politics. For example, in Bonnie Honig’s reading of On Revolution she concludes 
that Arendt “theorizes a powerful and suggestive practice of political authority for 
modernity, a practice that is uniquely activist and appropriate for a democratic politics.”22 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The closest Arendt comes to relating The Human Condition to The Origins of Totalitarianism comes at the end of 
in “The Vita Activa and the Modern Age.” Here she reiterates her line of reasoning from imperialism to 
totalitarianism, describing modern worldly alienation. Arendt argues that “The German example shows very 
clearly that under modern conditions the expropriation of people, the destruction of objects, and the 
devastation of cities will turn out to be a radical stimulant for a process, not of mere recovery, but of a quicker 
and more efficient accumulation of wealth…”21 
22 B. Honig, “Declarations of Independence: Arendt and Derrida on the Problem of Founding a Republic,” The 
American Political Science Review 85, no. 1 (March 1, 1991): 97. 
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She writes, “Arendt is ambivalent about the disappearance of authority in modernity. On the 
one hand, it marks the restoration of the world to humanity, the recovery of human 
worldliness, and new possibilities of innovative political action. On the other hand, it leaves 
the modern world bereft of the very things that once secured the foundation and longevity 
of the Roman republic: tradition, religion, and authority.”23 Honig’s formulation illustrates 
the contemporary attempt to render Arendt as a theorist of democratic political action, while 
at the same time criticizing her work for being too nostalgic. Honig focuses on plurality and 
the performative qualities of speech and action that Arendt outlines in The Human Condition 
without considering the ways in which Arendt develops these concepts against totalitarian 
practices. Upholding Arendt’s conception of plurality and heroic action to argue for a kind 
of democratic politics ignores the specific set of historical conditions that Arendt is 
responding to.  The focus on the promise of democratic politics also ignores Arendt’s 
arguments in The Life of the Mind and her lectures on Kant, which argue the publicity of 
action is problematic because it conflates the public and private sphere. Honig is right to 
focus on the critique of authority in politics in the context of founding, as Arendt makes 
clear her own frustration with living in a secular world, which lacks authority; but for Arendt 
this loss of authority indicates the metaphysical breakdown of the modern world, as well as a 
the loss of moral terms by which we can act as democratic citizens in the first place. Arendt 
emphasizes critical thinking as a form of political action, because she understands the 
collapse between thinking and action in philosophical terms as the reason for the emergence 
of Nazi ideology and ensuing mass participation. It is the absence of thinking, Denklosigkeit, 
which allowed for the loss of authority and tradition to occur in the first place. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23Ibid., 98. 
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 Consequentially, political action is not synonymous with mass politics or protest 
politics for Arendt. As Jeffrey Isaac argues in “Oasis in the Desert” Arendt’s argument in On 
Revolution points us towards a more “vigorous” conception of political action. Vigorous, in 
Isaac’s terms, becomes a misnomer for critical thinking, meant to further separate political 
action from unthinking mass political action.24 While Isaac tries to save Arendt as a 
democrat, he also recognizes the “deep tension between mass behavior and meaningful 
citizenship” in Arendt’s writing.25 Arendt’s resistance to mass political behavior was a direct 
reflection of her philosophical resistance to totalitarian ideology. For Arendt, the totalitarian 
ideology deployed by the Nazi party helped to invent mass political behavior. Mass political 
thinking became synonymous with Nazi politics. In “Tradition and the Modern Age” Arendt 
writes, “[h]owever, neither the twentieth century aftermath nor the nineteenth century 
rebellion against tradition actually caused the break in our history. This sprang from a chaos 
of mass-perplexities on the political scene and of the mass-opinions in the spiritual sphere, 
which the totalitarian movements, through terror and ideology, crystalized into a new form 
of government and domination.”26 The collapse of tradition and authority, which is so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Another prominent place this critique is featured in Arendt’s work is Crisis in the Republic, where she criticizes 
the American protest movement.  
25 Jeffrey Issac, “Oasis in the Desert,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 157. Isaac focuses on Arendt’s appraisal of the New England town councils. Isaac 
writes: “Tragically, these political forms did not-perhaps could not last.” This is tragic because, as Arendt 
insists, ‘whenever knowing and doing part company freedom is lost.’ The councils incarnated a vigorous, 
participatory, and egalitarian politics. The represented ‘a new form of government that would permit every 
member of the modern egalitarian society to become a ‘participator’ in public affairs.’” 
26 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 26. Arendt goes on to draw out the relationship between action and Nazi 
ideology: “Totalitarian domination as an established fact, which in its unprecedentedness cannot be 
comprehended through the usual categories of political thought, and whose ‘crimes’ cannot be judged by 
traditional moral standards or punished within the legal framework of our civilization, has broken the 
continuity of Occidental history. The break in our tradition is now an accomplished fact. It is neither the result 
of anyone’s deliberate choice nor subject to further decision.” 
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essential to Arendt’s conception of totalitarian loss, was directly related to the way Nazi 
ideology operated in society.27  
  In situating Arendt’s historical analysis Jerome Kohn writes “[i]t is only in the 
present dimension of time —  that which lies between past and future, between what has 
already happened and what has yet to come —  that freedom and the priority of the political 
for the human world fully emerge in Arendt’s thought.”28 Arendt turned to write about 
freedom and “the priority of the political” in the world only after the emergence of 
totalitarianism. In order to think through what was happening, Arendt had to re-shape the 
political theoretical frameworks of understanding, so that theory in itself and the world of 
thinking could act critically. The space between past and future, where understanding is 
possible, represented an opportunity for critical thinking as political action for Arendt. This 
form of present politics, however, required a new theoretical framework, which was capable 
of addressing the contemporary condition. 
 In this way, Kohn situates Arendt’s conception of political freedom in The Human 
Condition alongside her account of totalitarianism. The categories that Arendt presents us 
with in The Human Condition like labor, work, and action, represent the “human world” as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 In “Arendt’s Theory of Totalitarianism”, Margaret Canovan traces Arendt’s argument from The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, and the development of totalitarianism as a concept in the twentieth century. Canovan conflates 
Arendt’s problem of finding a theoretical framework for understanding totalitarianism and her conception of 
beginning anew. She writes, quoting Arendt, “‘Everything we know of totalitarianism demonstrates a horrible 
originality . . . . its very actions constitute a break with all our traditions . . .’ In other words, totalitarianism 
illustrated the human capacity to begin, that power to think and act in ways that are new, contingent, and 
unpredictable that looms so large in her mature political theory.” While Arendt does struggle with the concept 
of beginning anew in some of her early reflections on totalitarianism, she does not use the language Canovan is 
imposing upon her thinking about the newness of totalitarianism itself. Arendt mostly speaks of beginning 
anew in terms of natality, reflecting upon the fact that individuals were murdered for simply having been born 
Jewish. Totalitarianism is a new phenomenon, for Arendt, but that does not relate to her conception of action 
or beginning. What is so problematic about the emergence of totalitarianism is the absolute destructive power of 
Nazi ideology that belonged to no philosophical tradition, and possessed no form of utilitarian logic. The 
phenomenal quality of Nazi ideology meant that we needed to develop new categories of understanding in 
order to account for the Holocaust historically.  Margaret Canovan, “Arendt’s Theory of Totalitarianism,” in 
The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt (Cambridge, U.K.  ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
27.  
28 Dana Villa, The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt (Cambridge, U.K.  ; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 113. 
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opposed to the “inhuman world of totalitarianism.”29 The categories that Arendt 
conceptualizes represent the divisions between the different spheres of life in which we 
move. The inhuman world of totalitarianism was characterized by the loss of movement, the 
ability to appear in the world, and the complete isolation of individuals from one another 
and society, so freedom had to be defined by the re-institution of political divisions. The 
lines drawn between the spheres of life were so forcefully guarded in Arendt’s work because 
they represented the capacity for movement, which signified freedom. The lines between 
social, public, and private make the world a dynamic place, as opposed to a singular static 
reality where all are reduced to one. In other words, when and where we see the boundaries 
between public, social, and private collapsing we should be wary, according to Arendt. The 
spheres of life we go between enable us to move, and when they collapse in upon each 
other, we have nowhere left to go. If movement is the mark of democracy, and boundaries 
enable movement, we should safeguard the lines of demarcation.  
 In “Arendt and the Holocaust”, Mary Dietz takes up Arendt’s question “What does 
it mean to comprehend what is historically incomprehensible?” in order to illustrate the 
relationship between totalitarianism and The Human Condition. The unprecedented collapse of 
tradition and authority that Arendt observes poses a theoretical and a political problem for 
understanding what happened. Dietz cites Arendt’s correspondence with Eric Voeglin where 
she asks “how to write historically about something — totalitarianism — which I did not 
want to conserve but on the contrary felt engaged to destroy.”30 Dietz argues the task of 
comprehending The Holocaust posed at least two problems of thinking for Arendt. The 
first, historiography, “led Arendt to criticize the standard approaches of the social sciences as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Ibid., 126. 
30 Mary Dietz, “Arendt and the Holocaust,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt (Cambridge, U.K.  ; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 87–88. 
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well as political theoretical frameworks . . .”31 The second problem Arendt faces was how 
“we move from what we know of the event to how to remember it.”32 Dietz’s understanding 
of the twofold problem Arendt faced in her work creates an obvious divide between 
Arendt’s early accounts of The Holocaust and her later, political theoretical work which 
deals more directly with comprehension, remembering, and thinking. The factual reality of 
The Holocaust is easy enough to state as Arendt herself demonstrates, but it is far more 
difficult to comprehend and remember. In Arendt’s 1946 review of The Black Book “The 
Image of Hell” she writes: “The facts are: that six million Jews, six million human beings, 
were helplessly, and in most cases unsuspectingly, dragged to their deaths.”33 She goes on to 
lay out the linear and systematic terror and murder of the Jewish people in order to 
demonstrate how facts are not enough for understanding. The story in itself is not enough 
either, and so neither the historians nor the logicians can make sense of what Arendt saw as 
an entirely new phenomenon in the world.  
 In order to begin to comprehend what had happened Arendt turned to a theoretical 
form of understanding the world in The Human Condition. The totalitarian destruction of all 
pre-existing tradition and authority, which lead led to the complete collapse of the social and 
public spheres of life, left the world in an abyss of wreckage. Arendt wrote “[a]fter 
Auschwitz, the space one occupies if one ‘pulls back’ from the abyss is ‘an empty space 
where there are no longer nations and peoples but only individuals,’ in a way that leaves the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid., 88. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Hannah Arendt, “The Aftermath of Nazi Rule,” in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and 
Totalitarianism (New York, N.Y.: Schocken, 2005), 198. 
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factual territory behind and national pasts surmounted . . .”34 Arendt’s account in The Human 
Condition is an attempt to offer a political conceptualization back from the abyss.35    
 
I. The Loss of Tradition and Authority  
  “...The institution of concentration and extermination camps, that is, the 
social conditions within them as well as their function in the larger terror apparatus to 
totalitarian regimes, may very likely become that unexpected phenomenon, that stumbling 
block on the road toward the proper understanding of contemporary politics and society 
which must cause social scientists and historical scholars to reconsider their hitherto 
unquestioned fundamental preconceptions regarding the course of the world and human 
behavior.” 
              —  Hannah Arendt 
 
 For Arendt, loss is a manifold concept that encompasses the material losses of life 
from the loss of home, to the death of loved ones, to the loss of the world, or the loss of 
traditions that offer continuity in social and political life. She uses the word loss in a variety 
of contexts: polemically, sincerely, and descriptively. The word itself is not a conceptual 
category for Arendt, but it is used to signal the collapse of something that no longer exists, 
some piece of life taken away by totalitarian force.36 In order to begin to think about Arendt 
as a theorist of loss, we must turn to her work on the two-fold loss of tradition and authority 
in modernity. Although Arendt wrote essays directly addressing the conceptual losses of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Dietz, “Arendt and the Holocaust,” 89. 
35 In a similar vein to Dietz and Kohn, Lisa Disch focuses on Arendt’s undefined concept of the storyteller, in 
“Storytelling as Critical Understanding”. Here, Disch argues that in order to facilitate the process of 
understanding what happened, Arendt turns to the art of storytelling as a model for critical understanding that 
lies beyond historical narrative and wholly outside the methodologically driven frameworks of some social 
science. Disch works to make clear the relationship between Arendt’s early and under-read writings on the 
Holocaust that grapples with the problem of understanding the phenomenon of totalitarianism. The a priori 
assumptions of social science techniques regarding human behavior, and the utilitarian logic that governed how 
theoretical frameworks were applied to individual actions and institutions, were simply not fit for 
comprehending the Holocaust. 
36 For example: “For the Jews the destruction of the content of history means the loss of all historical ties…” 
Hannah Arendt, “The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question,” in The Jewish Writings (New York: Schocken, 
2008), 15. 
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tradition and authority in Between Past and Future, it is necessary to look back to her 
contextualized accounts of this twofold loss from her earlier work.  
In several of Arendt’s early works she argues that we need to think of new frames for 
understanding The Holocaust, because our traditional categories of understanding are not 
adequate. Nazi ideology overturned all pre-existing frameworks of understanding and 
tradition, challenging our moral and ethical systems of thought to reach beyond conceptions 
of right or wrong, good or evil. In 1945, Arendt wrote “Approaches to the ‘German 
Problem’”, which explores how Nazi propaganda turned to the “playground of history”, in 
order to destroy all preceding traditions. For Arendt, Nazism marked the negation of 
tradition in the modern world. “Ideologically speaking,” she writes, “Nazism begins with no 
traditional basis at all, and it would be better to realize the danger of this radical negation of 
tradition, which was the main feature of Nazism from the beginning.”37 The negation of 
tradition created space for the Nazi party to emerge in Europe, causing the “instantaneous 
breakdown” of all existing social and political structures.38 The Nazi party only claimed a 
philosophical tradition insofar as they could turn to it in order to justify or give logic to their 
own propaganda. 
 Although the loss of tradition and authority are more theoretical in nature, they 
opened up the necessary space for material losses to occur. The social stigma, laws, and 
forced emigration that followed from the Nazis’ rise to power led to the collapse of the 
social sphere. For Arendt, this collapse of the social sphere signifies the loss of humanity, 
erasing the boundaries between public and private life.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Hannah Arendt, “Approaches to the German Problem,” in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, 
Exile, and Totalitarianism (New York, N.Y.: Schocken, 2005), 108. 
38 Ibid., 111. 
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The Nazi party’s propaganda simultaneously appealed to the philosophical traditions 
of the nineteenth century and the nostalgia for nationalism during the First World War while 
negating them. Given the economic, social, and political reality of Germany after WWI, the 
Nazi party transformed the ideology of nihilism from the “quiet realm of mere negation” to 
the “intoxication of destruction as an actual experience.”39 Here, Arendt exposes the space 
between the tradition of nihilism as an emergent philosophy in the German tradition and the 
Nazi party’s utilization of this language to appeal to a sense of destruction. “When the Nazis 
appealed to the famous Fronterlebnis, they not only aroused memories of the Volksgemeinsschaft 
of the trenches, but even more sweet recollections of a time of extraordinary activity and 
power of destruction enjoyed by the individual.”40 The appeal of solidarity in society through 
nostalgia became a dangerous vehicle for political organization. The Nazis played to the 
people who had fought in the trenches of WWI and their memories of belonging to 
something extraordinary, along with their capacity for destruction as a form of collective 
political action. The element of total destruction inherent in Nazi ideology meant that we 
could no longer apply our usual, utilitarian, moral categories. Arendt writes, “[i]ts current 
application to politics, by no means a monopoly of totalitarian thinking, indicates a profound 
crisis in applying our usual standards of right and wrong.”41  
 For Arendt, the Nazis’ utilization of nostalgia as a political instrument to enlist men 
and women to their cause was built upon nothing. In addition to being built upon nothing, it 
also opened the door for a new form of neoconservative politics. In “The Eggs Speak Up” 
Arendt argues that it is one thing to love the past and revere the dead, but quite another to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ibid., 110. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Hannah Arendt, “The Eggs Speak Up,” in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and 
Totalitarianism (New York, N.Y.: Schocken, 2005), 283. 
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“pretend that the past is alive in the sense that it is in our power to return to it.”42 The 
question in this essay unasked but at hand is: How is one supposed to return to the silence 
of good and normalcy in political and social life? Arendt observes that the silence of 
normalcy is actually much more difficult to withstand than the chaos of crisis. She writes “it 
is much harder not to lose one’s head in our century during the periods of quiet and 
seemingly normalcy than to keep one’s head during the panic of catastrophes.” The brief 
silences of a century so filled with war and violence, were only testament to the story Arendt 
was trying to tell.43  
 In this vein, neo-conservatism only came into existence when the traditions and 
customs began to crumble away because of Nazi ideology. Conservatism, she writes “has 
always maintained the superiority of silent customs and inarticulate tradition in political life 
over programs, ideas, and formulae.”44 This form of conservatism that finds solace in the 
sentiment of nostalgia is seeking to escape from reality. The German Problem, as Arendt 
defines it, is the wish to move past what happened and not come to terms with it, let alone 
understand the condition of the present informed by the past — to recall only that time 
before the war, or look to the time when Germany will be forgotten by the next war. This 
form of absent memory was very politically troublesome for Arendt. She writes, “Watching 
the Germans busily stumble through the ruins of a thousand years of their own history, 
shrugging their shoulders at the destroyed landmarks or resentful when reminded of the 
deeds of horror that haunt the surrounding world, one comes to realize that busyness has 
become their chief defense against reality. And one wants to cry out: But this is not real — 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Ibid. 
43 Arendt writes, “The emergence of ex-radical or communists as conservatives after the war,” she argues, were 
“attempts at over-shouting the threatening silence that reveals itself the very moment we look tot he past for 
advice in our present situation.” Ibid., 282–283. 
44 Ibid. Neo-conservatism is my word here. Arendt writes “conservatism”, but she is inflecting it with elements 
of what has become neo-conservatism.  
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real are the ruins, real are the past horrors, real are the dead whom you have forgotten.”45 
Arendt was troubled by the busyness she observed, which appeared to ignore what had 
happened. “Tradition and the past are not the same.” Arendt argues that tradition guides us 
through the past, and what is “worth remembering.” In order to understand what happened, 
the recent past could not be ignored.46  
 The philosophical break with tradition that Arendt observes with the emergence of 
Nazi ideology made it impossible to understand what had happened. Nazi terror broke down 
all existing semblances of reality, which created a twofold challenge: to return to the reality 
of politics on one hand, and find a way to offer an understanding of what happened on the 
other. In Arendt’s 1946 essay, “The Image of Hell”, she writes that “From innocence 
beyond virtue and guilt beyond vice, from a hell where all Jews were of necessity angelic and 
all Germans diabolical, we must return to the reality of politics.”47 In the same stroke, Arendt 
writes that “The story in itself can yield nothing but sorrow and despair”, arguing that we 
must move beyond the telling of what happened towards a critical understanding of how and 
why this form of terror was able to emerge and operate.  
 The often polemical language deployed by Arendt in her early account of The 
Holocaust demonstrates the problem of understanding that she is struggling with. In “The 
Aftermath of Nazi Rule”, written in 1950 Arendt writes:  
The melancholy story of postwar Germany is not one of missed opportunities. In 
our eagerness to find a definite culprit and definable mistakes we tend to overlook 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ibid., 254. In her essay “The Aftermath of Nazi rule”, Arendt writes: “But no where in this nightmare of 
destruction and horror less felt and less talked about than in Germany itself. A lack of response is evident 
everywhere, and it is difficult to say whether this signifies a half-conscious refusal to yield to grief or a genuine 
inability to feel. Amid the ruins, Germans mail each other picture postcards still showing the cathedrals and 
market places, the public buildings and bridges that no longer exist. And the indifference with which they walk 
through the rubble has its exact counterpart in the absence of mourning for the dead, or in the apathy with 
which they react, or, rather, fail to react, to the fate of the refugees in their midst.” Arendt, “The Aftermath of 
Nazi Rule,” 23. 
46 Hannah Arendt, “The History of Political Theory” (LOC Arendt Archives), 1955. 
47 Arendt, Essays in Understanding, p. 200.  
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the more fundamental lessons this story may teach us. When all is said and done the 
twofold question remains: What could one reasonably expect from a people after 
twelve years of totalitarian rule? What could one reasonably expect from an 
occupation confronted with the impossible task of putting back on its feet a people 
that had lost the ground from under it?48  
 
Apart from the questions Arendt poses, what is interesting and revealing is her formulation. 
What is the eagerness to find a culprit? Why are we so quick to write the story, to 
memorialize the event and move on? In Between Past and Future Arendt offers a brief 
definition of crisis writing, “A crisis forces us back to the questions themselves and requires 
from us either new or old answers, but in any case direct judgments. A crisis becomes a 
disaster only when we respond to it with preformed judgments, that is, with prejudices. Such 
as attitude not only sharpens the crisis but makes us forfeit the experience of reality and the 
opportunity for reflection it provides.”49 A crisis ought to force us to ask the basic questions 
and critically think about what happened, while forfeiting our pre-judgments and opinions, 
or reliance upon familiar frameworks of reason. This is another way of saying that pre-
existing frameworks cannot help us to understand something like The Holocaust. If we try, 
the pre-existing frames of understanding and reason impose themselves on the event, 
precluding reality. The way we think about crises is directly related to whether or not our 
understanding, and remembering of the event, correlates to reality. 
For Arendt it was necessary to develop a conscious understanding of the present 
condition and the events that led to it.  In her preface to The Origins of Totalitarianism she says 
that “[c]omprehension . . . means, rather, examining and bearing consciously the burden that 
events have placed upon us — neither denying their existence nor submitting meekly to their 
weight as though everything that in fact happened could not have happened otherwise. 
Comprehension, in short, means the unpremeditated, attentive facing up to, and resisting of, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48  Ibid., 268.  
49 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 171. 
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reality — whatever it may be or might have been.”50 Arendt is wary of the impulse to try and 
re-write history, or look-back retrospectively, at what might have happened, or happened 
differently.  For Arendt, the attempt at beginning to offer a history of anti-semitism was at 
attempt at creating consciousness of the present condition, of understanding. For Arendt, 
the events of the twentieth century demonstrated not what might or might not have 
occurred, but the extreme actions that men were capable of, and understanding for Arendt, 
as a category, was politically necessary for humanity.  
The tendency to try or want to rely upon existing theoretical frameworks to 
understand contemporary events is illustrative of our dependence as theorists upon frames 
of reason and conceptual categories, which are informed by some claim of morality. To 
indict something as good or bad, just, democratic, or totalitarian is to pretend that the faculty 
of judgment, which guides moral precepts, is at all related to reason. The emergence of Nazi 
ideology, which relied upon pre-existing philosophical traditions and collective sentiment, 
caused the loss of tradition because it revealed the fragility of reason and constructed 
categories that gave form to a sense of tradition in the first place. In the same vein, trying to 
account for the past, or what happened, is equally problematic because it reinforces the same 
dominant logic of mastery whereby the past and experience can be known through reason, 
judgment, and conceptual categories.  
II. Understanding Loss: “We Refugees” & The Human Condit ion   
To live an entirely private life means above all to be deprived of things essential to a truly human life: 
to be deprived of the reality that comes from being seen and heard by others, to be deprived of an 
‘objective’ relationship with them that comes from being related to and separated from them through 
the intermediary of a common world of things, to be deprived of the possibility of achieving 
something more permanent than life itself.       
                                                                    —  Hannah Arendt 
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In trying to understand the rise of totalitarianism Arendt needed to construct and guard the 
spheres of life that create space for meaningful speech and action. To speak and act are not 
enough in this world to make us human. This is nowhere better seen than in Arendt’s 
account of the number of suicides that occurred among Jewish people before and after the 
war in her essay “We Refugees.” Written in 1943, two years after Arendt emigrated to the 
United States, “We Refugees” was written for the Jewish journal Menorah. 51 Penned before 
The Origins of Totalitarianism, and most of Arendt’s well-known published work, “We 
Refugees” directly explores the relationship between loss and politics, discussing the 
progressive collapse of the public and private spheres of existence, which led to total 
alienation from the human world. The essay is uncharacteristic of Arendt’s work because it 
represents a rare instance where she reflects upon her Jewish identity.52 It also demonstrates 
how fleeting any distinction is that one might attempt to draw between public and private. 
Despite Arendt’s personal experience with being a Jewish woman during The Holocaust, for 
her, this history is entirely political in nature. Arendt was concerned with how such 
experiences could be addressed and processed at a political level. This is not to say that it is 
devoid of emotion or passion, but rather that it moves beyond the sentimentality of private 
feelings often associated with loss. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Thomas Dumm offers an account of “We Refugees” in his book Loneliness as a Way of Life to illustrate how 
Arendt conceptualized the relationship between loss and loneliness. Giorgio Agamben’s “We Refugees” was 
published as part of a symposium, and draw out Arendt’s definition of “refugee.” Hanna Fenichel Pitkin draws 
from Arendt’s opening passages of “We Refugees” in her essay “Conformism, Housekeeping, and the Attack 
of the Blob: The Origins of Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the Social” in Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt. 
Her essay uses Arendt’s “We Refugees” to draw out the distinction between pariahs and parvenues. Bat Ami 
Bar On utilizes “We Refugees” in “Women in Dark Times: Rahel Varnhagen, Rosa Luxembourg, Hannah 
Arendt, and Me,” drawing out how the loss that refugees experiences foreclosed the possibility of political 
action in both public and private. In Chapter 4 of Elizabeth Young-Bruehl’s For the Love of the World she makes 
several references to “We Refugees” to illustrate how Arendt attempted to “understand her people.” Elisabeth 
Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 117. 
52 We know from her correspondence with Jaspers that Arendt drew a sharp line between her private identity 
and public Jewishness. When Jaspers asked her if she was a German or a Jew, Arendt wrote “I just noticed your 
question [again] about whether I’m a German or Jew. To be perfectly honest, it doesn’t matter to me in the 
least on a personal and individual level.” Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers, Correspondence 1926-1969 (San Diego: 
Mariner Books, 1993), 31. 
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 “We Refugees” touches upon several themes that recur throughout much of 
Arendt’s later writing. “The space between men” that constitutes “the world,” pariahs and 
parvenus, and the distinction between the public and private that comprise the conceptual 
framework Arendt uses to think about the condition of Jewish refugees.53 Throughout the 
essay, Arendt develops a relationship between the personal experiences of loss and the 
concepts and categories she uses to explain the rise of totalitarianism. In this essay, loss is 
put at the center of Arendt’s reflections on politics, and her personal existence as a refugee 
in the world. The emergence of statelessness that Arendt traces in The Origins of Totalitarianism 
leads to the destruction of the social sphere and subsequent collapse of the private and 
public spheres of life.54  
 Arendt begins “We Refugees” by saying “[i]n the first place, we don’t like to be 
called ‘refugees.’” She goes on to explain that historically the term “refugee” has been 
applied to people who have been forced to flee due to political persecution, or because of 
some crime they had committed. Therefore, those driven from Hitler’s Reich merely because 
of their Jewish identity preferred to be called “newcomers” or “immigrants,” because they 
had not committed any crimes. She notes that Jewish people were even more sensitive to 
being called refugees before the war, because they wanted to be perceived as having left on 
their own accord, to start over, or “rebuild” their lives. She writes, “[i]n order to rebuild 
one’s life one has to be strong and an optimist.”55 Arendt’s essay unfolds as she reflects on 
the condition of Jewish refugees and the number of suicides that occurred during and after 
the war. Arendt quickly reveals how the optimism that was necessary to “rebuild one’s life” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53Hannah Arendt, “We Refugees,” in The Jewish Writings (New York: Schocken, 2008), 264–74. 
54 Arendt writes, “Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man without losing his essential quality as 
man, his human dignity. Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from humanity.”54 It is only when individuals 
are no longer able to participate in a polity, to belong to a homeland that they lose all essential human dignity, 
because they no longer belong anywhere. 
55 Arendt, “We Refugees,” 264. 
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was created in the face of loss. Her disdain for this kind of feigned optimism forcefully 
reminds readers that it is really an expression of deep despair, wrought from the many 
material and worldly losses that people suffered. She writes:  
Our optimism, is indeed, admirable, even if we say so ourselves. The story of our 
struggle has finally become known. We lost our home, which means the familiarity of 
daily life. We lost our occupation, which means the confidence that we are of some 
use in this world. We lost our language, which means the naturalness of reactions, 
the simplicity of gestures, the unaffected expression of feelings. We left our relatives 
in the Polish ghettos and our best friends have been killed in concentration camps, 
and that means the rupture of our private lives.56  
 
Arendt’s list of losses reaches past the components of daily life, and into the core of human 
identity and what makes life livable in this world — a sense of familiarity that allows us to 
move freely, an occupation that gives one’s day-to-day life meaning, language that threads 
tradition and heritage together, the human lives lost, the friends and family. The tangible 
things one acquire, a home and belongings, the personal ties people form with family, 
friends and community, all of these crucial elements of identity were stripped away. With the 
physical disappearance of so much came the loss of meaning. With the loss of home came 
the loss of familiarity with “daily life;” with the loss of language came the loss of 
“naturalness” or the ability to express one’s genuine form of self without affect or pretense. 
With the loss of loved ones, came the loss of those ties that make social life livable. For 
Arendt, these losses totaled a loss of the world.  
 Throughout the essay, Arendt expresses much frustration with the idea that the 
Jewish people were somehow, in the face of this catastrophe, supposed to be “optimistic,” 
supposed to be able to move on and turn away from what was happening. The sardonic use 
of optimistic language that Arendt begins with quickly becomes a reflection of the despair of 
a displaced people, and recognition that optimism was a superficial attempt to overcome 	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these losses. The need to forget and be optimistic becomes one and the same for the Jewish 
people who were forced to emigrate. Reflecting on this desperate optimism Arendt 
emphasizes the fact that such forgetting is not possible, writing: “No, there is something 
wrong with our optimism. There are those odd optimists among us who, having made a lot 
of optimistic speeches, go home and turn on the gas or make use of a skyscraper in a quite 
unexpected way.”57  
 From this passage one can see how Arendt drew a line between the public need to 
appear optimistic and the inability to be so in private. The private quality of such loss cannot 
be forced to appear differently in public, giving speeches, or talking with others. Even 
though they were told not to speak about what was happening, they knew the truth. When 
they could not bear it any longer, their false optimism and forced happiness gave way to 
complete hopelessness. “Their optimism is the vain attempt to keep head above water. 
Behind this kind of cheerfulness, they constantly struggle with despair themselves. Finally, 
they die of a kind of selfishness.”58 The attempt to forget, to not mention “such events,” to 
adopt a new home, to “not be Jews” was in vain. It was the denial of their lives and their 
selves, of what was left after all had been taken, that led them to reject the world by taking 
their own lives. In this way, it is easy to see how Arendt takes such a hard-lined view of 
optimism, but moreover, how the losses that occurred shaped her understanding of what it 
meant to live in a world where all boundaries between public and private life had been 
destroyed. 
 If we read this essay through the more fully developed concepts of public, private, and 
social that Arendt presents us with in The Human Condition, then we see how this essay 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Ibid., 266. 
58 Ibid., 268. This uncharacteristic essay of Arendt’s has been largely unattended to, and yet, it is one of the rare 
instances where she talks about her personal experience with the Holocaust.  
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complicates her dichotomy between public and private. The collapse of optimism in “We 
Refugees” is also the collapse of the public/private distinction. The Jewish people, of which 
Arendt writes, were supposed to appear in public to be optimistic, but privately were living 
in a state of despair. When they were no longer able to put on the public face of optimism 
and deal with the reality of their private lives, they transgressed both realms of living by 
committing suicide. The social realm of existence had been extinguished by the rise of 
authoritarianism, and so they were pushed into an isolated existence, where they could chose 
between living or living as someone else. With the collapse of the social realm, individuals 
could no longer appear in public as they once had. The simplest act of buying bread became 
a reflection of their rejection from the world. Arendt writes, “We try the best we can to fit 
into a world where you have to be sort of politically minded when you buy your food.”59 
They were no longer welcome where they had once been at home. 
 The collapse of the social sphere pushed individuals into extreme states of hope and 
despair. For Arendt, hope and despair are intimately bound to the loss of one’s self, and the 
conditions that make life bearable and livable in this world. In Arendt’s first preface to The 
Origins of Totalitarianism she repeats the same hesitation about both hope and despair, writing: 
“The central events of our time are no less effectively forgotten by those committed to a 
belief in an unavoidable doom, than by those who have given themselves up to a reckless 
optimism . . . This book has been written against a background of both reckless optimism 
and reckless despair.”60  This passage, which sets the tone for her dissection of anti-
Semitism, is a direct reflection of Arendt’s earlier thoughts in “We Refugees” on the effects 
of authoritarianism.  For Arendt, the turn to “blind optimism” or “reckless despair” 
constitutes the same dangerous turn away from the present. The denial of loss, of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Ibid., 269. 
60 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Vii. . 
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experiences of our existence, affects the way that we interact with the world and one 
another. “The less we are free to decide who we are or to live as we like, the more we try to 
put up a front, to hide the facts, to play roles.”61 If we are told to “forget” then we are in 
essence denying a part of ourselves and forced to live a factitious existence. Moreover, for 
Arendt, to deny one’s past and not come to a critical understanding of the world is 
tantamount to denying the human condition, and turning away from humanity.  
 In a later published essay, “The Destruction of Six Million,” Arendt turns to Polish 
poet Tadeusz Borowski to express her political frustration with hope and optimism. Born in 
1922, Borowski was only a teenager when the Nazis invaded Poland, and was captured and 
sent to Auschwitz and Dachau. He was liberated from Dachau on May 1, 1945 by U.S. 
Troops; and it was only six years later that he too took his own life, by putting his head in a 
gas oven. In his collection of short stories and poetry, This Way for the Gas, Ladies and 
Gentleman, Borowski captures the silence of hope that Arendt tries to overturn. Borowski 
writes:  
Despite the madness of war, we lived for a world that would be different. . . . Do you really think that, 
without the hope that such a world is possible, that the rights of man will be restored again, we could 
stand the concentration camp even for one day? It is that very hope that makes people go without a 
murmur to the gas chambers, keeps them from risking a revolt, paralyses them into numb inactivity. It 
is hope that breaks down family ties, makes mothers renounce their children, or wives sell their bodies 
for bread, or husbands kill. It is hope that compels man to hold on to one more day of life, because 
that day may be the day of liberation. Ah, and not even the hope for a different, better word, but 
simply for life, a life of peace and rest. Never before in the history of mankind has hope been stronger 
than man, but never also has it done so much harm as it has in this war, in this concentration camp. 
We were never taught how to give up hope, and this is why today we perish in gas chambers.62 
 
For Borowski, giving up hope means rejecting life for life’s sake. Their hope was not hope 
for a better world, but for life itself. It was a hope for a return to the world before 
concentration camps and Hitler’s regime. It was a hope that what they once had might be 
restored. This form of hope enables a form of action that is destructive, breaking down 	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62 Tadeusz Borowski, This Way for the Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen, Reissue edition (New York: Penguin Classics, 
1992), 122. 
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social ties and human relationships. In this example, as Borowski puts it, hope overcame 
man. In this sense hope is rooted not in the will to live in the present, but in the will to 
return to a former space in time. Hope becomes a powerful instrument of control and 
destruction. For Borowski, clinging to hope meant helping the Nazi soldiers unload the rail 
cars and herd people towards the gas chambers in return for pillaging the goods they 
brought. Borowski could remain hopeful as long as his silence kept him alive.63  
From this quotation, Arendt describes how “hope” becomes a dangerous barrier to 
life, critical thinking and ultimately remembering what happened. In the face of despair, 
hope and optimism are usually seen as mechanisms that enable us to reach up and out of the 
crises we are facing however, for Arendt and Borowski they only dig one in further. Arendt 
writes, “Hope stronger than man — that means hope destructive of the very humanity of 
man.”64 When hope disables action, and optimism forces individuals to turn back upon 
themselves away from the world, not only does the distinction between public and private 
life collapse, but also humanity is extinguished. This is no clearer than in Borowski’s own 
account of Auschwitz, where he describes in morbid detail how one learned to live within 
the hope of rescue through participating in the horror of what was going on. The despair of 
the real weighed too heavily on any attempt to find reprieve in optimism.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 In Arendt’s reading of Borowski we can see part of her argument for the banality of evil emerging. She was 
desperately concerned with how the prisoners themselves became complacent in the Holocaust. Borowski’s 
harrowing account offers a narration of such co-optation for the means of survival. He writes: “The train has 
been emptied. A thin, pock-marked S.S. Man peers inside, shakes his head in disgust and motions to our group, 
pointing his finger at the door. ‘Rein. Clean it up!’ We climb inside. In the corners amid the human excrement 
and abandoned wrist-watches lie squashed, trampled infants, naked little monsters with enormous heads and 
bloated bellies. We carry them out like chickens, holding several in each hand. ‘Don’t take them to the trucks, 
pass them on to the women,’ says the S.S. man, lighting a cigarette”. Ibid., 39. 
64 Arendt, The Jewish Writings, 494.The end of this quote reads: “And even more destructive perhaps of this 
humanity was the very innocence of those who were trapped in this whole monstrosity, namely, that they were 
innocent even from the viewpoint of their persecutors. Their apathy was to a very large extent the almost 
physical, automatic response to the challenge of absolute meaninglessness.” Jerome Kohn also uses this description 
to explain Arendt’s understanding of terror and totalitarianism. Perhaps what is most shocking about Tadeusz’ 
account, and explains his own suicide, are the stories and poetry of his own account of Auschwitz. He was 
forced to participate in the daily execution of Jews in order to save his own life.  
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 At the other extreme, another way optimism manifested itself during and after World 
War II was in parvenus, and the desire to turn away from one’s previous life. To illustrate 
the severity of this personality, and the mentality that the Jewish people were encouraged to 
accept, Arendt offers the story of Mr. Cohn in “We Refugees.” Mr. Cohn was from Berlin, 
where he claimed to have “always been 150 percent German. In 1933 that Mr. Cohn found 
refuge in Prague and very quickly became a convinced Czech patriot - as true and as loyal as 
Czech patriot as he had been a German one.” When Mr. Cohn was forced to leave Prague 
under Nazi pressure in 1933, he found a new home in Vienna where he became an Austrian 
“super-patriot.” And on and on Mr. Cohn became the best citizen wherever he was forced 
to emigrate to. Arendt ends her anecdote with the addendum that “As long as Mr. Cohn 
can’t make up his mind to be what he actually is, a Jew, nobody can foretell all the mad 
changes he will still have to go through.”65 Mr. Cohn suffers from what Arendt calls “the 
desperate confusion of these Ulysses-wanderers” who are unable to admit to themselves 
their true identities.  
 In Arendt’s rejection of the parvenu's optimism to start over, she praises the pariah 
who chooses to take his or her identity and carry it through the world. The pariah’s refusal 
to forget is a way of acknowledging the losses that have shaped their identity as Jewish 
people. Arendt writes, “A man who wants to lose his self discovers, indeed, the possibilities 
of human existence, which are infinite, as infinite as is creation. But the recovering of a new 
personality is as difficult - and as hopeless - as a new creation of the world.”66 Arendt 
recognizes the limitless possibilities of human existence, the constant and ever renewing 
potential to begin again. When a person tries to willfully lose himself, though, and become 
someone else, it is completely hopeless. In attempt to cast off their pasts, some were trying 	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to forget the experiences that had brought them into the present. Such forgetting is not 
possible, and so such absolute creation is not possible either.  
 Arendt’s reflection on the desire to start over also reveals the desperate relationship 
between hope and despair. It illustrates how hope becomes a superficial attempt at becoming 
and appearing as someone else in the world. Loss might create the possibility to begin anew, 
but contained within this possibility is the knowledge that one will never be able to assimilate 
or regain one’s former self. The opportunity to start over, in other words, is forced. This 
experience of loss is constituted by an extreme deprivation of familiar life. For Arendt, the 
condition of the Jewish people has always been one of constant homelessness. As she begins 
“We Refugees” she reiterates the statelessness, or loss of one’s homeland. The loss of one’s 
home is not only central to Arendt’s understanding of the Jewish Question, but it reveals 
how fundamental a home for people (not necessarily a people) is to the human condition. 
The experience of this new kind of loss of home —  a loss that comes about through the 
denial of one’s very self, permeates Arendt’s Jewish writings. This lesson extends beyond the 
displacement of the European Jews. Under the right conditions any or all of us may be 
subjected to a similar experience of loss.  
 In “We Refugees” Arendt begins with “we lost our home” and moves to the broader 
losses of language, community and country of origin. Not having a proper place, somewhere 
to call home, the Jewish people were doubly cast out —  from both their private homes and 
their homelands. Arendt writes, “The Jews have been wandering around the world for two 
thousand years, taking in tow their belongings, their children, and their nostalgia for a 
homeland.”67 Without any specific place to call home, the entire world paradoxically 
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becomes one’s shelter, and life is not defined in terms of allegiance to some place, but rather 
becomes life in and of itself.68  
 The loss of the world that occurs when the components of daily life have been 
stripped away through violence is a kind of loss that exposes the bareness of life. Without a 
place to call home, the Jewish people were pushed out into the world and forced to emigrate; 
but once there, they were told to forget why they left and become citizens of a new state. In 
this experience, Arendt saw how the internalization of loss ultimately led to a turn away from 
humanity and the world. For Arendt, increasing worldly alienation that arose out of the 
collapse of the social distinctly marked the modern era. In The Human Condition, defining the 
private realm of property Arendt argues that the modern condition can be characterized by 
the “mass phenomenon of loneliness.” In the private sphere, the mass loneliness takes on its 
most anti-human form. She writes, “The reason for this extremity is that mass society not 
only destroys the public realm but the private as well, deprived men not only of their place in 
the world but of their private home, where they once felt sheltered from the world and 
where, at any rate, even those excluded from the world could find a substitute in the warmth 
of the hearth and the limited reality of family life.”69 As we see in The Human Condition, 
modernity is characterized by loss for Arendt, and this ultimate loss of meaning and 
alienation from the world was signaled by the loss of tradition, authority, public space, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 This is an element of what it means to be cosmopolitan - cosmopolitan is often a disparaging term for the 
Jews in the twentieth century. Giorgio Agamben also takes much from this Arendtian formulation in his Bare 
Life. In Agamben’s “We Refugees” he wrote that “Arendt” overturned “the condition of refugee and person 
without a country - which she herself was living - in order to propose this conditions as a the paradigm of a 
new historical consciousness.” Agamben emphasizes Arendt’s insistence that continued assimilation from one 
country to the next is not possible, and rather refugees should stop wanting to be assimilated. Agamben also 
draws out Arendt’s critique of the nation-state as specifically important to the purported claim that the nation-
state is declining. Soon all will become refugees in one form, he writes, and we will need to take the refugee as 
the figure from which to reconsider the “rights of man.” He supports his argument drawing on Arendt’s 
chapter in The Origins of Totalitarianism where she draws together “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End 
of the Rights of Man.” Giorgio Agamben. Hannah Arendt, “We Refugees,” in The Jewish Writings, (New York: 
Schocken, 2008), 264–74. Symposium. 1995, No. 49 (2), Summer, Pages: 114-119. 
69 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 59. 
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culture, and identity. All of these losses meant vulnerability to authoritarian and totalitarian 
regimes.70 In the twentieth century, with the creation of mass society and culture, 
bureaucratization and animalistic laboring, Arendt saw public freedom, tradition, 
individualism and humanity being eclipsed by private values, atomization, loneliness and a 
disregard for the past.   
 In this vein, being with others is at the heart of Arendt’s concept of worldliness. In 
many of Arendt’s writings on Jewishness and totalitarianism she refers to what she calls the 
“space between men.” The space between men for Arendt is what constitutes the world in 
common by allowing men to stand apart and yet together. In other words, it allows men to 
remain individuals while participating in society and politics, interacting with one another. 
To be, to exist in the world is necessarily a kind of social relationship that is constituted by 
the space between, and facilitated by a shared language that renders “experience” intelligible 
and the world “common.” Perhaps most notably in The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt 
argues that this loss of space between men created room for totalitarianism to take hold. She 
argues that when this space was destroyed, men became susceptible to totalitarianism, 
because they lost the social world that they shared in common with others, including their 
individuality and ability to think independently.71 
 Isolation in the political sphere is parallel to loneliness in the social sphere.72 While 
loneliness as a kind of solitary condition contains positive potential for thought, it also 
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creates the bare conditions of existence that opened up room for ideological tyranny, while 
simultaneously closing the space that allows individuals to move freely in the world. Terror 
destroys the capacity of motion, by eliminating the space between men that is required for 
action.73 The loss of individuality, in this instance, which leads to the reduction of individual 
men to masses does not open up space for action. Rather, this loss delimits what is possible. 
When people are confined to a solitary existence within the world that still houses the 
artifices of past social conditions, they are forced to turn back upon themselves. “What 
makes loneliness so unbearable is the loss of one’s own self which can be realized in 
solitude, but confirmed in its identity only by the trusting and trustworthy company of my 
equals.  In this situation man loses trust in himself as the partner of his thoughts and that 
elementary confidence in the world which is necessary to make experiences at all.  Self and 
world, capacity for thought and experience are lost at the same time.”74  Creating the 
conditions of isolation and loneliness are germane to totalitarian movements.  
  For Arendt, despair springs from man’s inability to act in the world, and action is 
directly related to her conception of freedom. Caught between past and future, without any 
inheritance, man is left in a state of despair unable to look either backwards or forwards. The 
loss of tradition in the modern world left us in darkness.  
Arendt used the public/private distinction in her work as a conceptual framework to 
restore a form of democratic life before the rise of totalitarianism. Democratic in this sense, 
for Arendt, does not mean a form of democratic political action. Instead, it becomes a kind 
of reclamation where the wasteland of political life is somehow rendered fertile for critical 
thinking. It represents an opportunity not to return to a moral-ethical framework of good, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
person feel myself deserted by all human companionship—without being isolated” Arendt, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, 613. 
73 Ibid., 600. 
74 Ibid., 614. 
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bad, democratic &c., before the war, but rather the opportunity to understand why those 
very frameworks came into being and were undone. In order to talk about understanding 
history versus mastering history Arendt’s later works on Thinking, Willing, and Judging and 
lectures on Kant examine the concept of history in itself, and our own relation to time in 
thinking through political moments and events.  
 
III. In Between Past and Future: The Gap Space 
The fact that we usually treat matters of good and evil in courses in ‘morals’ or ‘ethics’ may indicate how 
little we know about them, for morals comes from mores and ethics from ēthos, the Latin and the Greek 
words for customs and habit, the Latin word being associated with rules of behavior, whereas the Greek 
is derived from habitat, like our ‘habits.’75  
—  Hannah Arendt 
   
                                                                                     
The space between past and future is a theoretical way of grasping the space between 
offering a historical account of something that has past, like the holocaust, and the 
responsibility we have to think about it. In Between Past and Future, Arendt primarily talks 
about loss in the sense that tradition is being lost to time and the progression of philosophy. 
The tradition that Arendt points us to in this essay is the relationship between the desires for 
secular immortality versus religious immortality. With the breakdown of the Hebrew-
Christian traditions in modernity, the notions of beginning and end no longer resonated. 
Arendt writes, “The growing meaninglessness of the modern world is perhaps nowhere 
more clearly foreshadowed than in this identification of meaning and end.”76 Arendt uses 
this foreshadowing to criticize the utilitarian philosophy of means and ends that was “so 
characteristic of the earlier industrial phase of the modern age.”77 The framework of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Arendt, The Human Condition, 5. 
76  Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954, 78. 
77 Ibid., 79. 
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utilitarian logic, driven by the desire to find meaning, leads us to nothing more than patterns 
along a historical or ahistorical timeline. Arendt argues that the problem with this utilitarian 
logic is that only patterns make sense because only patterns can be made.  
 From Arendt’s account of secular meaninglessness in the modern age and critique of 
utilitarian philosophy, which sought and seeks to create meaning, she transitions to an 
introspective critique of her own attempts to account for totalitarianism. She writes: 
“In my studies on totalitarianism I tried to show that the totalitarian phenomenon, 
with its striking anti-utilitarian traits and its strange disregard for factuality, is based 
in the last analysis on the conviction that everything is possible — and not just 
permitted, morally or otherwise, as was the case with early nihilism. The totalitarian 
systems tend to demonstrate that action can be based on any hypothesis and that, in 
the course of consistently guided action, the particular hypothesis will become true, 
will become actual, factual reality. The assumption which underlies consistent action 
can be as mad as it pleases; it will always end in producing facts which are then 
‘objectively’ true.”78 
 
Arendt’s critiques of pragmatism and utilitarianism as attempts to impose meaning on 
modern man here are directly connected to her own attempt to understand how it was that 
totalitarian ideology was able to arise in the twentieth century. The philosophical traditions 
that dominated the nineteenth century were guided by the emergence of nihilism, which 
opened up space for a kind of mathematical or logical understanding of the world and 
individual’s actions.  With the emergence of nihilism Arendt argues the moral standards by 
which we could judge the world were loss. Faith and reason were lost. Without standards, 
faith, or reason, totalitarian ideology had the ability to justify anything it pleased through a 
claim to objectivity.  
As we just saw this critique is present nearly twenty years prior in Arendt’s work. 
Except instead of struggling to comprehend how Nazi ideology was able to emerge from the 
existent philosophical tradition, calling upon it while destroying it at the same time, Arendt is 	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struggling to find a way to understand the historian’s desire to derive meaning from history. 
The difference between the two sets of work is the difference of time, which has given us an 
opportunity to both process and offer an account of The Holocaust. Here we see the 
problems of history and remembering come together in Arendt’s indirect critique of 
contemporary social scientific methods. The “social techniques” of understanding only have 
to wait for a “certain time-lag” in order to construct meaning from history. The drive to find 
meaning or truth from history, to make sense of how something could have happened, for 
Arendt, in part explains the loss of tradition. 
 This form of accounting for past events is wholly problematic for Arendt. Not only 
does she draw an indirect comparison between forms of social scientific technique and 
totalitarianism itself, which relied upon invented meaning, but she also blames this form of 
historiography in part for the “growing worldly alienation” that characterizes the modern 
age. The existing frameworks of understanding were not only inadequate for understanding 
the events of The Holocaust, but were and are dangerous for the way we think about 
history.79 
IV. Crit i ca l  Thinking and The Gap Space  
 In order to understand the events of the twentieth century Arendt proposes a kind of 
understanding that tethers one neither to the past or the future. As opposed to offering an 
account of something that has occurred, she turns us away from an understanding of action 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Arendt writes, “In the situation of radical-world alienation, neither history nor nature is at all conceivable. 
This two fold loss of the world—the loss of nature and the loss of the human artifice in the widest sense, 
which would include all history—has left behind it a society of men who, without a common world which 
would at once relate and separate them, either live in a desperate lonely separation or are pressed together in a 
mass.” In this passage we see Arendt bring together her critique of theorists and historians attempts to impose 
meaning with pre-existing frameworks of understanding and reason, and her own understanding of the effect 
of Nazi ideology. The language of “desperate lonely separation or pressed together in a mass” directly reflects 
her argument in The Origins of Totalitarianism where she describes how Nazi propaganda and law forced 
individuals into a state of isolation and loneliness.  
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towards her rendering of thinking and judging through her lectures on Kant to argue for what she 
calls critical thinking.80 This theoretical model for dealing with loss is useful to the work of 
political theory because it demonstrates how political action can exist as a form of critical 
engagement and thought. By politicizing loss Arendt meant that it had to be made public, 
intelligible and visible. For Arendt, thinking is not a private activity. She further explicates 
this argument in her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy writing, “critical thinking, while still a 
solitary business, does not cut itself off from ‘all others.’ To be sure, it still goes on in 
isolation, but by the force of imagination it makes the others present and thus moves in a 
space that is potentially public, open to all sides; in other words it adopts Kant’s world 
citizen. To think with an enlarged mentality means that one trains one’s imagination to go 
visiting.”81 Critical thinking, according to Arendt, necessarily implies communicability. The 
act of thinking depends on others. It is a form of analysis that allows one to engage in a 
conversation with oneself with others.82 Thinking critically means discriminately 
incorporating the ideas one receives from others into one’s own thought and applying critical 
standards to one’s own thought. It is a self-engaged, conscious, form of thinking. Critical 
thinking, for Arendt, is a form of plurality that anticipates one’s ideas will enter the world, 
and relies upon the notion that men cannot think alone. The act of thinking is necessarily 
dependent upon the condition of plurality in the world, and thinking will eventually, 
inevitably, lead to action. 
 In Arendt’s preface to Thinking she begins by sharing her own thought process during 
the Eichmann trial, which led her to the concept the banality of evil. She questions her arrival 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Arendt’s Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy were published posthumously and meant to complete what would 
have been her final work on judging. As such, the published volume I am working with begins with her post-
script to Thinking.  
81 Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 43. 
82 Ibid., 42. “To think critically applies not only to doctrines and concepts one receives from others, to the 
prejudices and traditions one inherits; it is precisely by applying critical standards to one’s own thought that one 
learns the art of critical thought.” 
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at the concept, and with what right she used it. It was the trial of Eichmann, she tells us, that 
prompted her study of “those moral questions” and ethics.83 She writes, “There was no sign 
in him of firm ideological convictions or of specific evil motives, and the only notable 
characteristic one could detect in his past behavior as well as in his behavior during the trial 
and through-out the pre-trial examination was something entirely negative: it was not 
stupidity but thoughtlessness.”84 She goes on to write, “It was this absence of thinking — which 
is so ordinary an experience in our everyday life, where we have hardly the time, let alone the 
inclination, to stop and think — that awakened my interest.” In these passages we hear 
reverberations of her prelude to The Human Condition and the axiom she presents us with: to 
stop and think what we are doing. Instead of trying to understand the world through some 
form of reason or historiography, in these last works Arendt subtly argues for a new form of 
political action as critical thinking. While this work can be considered more philosophical 
than theoretical, perhaps it has more to contribute to the work of political theory in the 
sense that Arendt is attempting to offer an example and study of the art of critical thinking 
as a political activity. Whereas The Human Condition attempts to understand the world 
through the construction of conceptual categories, and The Origins of Totalitarianism attempts 
to offer a historical account of how totalitarianism emerged, in these late works on thinking, 
willing, and judging we see the essential questions that drove her studies: What motivates 
“evil-doing?” And, can thinking make men stop “evil-doing”?85 If evil in the world is the 
consequence of acting without thinking, than perhaps critical thinking in itself is a form of 
political action that can prevent such events from happening again. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind (New York: Mariner Books, 1981), 6. 
84 Ibid., 4 .“Clichés, stock phrases, adherence to conventional, standardized codes of expression and conduct 
have the socially recognized function of protecting us against reality, that is, against the claim on our thinking 
attention that all events and facts make by virtue of their existence.” 
85 Ibid., 5. 
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 Unsatisfied with the answers philosophy and her previous undertakings had provided 
to these questions, Arendt calls her own study of The Human Condition into question. She 
reminds us that the work began “more modestly” as in inquiry into “The Vita Activa”: “I 
had been concerned with the problem of Action, the oldest concern of political theory, and 
what had always troubled me about it was that the very term I adopted for my reflections on 
the matter, namely, vita active, was coined by men who were devoted to the contemplative 
way of life and who looked upon all kinds of being alive from that perspective.”86 Wary of 
the distinction that thinkers like Marx had drawn between thinking and praxis, Arendt moves 
to undermine this dichotomy by arguing that thinking is not an isolated activity that occurs 
in some sort of desert. She argues that while thinking is often seen as a sort of withdrawal 
from the world, it is not. And, not only is it not a wholly solitary activity, but it shouldn’t be 
seen in contrast to acting in the world, or notions of action or praxis. This false philosophical 
division between thinking and action, she argues, made men like Eichmann possible. She 
writes: 
 “If, as I had suggested before, the ability to tell right from wrong should turn 
out to have anything to do with the ability to think, then we must be able to ‘demand’ 
its exercise from every sane person, no matter how erudite or ignorant, intelligent or 
stupid, he may happen to be . . . In any event, the matter can no longer be left to 
‘specialists’ as though thinking, like higher mathematics, were the monopoly of a 
specialized discipline.”87  
 
Acting without thinking is, for Arendt, the problem that political philosophy must address. 
 Arendt turns to Kant’s distinction between Vernunft and Verstand — reason and 
intellect — to further draw thinking as an activity apart from “the scandal of reason.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Ibid., 6. She also gestures towards her use of Cato at the end of “The Vita Activa” in The Human Condition 
quoting “‘never is man more active than when he does nothing, never is he less alone than when he is by 
himself.’”  
87 Ibid., 13. The full quote reads: “Kant—in this respect almost alone among the philosophers—was much 
bothered by the common opinion that philosophy is only for the few, precisely because of its moral 
implications, and he once observed that ‘stupidity is caused by a wicked heart.’ This is not true: absence of 
thought is not stupidity; it can be found in highly intelligent people, and wicked heart is not its cause; it is 
probably the other way round, that wickedness may be caused but absence of thought.” 
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“Hence, the distinction between the two faculties, reason and intellect, coincides with a 
distinction between two altogether different mental activities, thinking and knowing, and two 
altogether different concerns, meaning, in the first category, and cognition, in the second.”88 
Reason is inspired by the search for meaning, but truth and meaning are not the same thing. 
Arendt blames the failure to make this distinction on the refusal to draw a distinction 
between reason and intellect, between “the ‘urgent need’ to think and the ‘desire to know’.”89 
The desire to know is motivated by the need to understand, to make sense of, to reason 
something, but this urgent desire does not lead men towards truth, and often times it turns 
us away from both truth and thinking. Put another way, thinking is instrumentalized in the 
name of reason, and this is why it is important for Arendt to return to Kant and draw a 
distinction between thinking and critical thinking.  
 In order for Arendt to address this question of thinking, it is necessary to address what 
she calls the “thinking ego” and Cato’s question: Where do we go when we think? In 
Thinking, Arendt argues that the in-between Gap Space is a place where the present can open 
up and thinking can occur. It is a space for consciousness in the present moment. She asks 
where the thinking ego is located in time, and whether its relentless activity can be 
temporally determined. In Between Past and Future Arendt draws a line between the loss of 
tradition within a historical framework and the collapse of tradition that enabled 
totalitarianism. One consequence of the loss of tradition in modernity meant that our 
inheritance to the past had been cut off. Future generations are born into an old world, and 
are submissive to the old order of things, but no longer have a tradition to look back upon in 
order to justify their own position in the continuum of life. With this loss, the linear 
temporal framework of the world collapsed, and man no longer positioned between past and 	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future ascended above the linear line of beginning and end. For Arendt, this loss of tradition 
is directly related to modern worldly alienation. 
 In this sense, Arendt thinks about tradition temporally and spatially. Turning to the 
poetic works of René Char and Franz Kafka at the beginning of Between Past and Future, 
Arendt conceptualizes the relationship between history and time in order to explain what 
tradition was and how it has ceased to exist. She writes:  
This gap (between past and future) was bridged over by what, since the Romans, we have called 
tradition. That this tradition has worn thinner and thinner as the modern age progressed is a secret to 
nobody. When the thread of tradition finally broke, the gap between past and future ceased to be a 
condition peculiar only to the activity of thought and restricted as an experience to those few who 
made thinking their primary business. It became a tangible reality and perplexity for all; that is it 
became a fact of political relevance.  
 
Here, we see Arendt describing the relationship between the loss of tradition, thinking as an 
activity, and the Gap Space between past and future. She turns to Kafka here and later in The 
Life of the Mind while discussing thinking, because of the visualization he offers in breaking 
with a linear conception of time.90 In Kafka’s parable “He” man is caught between the forces 
of past and future man, elevated to look down upon the continuum of time, creating space 
between himself and the world. This space between past and future is necessary, for Arendt, 
for critically thinking about the present moment of time and the act of thinking. Arendt’s 
conception of this gap-space described in the language of time is critical to understanding 
her argument for a present politics in the face of totalitarian society.  
 In both texts she first turns to French poet René Char in order to drawn upon Kafka 
— the relationship between the two is one of poetic expression. For Arendt they: 
analyze poetically our ‘inner state’ in regard to time, of which we are aware when we have withdrawn 
from the appearances and find our mental activities recoiling characteristically upon themselves . . . The 
inner time sensation arises when we are not entirely absorbed by the absent non-visibles we are thinking 
about but begin to direct our attention onto activity itself. In this situation past and future are equally 
present precisely because they are equally absent from our sense; thus the no-longer of the past is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 In the subsection on “The gap between past and future: the nunc stans” Arendt writes, “In the hope of 
finding out where the activity can be temporally determined, I shall turn to one of Kafka’s parables, which in 
my opinion, deals precisely with this matter.” Ibid., 203. 
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transformed by virtue of the spatial metaphor into something lying behind us and not-yet of the future 
into something that approaches us from ahead.91  
 
This Gap Space opens up an inner state that experiences time differently. Arendt describes 
the Gap Space as “a timeless time in which men can create timeless work with which to 
transcend their own finiteness.”92 The “absent non-visibles” we are thinking about represent 
that which is present, but which is not materially present. Past and future collide in the 
mental apparition of what has past, and its projection onto the future. However, both past 
and future are absent in the materiality from life in the moment.  
 Arendt points out that this conception of the in-between is different from our 
ordinary everyday use of the tenses past, present, future, where past signifies yesterday, 
present today, and future tomorrow. “Here too,” she writes, “the present is surrounded by 
the past and future inasmuch as it remains the fixed point from which we take our bearings, 
looking back or looking forward.”93 We take our bearings; find some standing ground from 
the present that is sandwiched between the past and future. The linear time continuum that 
we occupy is dependent upon the activities of daily life and our individual activity in the 
world: yesterday I did this, tomorrow I will do that. The non-thinking self that moves in the 
world experiences time differently from the thinking ego, which exists independent of spatial 
circumstances. This dichotomy is reflective of Arendt’s philosophical training, and essential 
to understanding how we are in the world.  The difference Arendt highlight points to 
fragmentation of the mind — that which exists in the material bio-historical world and is 
subject to the constraints of temporality, and that which exists outside the world and free of 
what she calls “spatial circumstances.” To think is to leave the world, which we are materially 
constrained by. Where do we go when we think? The home philosophers find in the world of 	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thinking is different from the material world that we must engage with daily, but these 
worlds do not exist wholly apart from one another. This distinction in the spatial 
construction of the Subject is essential to Arendt’s conception of thinking and acting.   
 The spatiality of everyday life allows us to conceptualize the past as lying behind and 
the future as lying ahead. Consciousness is the “I” sense, not the thinking ego, which is 
driven by our condition of material nature, what Arendt calls historical biographical time. 
This is an important distinction for Arendt’s conception of thinking. The material ego is not 
subject to the constraints of material life. Arendt describes the Gap Space as “a timeless time 
in which men can create timeless work with which to transcend their own finiteness.”94 The 
present is timeless, since time only exists in the past or future tenses.  
 That this Gap cannot be left to us by tradition is perhaps what Arendt means when 
she begins “The Gap Between Past and Future” with this passage from René Char- Notre 
heritage n’est precede d’aucun testament - “our inheritance was left to us by no testament.”95 
Arendt reads Char’s melancholy reflections on the French resistance to think about what she 
calls “the lost treasure of revolution.” If we read Arendt’s preface to Between Past and Future 
alongside Thinking, her use of Char and Kafka come into focus. She writes “After a few short 
years they were liberated from what they originally had thought to be a ‘burden’ and thrown 
back into what they now knew to be the weightless irrelevance of their personal affairs, once 
more separate from ‘the world of reality’ by an epaisseur triste, the ‘sad opaqueness’ of a 
private life centered about nothing but itself.” Arendt understood the in-between moment of 
resistance and revolution, politically motivated, to be a space where freedom could come 
into existence, where thought could be guided by something other than the “sad 
opaqueness” of private life. What lies at the center of our political thought, from what point 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 211. 
95 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 3. 
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do we turn? What center do we turn to? The material, historical, and biographical self, which 
is the self that goes about the daily activities of life? Or, the thinking ego that stands apart 
from the mind that shares an intimate relationship with the material impressions the world 
leaves upon the self? 
 The treasure that Char found in the resistance, as Arendt summarizes it, is that “they 
had discovered that he who ‘joined the Resistance, found himself,” that he ceased to be ‘in 
quest of [himself] without mastery, in naked unsatisfaction,’ that he no longer suspected 
himself of ‘insincerity,’ of being ‘a carping, suspicious actor of life,’ that they could afford ‘to 
go naked.’ In this nakedness, stripped of all masks — of those which society assigns to its 
members as well as those which the individual fabricates for himself in his psychological 
reactions against society — they had been visited for the first time in their lives by an 
apparition of freedom . . .”96 That they had become challengers points to the antagonistic 
nature of our ability to reflect and think about the world around us, to create the space 
necessary for reflection to be observers of the event or spectacle. Here again we see a 
difference emerge between the material ego and the thinking ego — Arendt turns to Char to 
draw out the differences between the two. In what circumstances can we cast off our 
fabricated masks, our socially constructed sense of identity? How do we thoughtfully interact 
with the world around us while preserving our own individual freedom? How do we become 
and remain conscious critical thinkers? In contrast to society, in the trenches, in the 
experience of resistance, Char found freedom and was able escape the demands of society.  
 Arendt’s critique of the private sphere of life is methodical and dissatisfying. What she 
does not explicitly say, but is found in reading her use of Char across On Revolution, Between 
Past and Future, and Thinking, is an indictment against the banality of private day-to-day life, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Ibid., 4. 
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and the social realm of interaction where we must conform or put on masks. The public 
space that Arendt envisions is not necessarily one of politics, but rather a space from which 
one can exist as oneself, in a critical capacity, without succumbing to the privacy that drives 
us away from the world, or the impressions that social life marks us with.  
Conclusion 
 Arendt’s conception of the Gap Space and non-time is similar and different from 
Benjamin’s conception of crystallization and homogenous empty time, which we will see in 
the next chapter. Much like Arendt, Benjamin turns to poets to consider the relationship 
between time and experience. “It seems plausible”, Arendt writes, “that Benjamin, whose 
spiritual existence had been formed and informed by Goethe, a poet and not a philosopher, 
and whose interest was almost exclusively aroused by poets and novelists, although he had 
studied philosophy, should have found it easier to communicate with poets than with 
theoreticians, whether of the dialectical or metaphysical variety.”97 As Arendt describes, 
Benjamin has the great gift of thinking poetically without being a poet, and certainly this 
compliment can be extended to her own writing as well. However, their relationships with 
poetics lead to a great difference in their conceptions of time, history, and tradition. Whereas 
Arendt relies upon a kind of detached metaphysical understanding of time separating out 
bio-historical narrative from non-time, Benjamin’s mysticism combined with his Marxism 
leads to his distinction between homogenous empty time (capitalist time) and crystallization 
(a way to revolt against capitalist time).  
 Much like Arendt, time is central to Benjamin’s understanding of the world. If Arendt 
divided up the world with conceptions of spheres and realms of living, then Benjamin did so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Hannah Arendt “Walter Benjamin: 1892-1940” in Walter Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections (New 
York: Schocken, 1969), 14. 
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with forms of time. Time, for Benjamin, is central to understanding the instruments of 
domination, practices of power, the possibility of resistance to power, and the promise of 
redemption. In The Origins of German Tragic Drama Benjamin discusses Historical time, tragic 
time, mythic time, individual time, messianic time, and musical time in order to offer an 
account of the melancholy mourning play, while critiquing (then) contemporary notions of 
sovereignty. In “On the Concept of History” Benjamin returns to time, juxtaposing 
historicity with historical materialism, reiterating his early arguments in the Trauerspiel book 
against the tyrannical impulse of individual and tragic time, which seek to overcome 
historical time.  
 Benjamin’s conception of historical materialism binds his sense of poetics and 
mysticism with a Marxian critique of materialist forces and modes of production. Arendt is 
critical of materialism as well, but in a different way, and it is Benjamin’s sense of mysticism 
that she can’t incorporate into her reading of his work. Benjamin’s sense of mysticism forms 
his conception of what he calls historical time, which is bound to the notion of Messianism, 
leaving the door to the future open, without claiming to know what will come. Arendt and 
Benjamin are both wary of trying to master the past and predict the future. For both, a 
critical temporality is necessary to displacing the idea that history is marked by events that 
can be grasped through reasoning or empirical processes — that somehow we can master 
the past. 
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CHAPTER II 
WALTER BENJAMIN: HISTORY, TIME, AND TRAUERSPIEL  
 
 “Historicism is ‘additive’ and it “musters a mass of data to fill the homogenous, empty time. Materialist 
historiography, on the other hand, is based on a constructive principle. Thinking involves not only the flow of 
thoughts, but their arrest as well. Where thinking suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant with tensions, it 
gives that configuration a shock, by which it crystallizes into a monad. A historical materialist approaches a 
historical subject only where he encounters a monad.” 
 —  Walter Benjamin, On the Concept of History 
 
“Tirelessly the process of thinking makes new beginnings, returning in a roundabout way to its original object. 
This continual pausing for breath is the mode most proper to the process of contemplation.” 
               —  Walter Benjamin, Epistemo-Critical Prologue  
 
In this chapter I am going to look at Benjamin’s approach to history in relationship to time, 
loss, mourning, and melancholia. While in many ways Benjamin and Arendt are dealing with 
similar topics of investigation — the impact of modernity and the rise of totalitarianism — 
Benjamin has a different conception of loss and time, which affects the way he approaches 
questions of authority and tradition. Through a close reading of The Origin of German Tragic 
Drama and On the Concept of History, I examine Benjamin’s critique of historicity and his 
argument for historical materialism. In conclusion, I turn towards contemporary work being 
done on Benjamin and Antigone, in order to demonstrate how the Frankfurt School tradition 
of critical theory — specifically here Benjamin’s work — works against the philosophical 
reasoning of moralizing ethics. Through The Origin of German Tragic Drama, and Benjamin’s 
distinction between tragedy and Trauerspiel, I turn to Bonnie Honig’s Antigone, Interrupted, 
which deploys Benjamin in the name of what she terms “agonistic humanism.” 
Introduction 
In Hannah Arendt’s essay “The Dark Times” she begins her account of Benjamin’s 
life and work through a kind of personal narrative. Her tone is unusually poetic and stern, 
revealing her personal attachment to Benjamin more than his thought. There is no question 
	   61	  
she situates her own work next to Benjamin’s using the same repetitive turns in language and 
philosophical pretext that we find throughout much of her writing. “No doubt, the Jewish 
question was of great importance for this generation of Jewish writers and explains much of 
the personal despair so prominent in nearly everything they wrote. But the most clear-
sighted among them were led by their personal conflicts to a much more general and more 
radical problem, namely to questioning the relevance of the Western tradition as a whole.”98 
Here we see Arendt’s understanding of the relationship between the Jewish question, 
despair, and the loss of tradition present itself within the context of Benjamin’s work. And, 
although these topics certainly hold a great interest for Benjamin — especially the past, 
history, and tradition — Arendt and Benjamin maintain very difference understandings of 
history and time.99   
For Benjamin, memory and remembering is a dynamic process that does not displace 
the present or predict the future. Benjamin’s historical materialism is guided by what he sees 
as the detritus of modernity. The detritus — an old door frame, a neon street sign, milk 
crates, empty streets — does not signify an empty form for Benjamin, rather, each object is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Ibid., 37. A few pages later Arendt repeats, “Truth, so Benjamin said shortly before he became fully aware of 
the break in tradition and the loss of authority, is not ‘an unveiling which destroys the secret, but the revelation 
which does it justice.’” Ibid., 41. 
99 According to Arendt, Benjamin “knew that the break in tradition and the loss of authority which occurred in 
his lifetime were irreparable, and he concluded that he had to discover new ways of dealing with the past.” 
Arendt paints Benjamin as a pearl-diver, and characterizes the diver as a rescuer of those “rich and strange” 
things which are cemented beneath the surface and must be brought up into the light. She draws together 
Benjamin’s conception of crystallization, the Flâneur, and the collector. She describes Benjamin’s collection of 
fragments as netting, gathering up the bits that had been left behind. According to Arendt, Benjamin’s 
collecting of fragments, of pearls and coral, is the work of redemption. It is the redemption of history without 
the “aid of tradition.” Arendt’s romantic vision of Benjamin work as the redemption of history without the aid 
of tradition is a projection of her own concept of redemption. For Arendt, working through what was, tracing 
back, and digging down into history redeems the loss of tradition in the modern age. The quote Arendt cites 
from Benjamin’s notebooks draws out the distinction between her idea of redemption and Benjamin’s. For 
Arendt redemption is the work of restoring tradition and context to the objects or debris that are cast aside by 
or lost to the progression of time; for Benjamin redemption is a rejection of context, of tradition, and 
restoration. Benjamin isn’t praising the nostalgia or utopian longing of the “revolutionary.” Instead he is 
observing the relationship between the act of “collecting” and the desire for redemption in the material world. 
Benjamin isn’t trying to redeem what has been lost, although he is working with the debris that loss leaves 
behind.   
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trace of something left in the world and is a key for entry into the world. By approaching 
ordinary objects with a sense of religious reverence, Benjamin’s conception of historical 
materialism requires a different understanding of history and time. As a result, his work is 
possessed with both a mysticism and sensuality that transforms the everyday into radical 
possibilities for “weak Messianism.” 
In Berlin Childhood Around 1900, Benjamin writes “My assumption was that the feeling 
of longing would no more gain mastery over my spirit than a vaccine does over a healthy 
body. I sought to limit its effect through insight into irretrievability — not the contingent 
biographical but the necessary social irretrievability of the past. This has meant that certain 
biographical features, which stand out more readily in the continuity of experience than in its 
depths, altogether recede in the present undertaking.”100 In knowing that the past cannot be 
restored one must set aside continuity of experience, sacrificing a linear narrative for 
understanding. Benjamin knew the future landscape would no longer resemble the past he 
had grown familiar with. He knew he would have to say goodbye to the place of his 
childhood, so he performed a kind of invocation through the work of memory. He returned 
to the place of his childhood in memory in light of his impending feeling of homesickness. 
He turned away from the contingent biographical features which we often rely upon to 
construct continuity through experience, and instead toward the “necessary social 
irretrievability of the past.” His account of his childhood is not a bio-historical narrative told 
through recounting a succession of formative events. Instead, Benjamin offers an account of 
his childhood in the same way he offers an account of Paris in the nineteenth century, 
through the material objects that give form to experience. For Benjamin recalling the room 
in which the experience occurred is as important if not more so than the experience itself. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Walter Benjamin, Berlin Childhood around 1900, trans. Howard Eiland (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 
2006), 37. 
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The material objects are portals into the fabric of memory that give shape to Benjamin’s 
understanding of the past, which is guided by affect as opposed to reason. His method of 
accounting for the past in this way is not only a-temporal; it works against the rectilinear 
succession of time by displacing memories through the process of remembering.  
Instead of offering a list of events than can be placed on a timeline, Benjamin offers 
a constellation of memory. In this way the event is removed from historical time, from the 
past, and one is able to re-experience it again as a new beginning. When the event, or 
fragment, is ripped from the context of historicism in this way, it can no longer be known, it 
cannot be mastered. The work of history loses its authority, which relies upon a linear 
temporal framework. Benjamin isn’t bridging over the gaps in history; he is working to blast 
open the continuum of history. 
To read Benjamin as nostalgic or longing to redeem the past is to misperceive his 
political project. The apparent emptiness of objects removed from history is the physical 
debris progress leaves behind. For Benjamin this debris is what remains, and these objects 
do not belong to the tradition of history or the work of historicism, but are rather caused by 
them. As such, they are signifiers for locating practices of power, the destructive promise of 
technological progress, and the visible wreckage left behind by the so-called victors of 
history. They are the dialectical images and the objects of contemplation that offer us a way 
in.101 In this way, Benjamin’s understanding of historical thought is laid out in his works on 
The Origin of German Tragic Drama and “On the Concept of History”. In these writings, 
Benjamin focuses on the relationship between Trauerspiel, melancholy, history, and time. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 There is an interesting dance here between Benjamin’s conceptions of objects and the material of life and 
Arendt’s assertion that language is essentially what is left behind. Since objects are necessarily possessed by 
language, they take on a linguistic form that is continuously unfolding for Benjamin.   
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In critiquing Carl Schmitt’s conception of sovereignty, and refusing Aristotle’s 
definition of tragedy, Benjamin draws important distinctions between tragedy, which is 
bound to mourning and the Trauerspiel, which is characterized by various melancholic 
personalities. Throughout his texts Benjamin conflates mourning with melancholia, 
complicating the traditional dichotomies and definitions. The distinction between tragedy 
and the Trauerspiel is useful for thinking about contemporary politics and modes of political 
action.  
I. Melancholy  
For Benjamin, the melancholic disposition represents a critical temporality. 
Conceptually, melancholy is imbedded throughout much of Benjamin’s work and many 
scholars have turned to this pivotal theme to explore his writings. For example, Max Pensky 
situates the concept of melancholy at the heart of all of Benjamin’s work, focusing on his 
definition of acedia; Eric Santner focuses on the passages in The Origin of German Tragic Drama 
that bind melancholy to the condition of creaturely life; and Jonathan Flatley focuses on 
Benjamin’s criticism of left melancholy, arguing that melancholy must be connected to 
present political concerns. Each of these readings emphasizes a different aspect of 
Benjamin’s writings on melancholy. There is no singular melancholy, but rather histories of 
melancholies at play throughout Benjamin’s work on the Trauerspiel. 
In The Origins of German Tragic Drama, Benjamin offers a brief history of melancholy, 
focusing on Saturn, Chronos, and acedia. For Benjamin, melancholy is a complex disposition 
with a dynamic past that gives form to his understanding of materialist dialectical thinking. 
Melancholy is the key trait of the characters in the Baroque mourning-play, and each 
character expresses a different form of the affective disposition. Benjamin begins by 
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referencing Kant’s definition of melancholy in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and 
Sublime, which is rooted in the “work of the older theoreticians.” Melancholy is depicted as 
“‘vengefulness . . . inspirations, visions, temptations,  . . . significant dreams, presentiments, 
and miraculous portents.’”102 For Benjamin, melancholia cannot be confined to medical, 
astrological, or sociological disciplines, but instead veers from one into the other. Marked as 
an ancient pathology, as a medical ailment melancholy was assigned to the rule of Saturn, 
and later the spleen. From observation, melancholics have an “inclination for long journeys,” 
genius, providence, and contemplation. In vaguely tracing these wandering definitions of 
melancholia, Benjamin demonstrates the inability to confine the affect to some form of 
empirical reality. His working through the rough history shows how the interpretations and 
reinterpretations of a concept like melancholia can be opened up in different ways.  
At heart melancholy is, if nothing else, riddled with contradictions. 
The astronomical explanation of this is obscure. But not if the distance of the planet from the earth 
and the consequently long duration of its orbit are no longer conceived in the negative sense of the 
Salerno doctors, but rather in a beneficent sense, with reference to the divine reason which assigns the 
menacing star to the remotest place, and if, on the other hand, the introspection of the melancholy 
man is understood with reference to Saturn which ‘as the highest planet and the one farthest from 
everyday life, the originator of all deep contemplation, calls the soul from externalities to the inner 
world, causes it to rise ever higher, finally endowing it with the utmost knowledge and with the gift of 
prophecy.’ Re-interpretations of this kind, which give the transformation of these doctrines its 
fascination, reveal a dialectical trait in the idea of Saturn, which corresponds astonishingly to the 
dialectic of the Greek conception of melancholy.103 
 
Saturn exists in the spirit of contradictions. “Like melancholy, Saturn too, this spirit of 
contradictions, endows the soul, on the one hand, with sloth and dullness, on the other, with 
the power of intelligence of contemplation; like melancholy, Saturn also constantly threatens 
those who are subject to him, however illustrious they may be in and of for themselves, with 
the dangers of depression or manic ecstasy . . .”104 Reading Dürer’s Melencolie 1 through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (Verso, 2009), 148. 
103 Ibid., 149. 
104 Ibid. 
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Panofsky and Saxl, Benjamin focuses on the dialectical quality of melancholy through the 
various representations. 
According to Benjamin, the German Trauerspiel “remained astonishingly obscure to 
itself, and was able to portray the melancholic only in the crude and washed-out colors of 
the medieval complexion-books.”105 Benjamin focuses his study on Dürer’s artistic 
rendering. The genius of Dürer’s work was its use of symbolism — the downward gaze, the 
prophetic dreams, and the dog, are just a few of the melancholic emblems present in the 
masterpiece. In the Baroque there is a relationship between the symbolic and the allegorical, 
which contains destructive potential and dialectical force.  “For the only pleasure the 
melancholic permits himself, and it is a powerful one, is allegory.”106 Allegory is a mode of 
political contemplation, defined by a melancholic disposition; it is not a form of political 
action within the material world of objects.107 Ultimately, Benjamin is critical of the 
mourning-play. The disruptive potential Benjamin sees in the Baroque is undermined by its 
idealism. The theological impulse of German idealism is anti-political, and the accompanying 
conception of melancholy that emerges with allegory relies upon a removed contemplative 
gaze. Within this view, the world of things — “dead objects” — cannot be redeemed, and 
the gaze is shifted towards the after-life.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Ibid., 158. 
106 Ibid., 185. 
107 In The Dialectics of Seeing, Susan Buck-Morss nicely summarizes Benjamin’s argument about the relationship 
between allegory and melancholy writing, “The Baroque poets saw in transitory nature an allegory for human 
history, in which the latter appeared, not as a divine plan or chain of events on a ‘road to salvation,’ but as 
death, ruin, catastrophe; and it was this essentially philosophical attitude that gave allegory a claims beyond 
mere aesthetic device. The forsakenness of nature, understand as a theological truth, was the source of the 
melancholy of the allegorists: ‘The steadfastness which expresses itself in the intention of mourning is born out 
of loyalty to the world of things.’ But it is a world of ‘dead objects,’ a realm of ‘infinite hopelessness.’ In it, 
political action is judged as mere arbitrary intrigue.’ Now at the crucial point—and this follows necessarily from 
the melancholic’s politics of contemplation rather than intervention—allegory deserts both history and nature 
and (like the whole tradition of idealist philosophy that comes after it), takes refuge in the spirit. All hope is 
reserved for a hereafter that is ‘emptied of everything that contains even the imperceptible breath of the 
world.’” Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project (Cambridge, Mass.: The 
MIT Press, 1991), 175. 
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This impotent definition of melancholy is extended to the principal character, the 
sovereign, in the mourning-play, and Benjamin’s discussion of the sovereign plays with a 
paradoxical definition of melancholy as acedia that becomes a way of critiquing sovereignty. 
In describing the sovereign this way, Benjamin draws into focus the question: what is 
political action? Benjamin’s discussion of acedia, in this sense, is inline with his critique of 
Eric Kästner in his essay “Left Melancholy.” In this essay, Benjamin offers a very sardonic 
form of melancholy, which is characterized by meaningless action. Instead of the sovereign’s 
“right” to act being undermined by his acedia, the left-wing radical’s desire for political 
movement in undermined by his sentimental insistence on acting in the past. What the 
sovereign and the left-radical share in common is a desire for some form of political action. 
The forces of capitalist production have reified left wing struggle, transforming political 
movements into objects of consumption, bound by a form of identity politics. 
Benjamin discusses the empty forms of left wing resistance. He argues that political 
struggle in itself has been turned into an object of consumption. Written as a critique of the 
left intelligentsia during the collapse of the Weimar Republic, Benjamin criticizes Kästner’s 
poetry for mirroring the petit-bourgeoisie it appears to critique. 108  “In short, this left-wing 
radicalism is precisely the attitude to which there is no longer, in general, any corresponding 
political action.  It is not to the left of this or that tendency, but simply to the left of what is 
generally possible.  For from the beginning all it has in mind is to enjoy itself in a negativistic 
quiet.  The metamorphosis of political struggle from a compulsory decision into an object of 
pleasure, from a means of production into an article of consumption--that is this literature’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Benjamin writes, “No wonder Kästner, in settling accounts with the bankers in ‘A Hymn’, is as obliquely 
familial as he is obliquely economic when he presents the nocturnal thoughts of a proletarian woman under the 
title ‘A Mother Takes Stock.’  Ultimately, home and income remain the strings with which a better-off class 
leads the mewling poet.” The poet, Benjamin argues is heavy-hearted because he has succumbed to routine 
through loss of indignation.  He has forfeited the gift of being disgusted.  The style of irony, in which Kästner writes, 
has become routine in itself.  
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latest hit.”109 The signs and symbols represent the leftover sentimentalism of past political 
struggles.  Repeated rhetoric and the clenched papier-mâché fist come to replace actual left-
wing resistance. The objects once produced alongside a movement have become isolated 
signs of movement that provide gratification in the same way any other object of 
consumption does.   
Benjamin expresses a consistent and general wariness towards political action 
through his writings on melancholy. Absent theology, the radical potential of melancholy as 
a political disposition lays in its distant stance towards the world. It can easily be argued that 
melancholy is the key conceptual category in much of Benjamin’s writings, but it is 
important to remember the relationship Benjamin draws between political action and 
melancholia in critiquing both the sovereign and left wing activist.110 There is a tendency in 
reading Benjamin to transform his use of melancholy, or critique of the mourning-play, into 
a new form of left political action. There is a reductionism in reading Benjamin this way that 
often misses his critique of linear temporality and conception of historical materialism. 
I.II. Reading Benjamin’s Melancholy 
 
 As Jonathan Flatley surmises in his Affective Mapping, “For Benjamin, melancholia is 
not a problem to be cured; loss is not something to get over and leave behind . . .Thus, he 
persistently critiques a melancholia that leads to inaction and complacency, such as the one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Walter Benjamin, Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 1: 1913-1926 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 
2004), 19. 
110 For a critical summary of melancholy as the organizing principle in Benjamin’s work see: Ilit Ferber’s Philosophy 
and Melancholy: Benjamin's Early Reflections on Theater and Language. For a critical history of melancholy see: Saturn 
and Melancholy by Fritz Saxle, Raymond Klibansky, and Erwin Panofsky. For a more contemporary history of 
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he finds in the (at the time) popular poetry of Eric Kästner.”111 Focusing on the left 
melancholy Benjamin is critical of, Flatley argues that melancholy must be connected to the 
present, and present political concerns. He writes, “What emerges is the picture of a 
politicizing, splenetic melancholy, where clinging to things from the past enable interest and 
action in the present world and is indeed the very mechanism for that interest.” Rejecting 
Aristotle’s definition of melancholy wholesale, Flatley turns to the idea of “melancholy as 
method” tying together Benjamin’s Arcades with The Origins of German Tragic Drama through 
the theme of allegory. Flatley too wants to draw some form of “politicizing” action out of 
melancholy arguing that melancholy is not so much a disposition for Benjamin as marker of 
“historical-allegorical insight.”112 In order to explore this idea of melancholy as method, 
Flatley turns to Benjamin’s “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” and brings together his 
reflections on remembering and The Origins of German Tragic Drama. Objects facilitate a form 
of remembering that is not experience proper, but a form of “memory-experience.” Flatley 
writes, “Indeed, one might say that this memory-experience does not really happen in the 
subject, but outside of us in the world of things.”113 For Flatley, Benjamin’s idea of historical 
materialism is a practice of melancholy remembrance that enables engagement with present 
political concerns. 
In Melancholy Dialectics, Max Pensky focuses on the contradictory nature of 
melancholy as acedia. According to Pensky the melancholic experiences a desire to transform 
his or her melancholy into a productive form of action. Pensky argues the dialectical 
potential of melancholia is contained in the paradox of simultaneously experiencing acedia 
and the drive to action. Pensky writes, “He demands a moment of recognition, in which 	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contemporary melancholia would be forced to reveal its duplicity with the agents of 
oppression, and he proclaims a critique that, stripped of all its esoteric, contemplative 
ornament, would publicly demand a decisive commitment to political action.”114 Pensky is 
not referring here to traditional notions of political action, but rather to a critically engaged 
form of thinking and writing that essentially inverts melancholia, turning it back upon itself. 
He argues that Benjamin is taking his own melancholia and using it to do something 
productive through writing, which is counterintuitive. While I agree with Pensky’s 
conclusion that melancholy more broadly contains dialectical potential, it is the potential of 
historical materialism. Melancholy cannot be reduced to a form of acedia any more than the 
sum of Benjamin’s writings can be reduced to his own sad nature. 
In Pensky’s terms of talking about melancholy as a form of acedia there is an 
assumption that melancholy is not an active affect. That it is sedentary, or inward in a way 
that puts it at odds with the way we think about political action. Benjamin’s characterization 
of the sovereign in the Trauerspiel is caught between a desire and imperative to act and the 
inability to fulfill the action. This paradox is meant to illustrate how the power of the 
sovereign is truly saturnine. It is not in itself dialectical in a traditional or productive way. If 
we are to wrest a conception of dialectics away from Benjamin’s writing it must focus on his 
conception of historical materialism and temporality in relationship to melancholy.115 
Benjamin’s contemplative approach to the objects of his work is testament to the 
melancholy dialectic. The critical potential of what Pensky calls Benjamin’s melancholy 	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dialectic is a form of critical temporality that arrests time. Pensky writes, “Melancholy 
occupies the space that separates Benjamin’s ‘messianic’ and ‘materialistic’ gaze — it is a 
space that is carved between the subject and the object by a question concerning the 
possibility of meaning: a space Benjamin sought his life long to fill with the storehouse of 
images yielded up to him and constructed in his shocking, healing writing.”116 The objects of 
contemplation that Benjamin collected in fragment-form in his Passagenwerk or Berlin 
Childhood Around 1900 are dialectical images that represent what he calls crystallization. These 
dialectical images broken away from the mosaic, re-thought and given new context, have the 
power to interrupt the linear flow of capitalist time, what Benjamin calls homogenous, empty 
time.  
In convolute “N” of the Passagenwerk Benjamin nicely describes the relationship 
between dialectical thinking, the object of contemplation, and time.  
“It’s not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on the past; 
rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a 
constellation. In other words, image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the present to 
the past is a purely temporal, continuous one, the relation of what-has-been to the now is dialectical: is 
not progression but image, suddenly emergent. – Only dialectical images are genuine images (that is, 
not archaic); and the place where one encounters them is language.”117 
 
For Benjamin, the image in itself contains a dialectic, which is accessed through the way the 
subject approaches its object of contemplation. The image is “dialectics at a standstill”, and 
in different places, Benjamin describes this standstill as a flash, a lightening flash, crystallization, 
and the nunc stans. In The Origins of German Tragic Drama and “On the Concept of History” 
Benjamin approaches the relationship between the subject and the object by considering 
temporality. In the Arcades Project we see Benjamin carrying out his work as a form of 
critique, whether or not we can call this political action is debatable. Benjamin is offering a 
critical dialectic between the subject and the object that is both materialist and messianic in 	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order to critique normative narratives of progress and time that reify capitalist logic. Within 
this dialectical play, which has the power to hold the object of contemplation apart from its 
historical context, Benjamin argues that philosophical truth can be discovered. The 
relationship between the melancholic disposition, which turns the subject towards the object 
with a contemplative gaze, and the search for truth through thinking and writing has been 
documented back to Aristotle.118 The melancholic suffers from melancholy precisely because 
he or she can see reality, and yet cannot augment reality.119  
Unlike Pensky, Santner focuses on the concept of “creaturely life” in Benjamin’s 
Trauerspiel book. Man’s condition in the world, or what Benjamin calls das Kreaturliche, is a 
part of his study of melancholy. In Creaturely Life, Eric Santner focuses on the passages in The 
Origin of German Tragic Drama that bind melancholy to the condition of creaturely life. He 
writes, “In his Origin of German Tragic Drama, Benjamin argues that the melancholy affect 
‘emerges from the depths of the creaturely realm’ and ‘is the most genuinely creaturely of the 
contemplative impulses.’”120 For Santner melancholy becomes the universalizing feature of 
humanism; to be creaturely means to be vulnerable, to suffer. For Santner creaturely life and 
the affect of melancholy do not represent a critical temporality, but rather a temporality of 
violence, where the individual is subject to the sovereign because of his creatureliness.121 
The idea of creaturely life that Benjamin constructs is interesting and worth 
attention, but the way Santner approaches the texts willfully reduces melancholy to a singular 
definition that rejects the histories of melancholies Benjamin is describing. Benjamin actually 	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writes, “If melancholy emerges from the depths of the creaturely to which the speculative 
thought of the age felt itself bound by the bonds of the church itself then this explained its 
omnipotence. In fact it is the most genuinely creaturely of the contemplative impulses, and it 
has always been noticed that its power need be no less in the gaze of a dog than in the 
attitude of a pensive genius.”122 A few passages later he clarifies that “This gloomy 
conception of melancholy is not of course the original way of seeing it. In antiquity it was, 
rather, seen in a dialectical way. In a canonic passage in Aristotle genius is linked with 
madness within the concept of melancholy.”123 Benjamin is actually criticizing this “gloomy 
conception of melancholy.”   
Melancholy for Benjamin serves a different political purpose; melancholy as acedia is 
characterized by an inability to act. The distinction between historical time and history that 
Benjamin offers is characterized by the duality of melancholy. A parallel runs throughout the 
play between the divinity of historical time and the constraints of creaturely history. 
Historical life is the object of the mourning play, but history is the instrument given to the 
sovereign to wield his power. 
Benjamin begins his study of “Trauerspiel and Tragedy” saying that the object of the 
Trauerspiel is historical life, but his point is that historical life is a Trauerspiel. The main 
character in the play is the Prince, who holds history in his hands. History in the hands of 
the Prince serves a specific political purpose, one that differentiates him from creaturely life, 
but firmly posits him within creaturely life. His claim to authority and power is given 
credence by the loyalty of his followers but, as Benjamin points out, loyalty in the world of 
things is always unfaithful. And so, “The Prince is the paradigm of the melancholy man. 
Nothing demonstrates the frailty of the creature so drastically as the fact that even he is 	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subject to it.”124 The materiality of creaturely life undermines the Prince’s claim to 
sovereignty, and reveals the tyrannical nature of his actions. Despite his clutch on history he 
cannot overcome historical time, he has no control over fate, unlike the heroes in tragedies. 
The power he has to make the decision, to declare a state of emergency, is even subdued by 
his melancholy mournful character, which is further undermined by the treacherous loyalty 
of his followers.  
II. The Mourning Play and the Melancholy Prince 
“Mournful melancholy mostly dwells in palaces.”   
 —  Walter Benjamin 
 
 
 Trauer, for Benjamin, is a form of work or play, and comes from the German baroque 
tradition. For Benjamin, the distinction between Trauerspiel and tragedy relies upon a 
distinction between “historical time” and “tragic time”. In the Trauerspiel the main object of 
the content is historical life, and the main character is the monarch or sovereign. “Historical 
life” he writes,  “as it was conceived at that time, is its content, its true object. In this it is 
different from tragedy. For the object of the latter is not history, but myth, and the tragic 
stature of the dramatis personae does not derive from rank — the absolute monarchy — but 
from the pre-historic epoch of their existence — the past age of heroes.”125 Historical life 
composes the true object of the Trauerspiel, as opposed to the tragedy, which relies upon the 
determined narrative of heroic actions and death. Historical life, in Benjaminian terms, is not 
bound to the confines of earthly, creaturely narrative. In saying the object of the Trauerspiel is 
historical life, Benjamin is opening up the politically disruptive potential of the text. Unlike 
tragedy, which relies upon myth and history, the Trauerspiel breaks with a determined 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Ibid., 142. 
125 Ibid., 62. 
	   75	  
narrative. Benjamin begins his definition of Trauerspiel with a passage from Opitz, arguing 
that core of Trauerspiel is comprised of “the commands of kings, killings, despair, infanticide 
and patricide, conflagrations, incest, war and commotion, lamentation, weeping, sighing, and 
suchlike.”126 Those who write mourning plays must be well versed in the language of politics.  
Mourning, which Benjamin conflates with melancholy, “is the state of mind in which 
feeling revives the empty world in the form of a mask, and derives an enigmatic satisfaction 
in contemplating it. Every feeling is bound to an a priori object, and the representation of this 
object is its phenomenology. Accordingly the theory of mourning, which emerged 
unmistakably as a pendant to the theory of tragedy, can only be developed in the description 
of that world which is revealed under the gaze of the melancholy man.”127  Mourning in this 
baroque sense becomes an ornament to the theory of tragedy. Mourning and melancholia 
understood together offer a different definition of mourning. The root of this melancholy 
mourning, Benjamin argues, is a product of Lutheranism, which deprived human acts of all 
value, giving birth to an empty world.128  The laws that govern the Trauerspiel are found in the 
heart of mourning, which is not so much a feeling as it is the depiction of the relationship 
between a subject and object — the subject who approaches the object for contemplation. 
For example, Benjamin offers up the prophetic image of Dürer’s figure Melencolia, where 
“the utensils of active life are lying around unused on the floor, as objects of 
contemplation.”129 Active life is separated from the melancholic figure that observes the 
world from a distance with a turned down face. In this conception of melancholy mourning 
there is an explicit divide between the active world and the act of contemplation. Melancholy 
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in this sense represents a simultaneous withdrawal from and engagement with the world 
through thinking and contemplation. 
 For Benjamin there is a direct relationship between the concept of sovereignty and the 
concept of history. The sovereign “is the representative of history. He holds the course of 
history in his hand like a scepter.”130 According to Benjamin this depiction of sovereignty 
arose with the new concept of sovereignty that emerged in the seventeenth century during 
the counter-reformation. The baroque definition of sovereignty, he argues, is a result of the 
absence of eschatology. “The hereafter is emptied of everything which contains the slightest 
breath of this world…”131 The sovereign in the German Baroque period is defined by his 
relationship to and separation from the divine. The move to undercut transcendence 
liberated the sovereign from God, reifying his powers within the earthly realm. Benjamin’s 
delicate dance here directly undercuts Carl Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty in Political 
Theology. In Benjamin’s words “The level of the state of creation, the terrain on which the 
Trauerspiel is enacted, also unmistakably exercises a determining influence on the sovereign. 
However highly he is enthroned over subject and state, his status is confined to the world of 
creation; he is the lord of the creatures, but he remains a creature.”132 The absence of an 
eschatology meant that the sovereign remained a man among men. Without the authority of 
divinity, the sovereign’s actions were no longer beyond the human realm. In “transcending 
transcendence,” claiming his power through proclaiming a state of emergency, the sovereign 
simultaneously undermines his ability to enact the power of sovereignty he claims. In other 
words, the sovereign is impotent, because “The prince, who is responsible for making the 
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decision to proclaim the state of emergency, reveals, at the first opportunity, that he is 
almost incapable of making a decision.” The Prince’s indecision is what turns him from a 
prince into a tyrant, because he has no real authority.133   
 Benjamin’s depiction of the baroque sovereign is designed as a counterargument to 
Schmitt’s discussion of the state of emergency in Political Theology, which claims that 
“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.” Benjamin writes, “Whereas the modern 
concept of sovereignty amounts to a supreme executive power on the part of the prince, the 
baroque concept emerges from a discussion of the state of emergency, and makes it the 
most important function of the prince to avert this. The ruler is designated from the outset 
as the holder of dictatorial power if war, revolt, or other catastrophes should lead to a state 
of emergency.”134 If the sovereign has the right to declare a state of emergency, but has no 
ability to decide on proclaiming a state of emergency, then he is revealed as a tyrant. “The 
drama makes a special point of endowing the ruler with the gesture of executive power as his 
characteristic gesture, and having him take part in the action with the words and behavior of 
a tyrant even where the situation does not require it; in the same way it was probably unusual 
for full robes, crown and scepter to be wanting when the ruler appeared on stage.”135 The 
tyrant and the sovereign are different faces of the same coin in the baroque, and “the 
function of the tyrant is the restoration of order in the state of emergency: a dictatorship 	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whose utopian goal will always be to replace the unpredictability of historical accident with 
the iron constitution of the laws of nature.”136 The impotence of the sovereign combined 
with the tyrannical nature of his personality is the form of the martyr-drama Trauerspiel. In 
this mourning play the prince’s impotency is revealed through his indecisiveness, which 
proves he is not above men. Like anyone else he cannot rise above the movement of 
historical time, because he is human, individuated, and so is subject to the temporal 
constraints of this world. The function of the tyrant is to forcibly impose order upon the 
unpredictability of historical time, but historical time cannot be subjected to empirical 
processes. Put another way, it doesn’t matter how many children Saturn eats he will always 
be undone. 
 For Benjamin, in order to undermine the notion that sovereignty is the exception to 
the rule he had to construct a temporal framework for thinking about what it is the 
sovereign does (or doesn’t do) and where the power to act comes from.137 In a separate short 
fragment published in Benjamin’s collected writings, entitled “Trauerspiel and Tragedy”, he 
approaches the differences between Trauerspiel and tragedy through the different ways they 
relate to historical time. Historical time, according to Benjamin, is unfulfilled time. He writes: 
Historical time is infinite in every direction and unfulfilled at every moment. This means we cannot 
conceive of a single empirical event that bears a necessary relation to the time of its occurrence. For 
empirical events time is nothing but a form, but, what is more important, as a form it is unfulfilled. 
The event does not fulfill the formal nature of the time in which it takes place. For we should not 
think of time as merely the measure that records the durations of a mechanical change. Although such 
time is indeed a relatively empty form, to think of its being filled makes no sense. Historical time, 
however, differs from this mechanical time. It determines much more than the possibility of spatial 
changes of a specific magnitude and regularity that is to say, like the hands of a clock-simultaneously 
with spatial changes of a complex nature.138 
 
The concept of historical time is directly tied the discussion of the figure of the sovereign. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Ibid., 74. 
137 Again, Benjamin is responding to Schmitt’s claim that “The exception is more interesting than the rule. The 
rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything: it confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which 
derives only from the exception.” 
138 Benjamin, Walter Benjamin, 2005, 56. 
	   79	  
Separated from Benjamin’s conception of mechanical time, or what he will call empty 
homogenous time, historical time cannot be bound by reason or progress. It is not 
mechanical time; empirical processes cannot grasp it. For empirical events time is nothing 
but an unfilled form. On the other hand the event does not fulfill the formal nature of 
historical time in which it takes place. A process that is perfect in historical terms is 
indeterminate empirically. Benjamin draws a further distinction within historical time, 
between tragic time and messianic time. He writes,  
 This idea of fulfilled time is the dominant historical idea of the Bible: it is the idea of messianic   time. 
Moreover, the idea of a fulfilled historical time is never identical with the idea of an individual time. This 
feature naturally changes the meaning of fulfillment completely, and it is this that distinguishes tragic 
time from messianic time. Tragic time is related to the latter in the same way that individually fulfilled 
time relates to a divinely fulfilled one.139 
 
This distinction between tragic time and messianic time, between the fulfillment of 
individual time and the fulfillment of a messianic time distinguishes the mourning play from 
the tragedy. Messianic time is bound to historical time and is always unfulfilled, extending in 
every direction. It is the idea of a divinely fulfilled time. Tragic time, on the other hand, is 
related to individual time, and is fulfilled by the individual — the hero who dies of 
immortality. Benjamin writes, “Tragedy may be distinguished from the mourning play 
through the different ways they relate to historical time. In tragedy the hero dies because no 
one can live in fulfilled time. He dies of immortality.” The “overdetermined” death of the 
tragic hero relies upon the idea that individual time can be fulfilled.  In the mourning play 
there is symmetrical mirroring between the absolute and the finite, between the divine and 
man. For Benjamin, the repetition in the script iterates the play between the two forms of 
time. Whereas in the tragedy the fate of the hero is “overdetermined” and he must die of 
immortality, because of the immediacy “individual time confers on the action”, in the 
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mourning play “the law governing a higher life prevails” over “earthly existence.” In other 
words, in the mourning play the acts are carried out on two planes, what Benjamin describes 
as a hyperbola, where one branch is restricted to the earthly realm while the other exists in 
infinity. This mirroring repetition is the law on which the mourning play is founded. In the 
Trauerspiel time is not fulfilled, it is infinite, nonindividual, and without historical universality. 
The mourning play does not present us with the “image of a higher existence” but with “one 
of two mirror-images.”140  
Another way to think about the mirroring Benjamin describes is through his 
distinction between Historical Life — the object of the mourning play — and historical time, 
the temporality that guides its movement. While the Prince has the power to wield history, 
he does not have the power to control historical time, which emerges as the true 
contemplative object of the Trauerspiel. In this sense, historical time becomes a powerful 
check on the Prince’s right to claim sovereign authority through declaring a state of 
emergency. If the Prince cannot make his declaration, but exercises his power anyway he is 
revealed as a tyrant, who becomes subject to historical time, transforming him into a martyr.   
Historical time is the uncontrollable force in the mourning play that denies the 
Prince the ability to fulfill time or make a decision. Mourning is at the heart of history, 
because it provides the time sequence of historical life that grounds its narrative. In this 
melancholy mourning play contemplation is directed towards the empty material objects of 
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life that carry meaning; whereas the real object of contemplation for us the audience is 
historical time itself.  
Historical time, as the object of contemplation, opens up the possibility of exploring 
messianic time.  In Benjamin’s last work, “On the Concept of History,” he draws a direct 
connection between the “state of emergency” and the practice of fascism, which operates 
against historical time. He writes, “The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state 
of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a 
conception of history that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it 
is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the 
struggle against fascism. One reason why Fascism has a chance is that in the name of 
progress its opponents treat it as a historical norm.”141 In the mourning play the sovereign 
holds history in his hands, wielding it like a scepter, but in his hands it has no more value or 
power than his crown and purple robes. The Trauerspiel is a form that reveals the impotency 
of the sovereign by offering us a different temporality. In other words, the mourning play 
offers us a way to take history out of the hand of the Prince revealing that the so-called state 
of emergency is never an exception. It is only the belief in a history that proclaims the state 
of emergency is an exception that gives the oppressor power.  
 In On the Concept of History, Benjamin describes historicism apart from historical 
materialism as a form of acedia that always falls on the side of the victor. In fragment number 
seven he writes, 
 Fustel de Coulanges recommended to the historian, that if he wished to reexperience an epoch, he 
should remove everything he knows about the later course of history from his head. There is no 
better way of characterizing the method with which historical materialism has broken. It is a 
procedure of empathy. Its origin is the heaviness at heart, the acedia, which despairs of mastering the 
genuine historical picture, which so fleetingly flashes by. The theologians of the Middle Ages 
considered it the primary cause of melancholy. Flaubert, who was acquainted with it, wrote: “Peu de 
gens devineront combien il a fallu être triste pour ressusciter Carthage.” [Few people can guess how despondent 	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one has to be in order to resuscitate Carthage.] The nature of this melancholy becomes clearer, once 
one asks the question, with whom does the historical writer of historicism actually empathize. The 
answer is irrefutably with the victor. Those who currently rule are however the heirs of all those who 
have ever been victorious. Empathy with the victors thus comes to benefit the current rulers every 
time. This says quite enough to the historical materialist. Whoever until this day emerges victorious, 
marches in the triumphal procession in which today’s rulers tread over those who are sprawled 
underfoot. The spoils are, as was ever the case, carried along in the triumphal procession. They are 
known as the cultural heritage. In the historical materialist they have to reckon with a distanced 
observer. For what he surveys as the cultural heritage is part and parcel of a lineage [Abkunft: descent] 
which he cannot contemplate without horror. It owes its existence not only to the toil of the great 
geniuses, who created it, but also to the nameless drudgery of its contemporaries. There has never 
been a document of culture, which is not simultaneously one of barbarism. And just as it is itself not 
free from barbarism, neither is it free from the process of transmission, in which it falls from one set 
of hands into another. The historical materialist thus moves as far away from this as measurably 
possible. He regards it as his task to brush history against the grain.142 
 
Here in Benjamin’s last work we hear him echoing his understanding of the relationship 
between acedia as a form of melancholic mourning and sovereignty that he developed in The 
Origin of German Tragic Drama. The historicist suffers from a form of acedia, which is his 
weakness. His sympathy falls on the side of the victor. The historicist, much like the Prince, 
wishes to conquer historical time, ordering the events of history along the linear path of 
homogenous, empty time.   
If we are willing to accept a singular static notion of history then we are complicit in 
sympathizing with the victor. Whereas the historicist offers a universal conception of history, 
the historical materialist offers a specific experience with the past. The experiences of the 
past, history, are the object of contemplation, which means that it is the responsibility of the 
historical materialist to constantly return to the object of contemplation. Historicism is 
“additive” and it “musters a mass of data to fill the homogenous, empty time. Materialist 
historiography, on the other hand, is based on a constructive principle. Thinking involves 
not only the flow of thoughts, but their arrest as well. Where thinking suddenly stops in a 
configuration pregnant with tensions, it gives that configuration a shock, by which it 
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crystallizes into a monad. A historical materialist approaches a historical subject only where 
he encounters a monad.”143  
In order for Schmitt to endow the Prince or Monarch with the power of sovereignty 
through the declaration of a state of emergency, he had to ascribe to a universal notion of 
history. History in the hands of the sovereign bears the weight of authority, and is used in 
order to preserve tradition and so power. This is what Benjamin means in “On the Concept 
of History” when he writes that history is in danger of becoming “a tool of the ruling 
classes.”144 The messiah comes not only as the redeemer of history but the subduer of the 
Antichrist, the Antichrist being the conformist, who seeks to turn history as an object proper 
into an instrument of power for the ruling classes like the sovereign. Benjamin is critical of 
what he calls a “vulgar-Marxist” conception of nature that accepts “progress” as part of our 
inheritance of history. Instead of recognizing the barbarism inherent in the narrative of 
progress, which is handed down by the victors, Marx accepts technological progress as a 
condition of the laboring process. “It recognizes only the progress in the mastery of nature, 
not the retrogression of society; it already displays by the technocratic features later 
encountered in fascism.”145 For Benjamin the conception of historical progress is bound to 
the historicist’s universal offering of the past. Progress is the narrative of history.  
The historicist’s conception of historical progress is the progression of a 
homogenous, empty time.146 Benjamin draws a further distinction between Jetztzeit and 
Gegenwart — the present time and now time — in order to further separate the historicist 	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from the historical materialist. “History is the subject of a structure whose site is not 
homogenous, empty time, but time filled by the presence of the now [Jetztzeit].”147  The nunc 
stans, the non-time is the spatial disposition of the historical materialist who operates beyond 
the realm of history. “A historical materialist cannot do without the notion of a present 
which is not a transition, but in which time stands still and has come to a stop. For the 
notion defines the present in which he himself is writing history. Historicism gives the 
‘eternal’ image of the past; historical materialism supplies a unique experience with the 
past.”148 The lack of commitment to the other that Benjamin’s describes in the relationship 
between the courtier and the prince illustrates the importance of material-fetishism, which 
illustrates the relationship between historical life and trauerspiel in the construction of 
Subjectivity. Although Benjamin is a “thinker of things,” understanding the world through 
objects, which give form to daily life, he understands that redemption for the oppressed does 
not exist within the things themselves. The world of things belongs to “homogenous, empty 
time” where the past is recycled into the new through processes of production and 
consumption.149  
II.I. The Courtier 
Benjamin further strips the sovereign of his power by introducing us to another 
character in the Trauerspiel, the courtier. The relationship between the courtier and the Prince 	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reveals the shallowness of the subject’s attachment to the authority of the Prince. The 
melancholy of the prince, as Benjamin describes it, is acedia. Saturn causes people to be 
‘apathetic, indecisive, slow’. The fall of the tyrant is caused by indolence of the heart. Just as 
this characterizes the figure of the tyrant so does unfaithfulness — another feature of the 
saturnine man — characterizes the figure of the courtier.”150 The Prince’s claim to authority 
is undermined by his melancholy disposition, and his power as Prince is further undermined 
by the acedia of his subjects. Melancholy, here, serves a dual purpose. It reveals the Prince for 
who he really is, a man among men, and it reveals the perfidiousness of the subjects who are 
supposed to be loyal.  
Benjamin describes the courtier’s melancholy in terms of material attachment. His 
treachery is: 
…a dismal and melancholy submission to a supposedly unfathomable order of baleful constellations, 
which assumes an almost material character. Crown, royal purple, scepter are indeed ultimately 
properties, in the sense of the drama of fate, and they are endowed with a fate, to which the courtier, 
as the augur of this fate, is the first to submit. His unfaithfulness to man is matched by a loyalty to 
these things to the point of being absorbed in contemplative devotion to them.151 
 
The courtier is loyal only to the accouterments of power, and treats them as dissociated 
objects of melancholy contemplation. His commitment relies upon the symbolic order of 
power, which the Prince embodies and signifies. The power to declare a state of emergency, 
the crown, robes, and so on all signify the authority he has been granted. All meaning is 
contained within the material objects, which facilitate ritual and the enactment of authority. 
Benjamin’s depiction of the courtier illustrates the subject’s commitment to material objects 
over individual human beings. The courtier’s “Loyalty is completely appropriate only to the 
relationship of man to the world of things.”152  
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The Courtier betrays the prince because his commitment is to the material 
representations of kingdom over the individual princes who manifest their power through 
the materiality of rulership. In “critical moments” the courtier will abandon the ruler, with a 
sense of mourning, which Benjamin calls parasitical. The other who signified authority was 
only able to do so because of the material structure and ritual available. As long as the 
courtier has a prince it doesn’t matter who the prince is. Loyalty only exists in the realm of 
creaturely life. Benjamin writes, “all essential decisions in relation to men can offend against 
loyalty; they are all subject to higher laws. Loyalty is completely appropriate only to the 
relationship of man to the world of things. The latter knows no higher law, and loyalty 
knows no object to which it might belong more exclusively than the world of things.”153 The 
mournful melancholy Benjamin describes between the figure of the Prince and the courtier 
is one founded upon the idea of betrayal, and lack of loyalty, revealing once again the earthly 
constraints of either’s commitment. Loyalty, in Benjamin’s terms, betrays the world, and 
melancholy betrays the world “for the sake of knowledge. But in its tenacious self-
absorption it embraces dead objects in its contemplation, in order to redeem them.”154 The 
fragility of the Prince’s power, or the conditions of his creaturely life, as Benjamin might 
describe it, is what characterizes his melancholy nature.  
The world of things represents another marked distinction between the Trauerspiel 
and tragedy.155 This distinction between the tradition of romantic drama and tragedy is 
characterized by the introduction of stage property, which signifies and seals the tragic fate. 
“For once human life has sunk into the merely creaturely, even the life of apparently dead 
objects secures power over it. The effectiveness of the object where guilt has been incurred 	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is a sign of the approach of death. The passionate stirrings of creaturely life in man — in a 
word, passion itself — bring the fatal property into action.”156 Benjamin is primarily 
discussing Hamlet here, which for him signifies the martyr-drama Trauerspiel. By stage 
property he is very directly discussing the materiality of theater, the dagger, for instance, 
which symbolizes the seal of fate. The tragedy, on the other hand, which relies upon 
individual time renounces fate, the end has already been determined. The tragedy ends with a 
decision, but in the mourning play an ambiguity remains, what Benjamin describes as “an 
appeal of the kind martyrs utter.”157  
  As such, the Trauerspiel has no proper end. The lack of ending is testament to the 
condition of historical time, which extends infinitely in every direction.158 In many respects, 
materiality is the condition of creaturely life that gives form to the Trauerspiel; it is the subject 
of melancholy contemplation, and the cause of mourning. History in itself is set apart from 
historical time in order to represent a higher order of things. Benjamin must juxtapose his 
study of the mourning play with traditional tragedies in order to demonstrate the dynamism 
of time in the former, while explicating the narrowness and singleness of the latter. In the 
tragedy, the hero who dies of immorality through some consequential decision is saved in 
name only — the material signification of his being. In the mourning play the death is not 
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individual, and the one who dies is only stripped of his materiality. The Trauerspiel grants the 
possibility of a higher order of truth; tragedy denies it.  
III. Honig, Interrupted  
This thoroughly vain attempt to present the tragic as something universally human just about explains how the 
analysis of it can quite deliberately be based on the impression ‘which we modern men feel when we expose 
ourselves to the artistic effects of the forms with which ancient peoples and past ages endowed tragic fate in 
their literatures.’ Nothing is in fact more questionable than the competence of the unguided feelings of 
‘modern men’, especially where the judgment of tragedy is concerned.  
 —  Benjamin, The Origins of German Tragic Drama 
 
Thus, we might draw from Antigone inspiration for an agonistic humanism that sees in mortality, suffering, 
sound, and vulnerability resources for some form of enacted if contestable universality, while also recognizing 
these resources are various and opaque in their significations, just like language. In quest of a politics that is not 
reducible to an ethics nor founded on finitude, agonistic humanists draw not only nor even primarily on 
mortality and suffering, but also on natality, and pleasure, power (not just powerlessness), desire (not just 
principle), and thumos (not just penthos).159  
 —  Honig, Antigone, Interrupted 
 
 The contemporary turn towards ethics is illustrated by the proliferation of work 
being done on the Greek tragedy Antigone. If we are sympathetic to Benjamin’s critique of 
tragedy and study of the Trauerspiel, the consequences for contemporary political theory are 
important. For Benjamin, mourning does not signify the promise of redemptive politics. 
Nothing can be postulated from the tragic form, or the Trauerspiel. As he tells us in the 
Epistemo-Critical Prologue and reminds us in “Trauerspiel and Tragedy,” the philosopher must 
always return to the object of contemplation in order to make new beginnings. The object of 
contemplation in the Trauerspiel is historical life, and in order to engage his object Benjamin 
frames his study in terms of temporality.   
Temporality is central to Benjamin’s study of the Trauerspiel, and his critique of 
Aristotelian poetics, and the tragic form. Benjamin does not separate questions of temporal 
difference between tragedy and Trauerspiel from history. He can’t, as historical life is the 
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object of the Trauerspiel. Painted in historical terms, Benjamin traces the emergence of the 
German baroque mourning play to the anti-reformation movement, and melancholy 
mourning to Luther. The “formal language” of the Trauerspiel emerges from the 
“contemporary theological situation,” which is characterized (as we saw earlier) by the 
“disappearance of eschatology.”160 Benjamin writes, “Here, as in other spheres of baroque 
life, what is vital is the transposition of the originally temporal data into a figurative spatial 
simultaneity. This leads deep into the structure of the dramatic form. Whereas the Middle 
Ages present the futility of world events and the transience of the creature as stations on the 
road to salvation, the German Trauerspiel is taken up entirely with the hopelessness of the 
earthly condition. Such redemption as it knows resides in the depths of this destiny itself 
rather than in the fulfillment of a divine plan of salvation.”161 The German Trauerspiel is 
bound to the hopelessness of the earthly condition. Redemption only exists in a messianic 
form, in the movement of historical time. If we remember that Trauerspiel, unlike tragedy, 
exists on two planes, we see that no character and no action in its play can offer reprieve 
from or for the sovereign, or release us from the instruments of power, let alone hand them 
over to us. Even when the sovereign is brought down, it is because of this temporal gap 
between creaturely life and historical time.  
 There are three principles characters in the Trauerspiel, as Benjamin describes it, with 
two faces: the Prince and the tyrant, and the courtier who is the intriguer or the servant — 
and who will ultimately undermine the authority of the sovereign. In order to introduce the 
intriguer, Benjamin turns to the temporal distinctions between tragedy and Trauerspiel. This 
figure is unique to the Trauerspiel form and organizes its plot, which does not follow a spatial 
continuum. “In contrast to the spasmodic chronological progression of tragedy, the 	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Trauerspiel takes place in a spatial continuum, which one might describe as choreographic. 
The organizer of its plot, the precursor of the choreographer, is the intriguer.”162  Benjamin 
traces the emergence of the intriguer in the Trauerspiel form to the Spanish tradition, where 
the king “proves to be a secularized redemptive power.”163 Benjamin writes, “The German 
dramatists did not dare to plumb the vertiginous depths of this antithesis in one character. 
They know the two faces of the courtier: the intriguer, as the evil genius of their despots, and 
the faithful servant, as the companion in suffering to innocence enthroned.”164 The intriguer 
is only one face of the courtier and represents the evil genius behind the despot.  
 Honig’s section “Trauerspiel and/as Tragedy” in Antigone, Interrupted ignores the 
distinctions Benjamin draws between classical Greek tragedy and the different forms of the 
Trauerspiel, in order to introduce the figure of the intriguer or courtier. This move is predicated 
on the idea that melodrama is a form of tragedy is a form of Trauerspiel. She writes,  
 “Conspiracy is the theme that will help us make this move (towards an agonistic 
humanism).165 It comes from Walter Benjamin whose Origins of the German Tragic Drama (or Trauerspiel) 
picks up, as I have already intimated counter-chronologically, where Fassbinder leaves off: with the 
mourning or martyr play that is melodrama’s low-culture cousin. Extending Benjamin’s own 
arguments, we saw in Chapter 3 how melodrama, modernity’s democratized Trauerspiel, might have 
potentially transformative or, at least, interruptive powers. But Benjamin offers us till more. In 
Benjamin’s account of the Trauerspiel, we find suggestive resources by way of which to receive anew 
Sophocles’ great tragedy. There is surely a great deal of irony in this, for Benjamin, after all, is the one 
who insisted on the difference between the two genres, and charged that the Trauerspiel was brought 
down partly but the efforts of its purveyors to be ‘measured by the models of classical tragedy.’ 
Invoking Aristotle, they sought evaluation by standards they could never meet. It is their ‘gesture of 
submission’ to the classical ideal that Benjamin rejects. But the account he gives of the traits unique to 
the Trauerspiel does not just evidence the distance between that genre and classical tragedy nor only 
attest to the failure of the Baroque to rise to the standards of the classical. As it turns out, the traits of 
the Trauerspiel serve surprisingly well as genre cues for classical tragedy itself.”166 
 
 While Honig claims in her introduction to be critiquing, in one form or another, the 
contemporary “turn to ethics”, or the “ethical turn”, her dissection of Antigone only 
reaffirms this turn. It is not the embodiment of beings that facilitates the ethical turn, but 	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163 Ibid., 81. 
164 Ibid., 98. 
165 My parenthesis. 
166 Honig, Antigone, Interrupted, 85–86. 
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rather the drive towards a form of political action that is removed from history. Whereas 
Benjamin’s study of the Trauerspiel can and does provide a useful framework for critiquing 
the ethical turn that wants to claim new humanisms, Honig’s appropriation of his work, only 
affirms her own political agenda and instill an agonistic humanism. The move she wants to 
make cannot be facilitated by Benjamin’s careful study.   
In the introduction to the second part of Antigone, Interrupted, Honig turns to 
Benjamin to move away from Butler’s reduction of Antigone to “ethics” towards what she 
wants to call “agonistic humanism.” Unlike other contemporary readings of Antigone that 
find a universal humanism in “principled suffering” or “an anti-humanism of death-driven, 
desiring monstrosity”, Honig wants to “foreground the politicality of lamentation all the way 
down, as it were, in the hope that this may help release us from the spellbinding assumption 
that suffering or lamentation get beyond politics to the stark ‘human.’” She writes: 
Thus we might draw from Antigone inspiration for an agonistic humanism that sees in mortality, 
suffering, sound, and vulnerability resources for some form of enacted if contestable universality, 
while also recognizing these resources are various and opaque in their significations, just like language. 
In quest of a politics that is not reducible to an ethics nor founded on finitude, agonistic humanists 
draw not only nor even primarily on mortality and suffering, but also on natality and pleasure, power 
(not just powerlessness), desire (not just principle), and thumos (not just penthos). This alternative, 
agonistic humanism grows out of my reading of Sophocles’ Antigone, detailed in Part II, in which 
Antigone is not just a figure of resistance or a lamenter. Or better, what it means to lament turns out 
to have not only something to do with shared human finitude but also something to do with 
vengeance, politics, and the quest for sovereignty.167  
 
Identification with the materiality of life, or our embodiment as beings will only ever 
reinforce the “coerciveness of logic,” by reducing people to singular bodies. The points of 
common reducibility will not lead to a “humanism,” which is counterintuitive or operates as 
a modality of resistance, but rather will become subject to the methodologies and 
instruments of power. Universalist history belongs to the victors of history. Transforming 
tragic heroes into victors, re-appropriating sovereignty, as Honig claims, isn’t a move against 
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the cross-grained; it’s a move that seeks to blend that which was cast aside into the dominant 
and normative narratives of history. Re-writing history, re-writing the myth doesn’t redeem 
the past, it doesn’t “blast open the continuum of history”; instead it changes the experiences 
of history to be more consistent with what is perceived as more democratic.   
 There is difference between doing the work of the historicist and doing the work of 
the historical materialist. It is essential to remember that Benjamin’s study of the Trauerspiel 
form is a critique of sovereignty. In the mourning-play the sovereign represents power, and 
the assumed question is how can we subvert the power of the sovereign? Honig’s question 
appears to take this form, but the question is how can we occupy or claim the power of the 
sovereign. It seems essential also here to remember that the tragic hero always dies in the 
end. Sovereignty as a political form is like Chronos. We can re-appropriate sovereignty, but 
sovereignty will always lose. In this way, Benjamin is very clear in his critique of sovereignty, 
which Honig wholesale ignores. 
 Instead of reconsidering political action through Benjamin’s critique of sovereignty, 
Honig argues that we should try to exist within her understanding of the mourning-play, so 
that we may assume the power of the sovereign. Honig writes, “Benjamin presses on us 
throughout his work the idea that, like the messenger, we have both more and less agency 
than we think. We may be hopelessly embedded in structures and fantasies, discourses and 
iconographies, beyond out control but there is hope nonetheless. Small alterations, not 
always intended, may open up chasms of change — this is what Benjamin calls weak 
Messianism.”168 If anything the messenger in Antigone represents the faithful servant, not 
the intriguer. Either way, neither figure contains hope for any form of redemption let alone 
even a weak Messianism. Neither of these forms fulfills Honig’s desire to paint the figure of 	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the courtier into the Greek tragedy Antigone. The plotter is Weber’s reading of Benjamin’s 
intriguer, not Benjamin’s understanding of the role of the courtier in the Trauerspiel. Mourning 
is the site where the victor claims his past. History retains a linear temporality through the 
process of mourning, which relies upon past and future attachments to objects, or subjects 
masked with objects. The play of mourning, Benjamin finds, reveals one’s true material 
nature as a courtier; that is to say, attached to the accouterments of power instead of 
struggling against the grain. Honig wants to argue that this “plotter” conspires to disrupt the 
order of signification, the value objects that represent power have, but in Benjamin’s work 
this figure merely reveals the relationship between the figures that wield power and the 
objects they use to signify that power.    
Beyond this, as Benjamin demonstrates, the courtier is no better than the sovereign. 
The courtier only subverts the authority of the Prince because his attachment is to power 
and the signifiers of power itself. He is thoroughly embedded into the narrative of power; 
and is perhaps even more attached than the sovereign to his creatureliness and the world of 
things that signify power. One of the primary differences Benjamin draws between the tragic 
form and the Trauerspiel form is the difference between tragic time and historical time, 
respectively, as we’ve already seen. As Honig writes, Creon makes decisions, as so does 
Antigone. Neither character is paralyzed by the acedia found in the mourning play. Honig 
writes, “Creon’s decisions accent the gap between his power and capacity as ruler, and the 
guilt that ensues (to which Benjamin sensitizes us) works through the action and drives it. 
Creon cannot enforce his decrees and in time comes to see them as in error.”169 Creon can 
make decisions, he just can’t enforce them, and his decision-making is ultimately the root of 
his demise, as is characteristic of the tragic form, not the Trauerspiel. 	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 Benjamin draws a distinction between tragedy and Trauerspiel for a reason — Tragedy 
conforms to a historicist conception of time that is marked by fulfilled individual actions and 
time. Trauerspiel, on the other hand, represents historical time and the dialectical play of 
melancholy mourning, which can break free from the historicist’s reactionary politics. Tragic 
time depends upon an over determined narrative, where the tragic hero has the agency to 
make a choice. The tragic narrative reaffirms individualism, and the tragic narrative of 
mourning, for instance in Antigone, reaffirms a form of individual fulfilled time. There is an 
essential flaw, Benjamin argues, in trying to recognize “elements of Greek tragedy” in the 
Trauerspiel. As such, “the philosophy of tragedy has been developed as a theory of the moral 
order of the world, without any reference to historical content, in a system of generalized 
sentiments, which, it was thought, was logically supported by the concepts ‘guilt’ and 
‘atonement’.”170 In trying to read Greek tragedy into the Trauerspiel, Trauerspiel is reduced to a 
theory of moral order, without historical content, systematizing general sentiments, 
supported by concepts like guilt and atonement. Why does Honig go looking for the guilt of 
Creon? What is being atoned for? In claiming that melodrama is “modernity’s democratic 
Trauerspiel” she is subverting her own claim to turn away from a “universalized humanism” 
and ethics.171 
In grounding The Origin of German Tragic Drama in the Epistemo-Critical Prologue, 
Benjamin is critiquing any move towards Universalist humanisms from interpreting Greek 
tragedies. Benjamin is working on multiple levels to critique the application of methodology 
in philosophy (the study of art), including Aristotelian frames of poetics and Schmitt’s 
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171 Honig writes, “But the account he gives of the traits unique to the Trauerspiel does not just evidence the 
distance between that genre and classical tragedy nor only attest to the failure of the Baroque to rise to the 
standards of the classical. As it turns out, the traits of the Trauerspiel serve surprisingly well as genre cues for 
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conception of sovereignty. Benjamin separates knowledge from truth, arguing that the work 
of philosophy is the work of representation, of truth, which cannot be reduced to conceptual 
categories, which always operate in a scientific manner to divide the world. Benjamin writes,  
The reasons for the uncritical use of inductive methods have always been the same: on the one hand 
the love of variety and, on the other hand, indifference to intellectual rigour. . . . In the same way — 
hypostatizing after the fashion of primitive mythologies — we posit a being of uniform substance and 
complete reality and call it Humanism, just as if it were a living individual. But in this and countless 
other cases like it…we ought to be clear that we are doing nothing more than inventing an abstract 
concept in order to help us come to grips with an infinite series of varied spiritual manifestations and 
widely differing personalities.172 
 
Universality enables one to claim to know the world, and universal theories of being enable 
the practices of sovereignty. The invention of an “abstract concept” is meant to help us 
come to terms with the world — to “come to grips with an infinite series of varied spiritual 
manifestations — “and it is this coming to terms with that signals the drive towards 
knowledge away from truth. Benjamin wrote that even though beauty is what truth seeks to 
represent; “beauty will always flee: in dread before the intellect, in fear before the lover.”173 If 
the content of truth is beauty, composed in the world of ideas, it is the philosopher — the 
lover’s — duty to give chase in pursuit of truth. Knowledge, on the other hand, seeks to 
capture and possess. “Knowledge is possession. Its very object is determined by the fact that 
it must be taken possession of — even if in a transcendental sense — in the consciousness. 
The quality of possession remains. For the thing possessed, representation is secondary; it 
does not have prior existence as something representing itself. But the opposite holds good 
for truth.”174 
Honig’s conception of agonistic politics, which claims to reject universalisms derived 
from human finitude, is a rejection of non-participation, those who might seek a form of 
political withdrawal. This agonistic politics, she says is “very optimistic”, because it refuses to 	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allow refuge from the political contour of power in a private sphere. Honig takes linguistic 
cues from Arendt’s conception of plurality in The Human Condition — defining agonistic 
politics as a “commitment to action in concert”, which has focused on the possibility of 
producing something new.175 Honig’s deployment of Arendt, however, not only collapses 
her politically problematic albeit necessary distinction between the public and private realm, 
but also pushes us towards a form of political action that Arendt would have rejected. Honig 
makes her intentions clear,  
We have talked a lot about publicity and public things, but to be really clear it is around these things 
that equality and liberty and justice take shape. When they become merely procedural values, or when 
the form they take has to do with targets or indicators, they become shapeless and unrewarding 
values. They can only do the work that makes us value them if they are situated in the material life of 
citizens and residents together. And that I think is the optimism of agonistic politics.  
 
Equality, liberty, and justice being watchwords of neoliberal democracy, hardly equate to a 
form of agonistic democratic practices. Honig herself admits, “agonism is not per se always 
oppositional or inherently contestational. It just anticipates resistance to all efforts to 
institute and maintain equality or justice.” In order to begin to think about what might 
constitute democracy or democratic practices, one has to question the structural formation 
of language, signification, and the social institutions that house power and sovereignty. To 
put it another way, Honig isn’t thinking about a form of democracy or democratic action in 
her re-reading of Antigone that has the ability to undermine the state, instead she’s 
developing a sentimental conceptual framework that positions agonists to claim sovereignty. 
She likes the game of politics, as we might understand it. She wants to become the courtier 
to the sovereign in the Spanish mourning play. In contesting the power of the sovereign, the 
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courtier doesn’t subvert the structure of power, but rather merely reveals how its 
instruments operate. The courtier exposes where the authority of the sovereign comes from. 
The “cloak and dagger” routine, as Benjamin calls it, is just that. Power hungering after 
power. 
 Her turn away from the ethical turn is not a turn at all. Instead, it’s a reconstitution 
of liberal democracy masked with a form of humanism that posits a more socially conscious 
(plural) subjectivity in the center. This “life in common”, “action in concert” plurality is still 
an imperative to act, which is still the conflation of a sentimental morality derived from 
tragedy, which claims the name democracy, with ethics.  
Conclusion  
To argue for “counter-sovereignty” that contests normative claims to power and 
authority, is to argue that we become Benjamin’s courtier in the Trauerspiel. This argument is 
illustrative of Benjamin’s greater political critique of left melancholy, which remains attached 
to the significations of power rather than overturning power in itself. The rejection of 
universalism here is a false rejection masked by a superficially melancholic lust for power. 
Honig ends up reconstituting universalism in the name of democracy instead of undermining 
its underpinnings, or questioning contemporary political theory’s claim to democracy itself. 
In order to actually turn towards Benjamin, one must turn away from the Greek tragic 
narrative, and towards an understanding of melancholy that encompasses a dialectical 
possibility for resistance to both ethics and universalisms. 
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CHAPTER III 
WOLIN AND ADORNO:  
THE PROMISE OF MOURNING IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY  	  
“If theory is absorbed into the discourse of action so as to become inseparable, it will be 
impossible for it to perceive when action has fallen short of what it should be. It is the 
nature of action to fall short of theory and it is the role of theory to declare that. Theory can 
only perform that critical function if it retains a separate identity. Otherwise theory becomes 
techne, and the theorist becomes indistinguishable from the technician of power.” 
       — Sheldon Wolin, “On the Theory and Practice of 
Power” 
 
“That something should be done is a belief held by everyone nowadays; what is found to be 
problematic is when someone decides not to do anything for once, but to retreat from the 
dominant realm of practical activity in order to think about something essential.”  
       — Theodor Adorno, Problems of Moral 
Philosophy  
 
 
In this chapter I turn towards Sheldon Wolin’s conception of democratic time and 
invocation in order to further explore the contemporary turn towards mourning. I am going 
to discuss contemporary political theory’s turn towards a politics of loss and mourning 
through Wolin’s critique of the “systematization of loss” and turn towards Adorno in order 
to argue against the systematization is a gesture that refuses the proliferations of “turns”, 
themes, and conceptual categories in contemporary political thought. 
  
Introduction 
In this chapter I explore Wolin’s conceptions of democracy, democratic time, and his 
move from vocation to invocation in order to think about the ethical turn in contemporary 
political theory. In “Political Theory: From Vocation to Invocation” Wolin offers a critique 
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of what he calls the “systematization of loss” that illustrates how theorists have conformed 
to rhythmic cycles of capitalist production and consumption. Wolin’s turn towards Adorno 
in his essay on invocation is a rejection of demands for democratic political action. It is a 
rejection of normative narratives of political struggle that rely on winners and losers, and it 
speaks to a metaphysical desire that rejects the moralization of ethics. Loss of one form or 
another — the attenuation of democracy and the political events of the 20th Century — form 
the center of Wolin’s work. In his movement from vocation to invocation Wolin focuses 
these losses on the loss of the collective, which is necessary for both his conception of the 
political and political theory.  
Wolin usually begins his work by attempting to offer a definition of political theory, 
while offering an explanation of the political problem(s) he is addressing. His conception of 
the political, which cannot be separated from his vision of democracy, demands a center, 
something to respond to. Certain conceptual categories and philosophical questions form 
the center of Wolin’s work — democracy, politics, the political, and political theory. What is 
the work of political theory? What is the political? What is politics? How might we think 
about democracy within the context of American politics? How have postmodern forms of 
power changed the political terrain? What constitutes political action? How might we engage 
in it?176  
In Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought Wolin defines 
the work of political theory in the context of the western tradition of political philosophy, 
Plato’s “inquiry into the nature of the good life,” and “methods of analysis and criteria of 
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judgment.”177 Wolin first describes the relationship between philosophy and political 
philosophy; then moves from political philosophy to political theory to say that theorists 
have “accepted as their own the basic quest of the philosopher for systematic knowledge.”178 
Political theory emerges from the tradition of political philosophy as something that is 
created and radically new.179 At the beginning of The Presence of the Past Wolin writes, 
“Political theory might be defined in general terms as a tradition of discourse concerned 
about the present being and well-being of collectives. It is primarily a civic and secondarily 
an academic activity. In my understanding this means that political theory is a critical 
engagement with collective existence and with the political experiences of power to which it 
gives rise.”180 In “Political Theory as a Vocation” Wolin describes the work of political 
theory “as the vocation of the ‘epic theorist’”, there is a sense of “magnitude” where “by an 
act of thought, the theorist seeks to reassemble the whole political world. He aims to grasp 
present structures and interrelationships, and to re-present them in a new way.”181 Wolin 
never stops wrestling with the question of political theory and what it means to be a political 
theorist. This struggle informs the way he addresses political problems, the question of 
democracy, and the work of political science as a profession more broadly.  
At the beginning of Tocqueville: Democracy Between Two Worlds Wolin tells us that he is 
investigating Tocqueville’s conception of political theory, how he experienced it and 
practiced it. Wolin asks, how did he combine theoretical life with the life of the politician–
the vita contemplativa and the vita activa? Wolin returns to the Greek definition of theory as 	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(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), 4. 
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179 Ibid., 4–7. 
180 Wolin, The Presence of the Past. p. 1 
181 Sheldon S. Wolin, “Political Theory as a Vocation,” The American Political Science Review 63, no. 4 (December 
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theoros identifying the affinity between the wanderer, the outsider, and the theorist. He argues 
“ ‘theorist’ comes from the Greek word theoros, which was the name for an emissary who 
traveled on behalf of his city to other cities and societies. A theoria, from which ‘theory’ was 
derived, meant ‘journey.’ Travelling is, of course, an encounter with differences. . . .” Wolin’s 
conception of theōria emphasizes the aspect of seeing and publicity. Within his spatial and 
linguistic construction of theory Wolin draws us towards an understanding of temporality. 
Conceptions of loss and temporality are central to Wolin’s definitions of political 
theory and democracy. Within Wolin’s shifting conceptions of politics, the political, and 
political theory there are different notions of temporality that pull out the relationship 
between time, space, and politics. Wolin’s proclamation that political time is out of sync 
echoes Hamlet’s lament “our time is out of joynt.”182 There is a dissonance and discomfort 
felt when the present fails to exist beyond the shadow of past or future. Within this 
dissonance there is a need to think through the political theorists’ relationship to history as 
an object of contemplation, but also time and temporality as it informs our understanding of 
history and what light it can shed on our contemporary political situation.  
In “What Time is it?” Wolin argues, “Political time is out of sync with the 
temporalities, rhythms, and pace governing economy and culture.”183 Wolin begins from the 
premise that part of the task of political theory is an ongoing consideration of what “counts 
as politics” and what should be included in the “domain of the political.” In this spirit the 
work of political theory ought to embody a kind of dynamism that is able to respond to 
social, economic, cultural, and political shifts. Temporality becomes a measure of political 	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form, and for Wolin a democratic temporality requires “an element of leisure.” Part of the 
task of the political theorist, according to Wolin, is determining what is political. Within 
contemporary theory Wolin argues that there are two dominant trends he writes: “The 
promise of democratic political freedom of spatial limits has found both defendants and 
detractors among contemporary political theorists, dividing those who seek new political 
possibilities within these transformations from those who lament the disappearance of a 
common public space.” Arguing against Jeffrey Isaac, Wolin articulates the importance of 
thinking about temporality in relationship to politics and doing the work of historically 
informed political theory that rejects homogenous, linear narratives.184  
For Wolin, the work of political theory is governed by political time, which stands in 
opposition to “the temporalities of economy and popular culture.” His critique of political 
theory in “What Time is It?” asks why it is so difficult for the theorist to stand outside these 
dominant economic and cultural modes of temporality. The implication being: if the theorist 
was interested in the work of democracy, she would necessarily be opposed to capitalist 
rhythms of time that are only interested in production. At the end of “What time is it?” 
Wolin says, “It is not at all clear today what would not count as politics.” The proliferation 
of politics, what counts as political, is itself a product of what Wolin calls economic and 
cultural time. Temporality gives form to politics, and a critical temporality — thinking 
through the relationship between history and the work of politics, beyond lamenting our 
presumed democratic losses — is necessary to the work of theory. So, how do we escape the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Wolin writes, “The objection is in part that there is no single shared ‘political time’, only culturally 
constituted different times. Their self-conscious character produces the equivalent of a different time zone that 
contributes to a disruption and undermines the possibility of a common narrative structure and, along with it, a 
common identity -- formerly a staple element in conceptions of the political. These diverse time 
zones help to promote (what can be called) ‘the instability of political time’ and to expose a broader political 
problem, one which I can best approach through the language of temporality. I am referring to a pervasive 
temporal disjunction that has contributed to serious political difficulties and helped to make the task of the 
theorist daunting.” Ibid. Wolin reiterates what he considers the work of the “historical informed” political 
theorist to be in “Politics as a Vocation.” 
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tempos of contemporary capitalist culture?  
 One need not be in sync with to be attuned to the present moment. In a piece titled 
“Hannah Arendt and The Ordinance of Time,” Wolin argues, "Thinking was not like work, 
form-creating, but as Heidegger would later phrase it, Bestimmung, ‘attunement,’ that is, a 
sensitive responding to or feel for the atmosphere surrounding Being and a glimpse into its 
essential nature.”185 Here, thinking is presented apart from work  —  apart from a form of 
synchronicity between action and the temporal order of capitalist, empty, homogenous time 
to use Benjamin’s language. To be ‘attuned to’ is to have a feel for, to have an ear for the 
harmony, but it doesn’t mean one must sync to it. The demand for a democratic time is also 
a spatial demand that requires political theorists to have distance from what they are 
critiquing. To remain at once within and outside of is the dissonance in the lament ‘our time 
is out of joynt,’ but it is also Wolin’s warning that theory has become attuned to and 
synchronous with the dominant measurements of temporality. 
 The fast pace of contemporary political thought must to an extent mimic our time, but 
Wolin is rightly concerned. In replicating the pace of life, Wolin is afraid political thinkers 
have begun to mimic the forces that endanger it. The methodical rhythm of production and 
consumption shouldn’t be the drumbeat to which thought marches; thought shouldn’t 
march at all, especially if it is to do the work of political theory. 
I. Fugitive Democracy and Democracy in America  
The question of democracy in America is at the heart of Wolin’s work. Democracy 
has always been a fraught question for Wolin. Intimately interwoven with the role of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 The rest of the quotation reads: “In her studies and reflections on ancient Greek philosophy and politics 
Hannah Arendt acquired that "attunement" and she gave expression to it in a celebration of authentic politics . 
. . "  
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political theorist, the question for Wolin is idiosyncratic, and expands beyond claims for 
redemption or saving. The absence of democracy is our inherited loss as political theorists. 
Democracy operates as a signifier in Wolin’s work, invoking a set of questions and problems 
to which we must answer. Wolin’s understanding of democracy is deeply rooted in his 
reading of Tocqueville, which proffers a particular conception of democracy. As Wolin 
notes, Tocqueville “was the first political thinker to put the question of democracy at the 
center of his work” while also expositing the role of the political theorist. With these 
definitions, Wolin isn’t turning us back to an Athenian conception of democracy, but rather 
his reading of democracy in Tocqueville’s Democracy in America.”186 
 Wolin’s conception of the political is tied to his conception of democracy. “Fugitive 
Democracy” re-draws Wolin’s distinction between the political and politics. The political is 
an expression of the idea that a free society is diverse and enjoys moments of commonality, 
where through public deliberation, collective power is used to promote or protect the 
wellbeing of the collectivity. Politics refers to the legitimized and public contestations, 
primarily by organized and unequal social powers, over access to the resources available to 
the public authorities of the collectivity. Politics is continuous, ceaseless, and endless. Wolin 
is “reluctant” to call democracy a form of government; instead he argues that democracy is 
the political  —  episodic and rare. In “Democracy in the Discourse of Postmodernism” 
Wolin offers a genealogy of postmodern political thought further critiquing the problem of 
individual subjectivism that undermines the possibility of a dēmos within contemporary 
democratic forms.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 In “Norm and Form: the Constitutionalizing of Democracy” Wolin writes, “American democracy appears 
to have succeeded precisely where Athenian democracy failed. When Tocqueville asserted that in nineteenth-
century New England he had discovered ‘a democracy more perfect than antiquity had dared to dream of,’ he 
meant that Americans had resolved the tension between democracy and constitutionalism . . .” 
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Wolin’s conception of democracy as moments of the political are always appearing 
and disappearing. Just as he draws a distinction between politics and the political, he draws a 
distinction between democracy and moments of fugitive democracy. Wolin is concerned 
with what he calls the attenuation of democracy, which is characterized primarily by the 
progressive privatization of public institutions, of politics. In “Fugitive Democracy” Wolin 
writes: 
Institutionalization marks the attenuation of democracy: leaders begin to appear; 
hierarchies develop; experts of one kind or another cluster around the centers of 
decision; order, procedure, and precedent displace a more spontaneous politics: in 
retrospect the latter appears as disorganized, inefficient. Democracy thus seems 
destined to be a moment rather than a form. Throughout the history of political 
thought virtually all writers emphasize the unstable and temporary character of 
democracy. Why is it that democracy is reduced, even devitalized by form? Why is its 
presence occasional and fugitive?187  
 
In this passage Wolin observes that democracy is rendered as something occasional and 
fugitive. Democracy is a moment, and not something that can be institutionalized. He asks 
us to reconceive democracy “as something other than a form of government.” Democracy in 
America is absorbed by the political rhetoric of constitutionalism. The political as a form of 
fugitive democracy is fleeting. It contains within it possibility, but it is not a form of 
government, and it is not permanent. 
For Wolin, there is a necessary relationship between democracy and the political. 
Both are temporal categories for Wolin and rely upon a form of collective memory. 
Democracy exists as a possibility and relies upon the ability to remember the political. It is 
not necessarily revolutionary, but contains revolutionary potential. It is a moment of 
rebellion.188 Democracy in these terms of re-calling the political is not a call to action, to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Sheldon S. Wolin, “‘Fugitive Democracy.,’” Constellations: An International Journal of Critical & Democratic Theory 
1, no. 1 (April 1994): 19. 
188 Wolin writes, “Democracy needs to be reconceived as something other than a form of government: as a 
mode of being which is condition by bitter experience, doomed to succeed only temporarily, but is a recurrent 
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control, or to influence the State apparatus. Definitions of democracy that rely upon 
“citizen-as-actor and politics-as-episodic” are incompatible with the modern State, he argues, 
“as the fixed center of political life and the corollary conception of politics as continuous 
activity organized around a single dominating objective, control or influence over the State 
apparatus.”189  
The modern state is characterized by what Wolin calls ‘managed democracy.’ 
Managed democracy refers to the way in which the world is organized and manufactured by 
the government and corporate elites who shape our perception of reality — received 
information and images  —  “to maximize the modes of power which they command”190 He 
writes, “Managed democracy is a created world of images, sounds, and scenarios that makes 
only occasional contact with the everyday reality of most people. The rest of the time the 
world floats in dissociation, a realm wherein reference has been suspended.”191 Wolin is 
drawing a line between a manufactured world and the “everyday reality of most people.”   
II. Invoking the Political Theorist   
At the end of the twentieth century Wolin revisited his essay “Political Theory as a 
Vocation.” Wolin begins his millennial reflections on the future of contemporary political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
possibility as long as the memory of the political survives. The experience of which democracy is the witness is 
the realization that the political mode of existence is such that it can be, and is, periodically lost. Democracy, 
Polybius remarks, lapses ‘in the course of time’. Democracy is a political moment, perhaps the political 
moment, when the political is remembered and recreated. Democracy is a rebellious moment that may assume 
revolutionary, destructive proportions, or may not.” Ibid., 23. 
189 “What is actually being measured by the claim of democratic legitimacy is not the vitality of democracy in 
those nations but the degree to which democracy is attenuated so as to serve other ends. The most 
fundamental of these is the establishment and development of the modernizing State. The so-called ‘problem 
of contemporary democracy’ is not, as is often alleged, that the ancient conception of democracy is 
incompatible with the size and scale of modern political societies. Rather it is that any conception of democracy 
grounded in the citizen-as-actor and politics-as-episodic is incompatible with the modern choice of the State as 
the fixed center of political life and the corollary conception of politics as continuous activity organized around 
a single dominating objective, control of or influence over the State apparatus.” Ibid. 
190 Sheldon S. Wolin, “Democracy in the Discourse of Postmodernism,” Social Research 57, no. 1 (April 1, 1990): 
28. 
191 Ibid., 27–28. 
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theory in “Political Theory: From Vocation to Invocation” with a “confessional note” that 
lists his formative political experiences, all of which are in one way or another “dominated 
by loss.” He reflects that in a “culture that measures life by notions such as progress, 
development, innovation, and modernization, loss tends to be an experience we are advised 
to ‘get past.’ Loss belongs to history, while politics and life are about what is still to be 
done.”192 In beginning this way Wolin illustrates the role loss plays in his own political work. 
All formative political moments are in one way or another dominated by loss, they compose 
the center or place from which Wolin begins his work of political theory.  
At heart, Wolin’s essay is mournful of political theory as a practice. Instead of calling 
political theorists to vocation he offers a critical and at moments derisive dirge: “It would be 
nice to end on an uplifting note and invoke political theory to come to the aid of democracy, 
but besides being fatuous that call may be too late in the day.”193 He doesn’t leave us entirely 
empty handed, though. In turning towards Adorno, and the promise of future political 
theory, he offers us a way of thinking about moving forward, a way of “recognizing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Sheldon S. Wolin, “Political Theory: From Vocation to Invocation,” in Vocations Of Political Theory, 1 edition 
(Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2000), 3. 
193 Ibid., 21. There is darkness to Wolin’s thinking, as Brown wrote in “Democracy and Bad Dreams”, and this 
essay is perhaps the most mournful of Wolin’s writing. Something seems irretrievably lost in Wolin’s reflections 
upon the contemporary state of political theory. The language of solitude, loneliness, and loss, is not new to his 
writing, though, it solemnly punctuates his work on Tocqueville and frames the Presence of the Past. In “Evening 
Land” Ann Norton focuses on Wolin’s turn towards Adorno to discuss democracy and America as what she 
terms Abendland, or a land of death. She laments that without history, Americans have no sense of place, that 
Americans are always between past and future without being present. She writes “Democracy requires that at 
some moments, and in some respects always, one will cease to be.  . . .The practice of democracy is the practice 
of loss.” Democracy is a way of being towards death, what she describes as “the long practice of death.” And 
so, democracy, like theory, must need deal with the cross-grained, with that which is left behind. At the 
beginning of the collective volume Democracy and Vision, William E. Connolly begins by reflecting on Wolin’s 
original “Politics as a Vocation” and notes in an explanatory way that to do political theory in the 1960’s was 
“moribund,” writing “The air was thick with funeral orations. Because a new science of politics was on the 
verge of consolidation, political theory in the ‘normative’ or ‘traditional’ sense had become unnecessary.” 
Democracy, like political theory, is subject to constant change, and while it is swept up in the temporality of 
contemporary life, it must find a way to remain attuned to the cross-grained. Aryeh Botwinick and William E. 
Connolly, Democracy and Vision: Sheldon Wolin and the Vicissitudes of the Political. (Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 2001). 
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democracy as the dystopia of our time.”194 While the work of political theory has always been 
the work of retrieval, calling, and re-calling for Wolin, in a way his move towards invocation 
breaks with his past practice — and it must, if theory is going to move against the current 
tide, and embrace the cross-grained.  
Wolin places the question of loss in the hands of Adorno in order to argue that even 
if knowledge attains to the rectilinear succession of history it cannot do away with those who 
have been cast aside to the cross-grained. Instead of letting this dynamic illustrate the 
dialectical movement of history, it illustrates what Wolin calls a symbiotic relationship 
between losers and victors, where each requires the other. Wolin’s turn towards Adorno and 
his rejection of dialectics in favor of a symbiotic relationship pushes us back towards a neo-
Kantian critique of the subject, which forces us to consider both “We”, “I”, and the 
relationship between subject and object. What is lost in the historical narratives that Wolin 
wants to critique is this dynamic relationship, and it is also a certain form of collective we. 
The victors of history have defeated the losers, but not erased them, and require their 
continued existence. 
The loss of contemporary political theory is twofold: The loss of vocation in the 
practice of political theory, and the attenuation of democracy perpetuated by the rapid pace 
of technological change and the privatization of the public sphere. The loss of vocation for 
Wolin is evidenced by the number of “intellectual permutations” that only seem to align with 
the constant change that characterizes this contemporary world. “The theorist has replicated 
the pace of technological change: he and she are synchronous with the utopia.”195 The utopia 
of course is really our dystopic reality. Wolin sees the turns in contemporary thought as 
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194 Wolin, “Political Theory: From Vocation to Invocation,” 21. 
195 Ibid. 
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responding to a collective calling that must be responded to if democracy is going to be 
saved, if the political is going to exist. 
 In his own way, Wolin has moved from mourning the loss of democracy in America to 
a form of reflective melancholia, concerned that while returning to political theory as a 
vocation is more important than ever, that perhaps it can’t be re-called. He asks “Or is the 
concept of a calling still plausible, even urgent, in the context of pseudo-democracy, not as a 
personal choice or as institutional certification but as a public commitment for a time when 
the idea of publics has pretty much been superseded by that of constituencies or dissolved 
into various identities based on race, gender, or sexual preference?”196 The loss of vocation 
as a practice is traced to the emergence of two philosophical turns: “one the cultivation of 
subjective individualism and the other the objective or rational self-interest.”197 Wolin 
addresses the latter in his first essay on vocation, taking aim at methodologically bent 
political science, while the essay on invocation takes aim at the prior.198 
Wolin believes that the democratic way of life is best for the “vast majority” of 
human beings; he laments democracy being replaced by meritocracy as the work of political 
theory is replaced by imperatives to act. The losses between vocation and invocation 
described are not dissociated from one another. For Wolin, the attenuation of democracy is 
marked by the public/private inversion. Today, we can no longer differentiate between the 
political state and private economy. We live in what Wolin terms an “Economic Polity, ” and 
the collective that he wants to guard has been steadily eroded by the erasure of the 
public/private distinction. Progressive privatization of public institutions has transformed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Ibid., 5. 
197 Ibid., 6. 
198 Wolin doesn’t seem to link this to the loss of authority he cites in Weber. For Luther, a calling presupposed 
a certain “structure to the community” a place for the practice, which assumed the actor would be acting in the 
interest of the community, and the community needed and wanted what the practitioner provided.  
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collective political life into collective economic interests, which are regulated by the wants 
and needs of individuals. This appears ever more present in contemporary American politics. 
Wolin argues, our sense of powerlessness as a collective in the balance of struggle is “most 
acute when terrorism irrupts.”199 What is at stake for Wolin is the collective identity of the 
polity as it is expressed through our constitutional power. Instead of collective crisis 
strengthening democratic subjectivity, Wolin sees moments of loss making power “available 
to government, the loss [of which] is experienced by them [citizens] as political passivity.”200 
Our powerlessness is illustrated in that we have become the passive objects of power rather 
than active political subjects.201 Wolin traces this collective “identity crisis” to the eighties 
with “changes in the form and substance of power,” which are characterized by the 
expansion of state power through the merger between private economic interests and public 
institutions.202 American politics post 9/11, post the economic crisis, have only been further 
characterized by the merger between private and public. These moments of collective crisis 
do not open up space for democratic politics, because that the shareholders of power create 
and use that space. When democratic political action takes shape, it appears, at best, 
symbolically confined within the rhetoric of “never again,” or “not on my watch.” One 
could argue that corporative power interests have had more success in accessing 
constitutional rights in the past ten years than citizens have.  Surveying the political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 Wolin, The Presence of the Past, 30–31. He continues: “ . . . it is the perfect symbol of frustrated will: the vast 
majority of Americans want nothing more than to muster all of our vaunted power and use it to annihilate 
terrorists and the third-rate powers that subsidize them. And yet . . .we know that at the bottom we are 
helpless.” 
200 Wolin, “Political Theory: From Vocation to Invocation,” 12. He writes, “The peculiarity of the American 
way of legitimating power is that it tends, simultaneously, to disguise the actual expansion of state power under 
the category of pragmatic programs (from ‘internal improvements of the nineteenth century to Chrysler 
bailouts in the twentieth) while welcoming the increasing power of the ‘private’ economic institutions and 
interpreting that increase as located ‘outside’ the proper ‘sphere of government.’”  
201 Wolin, The Presence of the Past, 31. 
202 Ibid., 12. He offers the example of Chrysler Bailouts in the eighties, an example that surely resonates today 
after 2008. 
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landscape, with this view of American politics today, there is little to be hopeful for, which 
gives way Wolin in his move towards invocation.  
While Wolin has always been critical of the attenuation of democracy and protective 
of the work of political theory, there is an undeniable shift between The Presence of the Past, 
Politics and Vision and his essay on invocation. Wolin moves from critiquing the loss of the 
polity in The Presence of the Past, to mourning the loss of the promise that political theory 
might be able to retrieve or restore democratic losses in his essay on invocation. The Presence 
of the Past draws us to the vocation of political theory, arguing that it ought be “primarily a 
civic and secondarily an academic activity.”203 In reflecting on the inversion between public 
and private interests, Wolin again turns us back towards the public as the realm of the 
common good, where public service and political theory, as such, should be conducted in 
the “spirit of disinterestedness.”204 In part, this disinterestedness is lost in the loss of the 
collective. There is no collectivity to issue a call to, no body to respond to, because the 
privatization of public interests has fractured the collective (democratic) identity, leaving us 
with privatized “subjective individualism.” 
 Drawing a distinction between vocation and invocation, Wolin tells us that while 
vocation deals with acting, invocation is a response to a certain kind of loss. Invocation is 
signified by the loss of something irreplaceable. The world is in some way diminished by 
loss, and invocation assumes an understanding of the past, the present, and a sense of what 
is to come.205 In this sense Wolin’s work has always been a labor of invocation. A kind of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Ibid., 1. 
204 Wolin is drawing on Weber, who is drawing on Martin Luther, and the idea that politics as a vocation is 
performed out of a kind of selflessness. Wolin, “Political Theory: From Vocation to Invocation,” 25. 
205 “But what of invocation, of that which signified that something irreplaceable has gone, perhaps fled or been 
rendered ineffectual, with the result that the world has been diminished? What is at at stake is not the mere 
recognition of loss but how one works through it. To invoke presupposes that one has a grasp of how things 
have been, perhaps how something came to be, how some practice, expectation, or value became sufficiently 
powerful to gain a foothold and become established in the world.” Ibid. 
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recalling that forces us to think about the work of political theory as retrieval, a 
reconstructing of the collective. To put it in Wolin’s own terms vocation is that which deals 
with “politics and life” and “what is still to be done,” while invocation deals with losses, 
which belong to history. In setting up this movement from vocation to invocation as his title 
suggests, Wolin turns us away from the former to the later, asking us to consider these losses 
out of history. He is concerned that political theory has forgone the work of vocation 
altogether, and now cannot be invoked. If everything is political then how can political 
theorists think about what is politics, or the political? To what would they respond? Let 
alone, to whom? 
  “Political Theory: From Vocation to Invocation” accuses contemporary theorists of 
being hypercritical, to the point that everything becomes politicized. Instead of being 
uncritical in approach, theorists have become overly critical. If everything is political, Wolin 
argues, then politics loses all meaning.  He is essentially affirming a problematic and creating 
one at the same time, drawing a delineating line around political theory and acknowledging 
the problem of doing political theory post-68’, post-Foucault, where everything becomes a 
site of possible contestation and power.206 In this vein, Wolin argues that critical thought 
today has morphed from the Greek krisis, to the contemporary “critic.”  Political theorists 
are no longer responding to certain political events or moments; conditions “so grave as to 
force a turning point.” Instead, critical theory today has been inculcated in the twenty-four-
hour-a-day news cycle.207   
Wolin’s initial essay on political theory as a vocation was a response to specific 
political events. He was responding to something as he points out in his work on invocation, 
saying “Whatever the shortcomings of my original essay, its reference point was plainly to a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Wolin explicitly cites Foucault.  
207 Wolin, “Political Theory: From Vocation to Invocation,” 15. 
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widely acknowledged crisis in American politics centered in the Vietnam War.”208 Wolin goes 
on to say that although the war was connected to other conflicts of the period like civil 
rights and racism, the fact of having a political center — some specific event to write in 
response to “lent an intensity to politics as well as to theorizing.” The one paradigm left, 
Wolin suggests, is “the domination of the world by change . . .We live in a utopia in which 
loss has been systematized, a utopia whose existence depends symbiotically on the 
perpetuation of dystopia.”209   
II.I. Systematized loss 
The systematization of loss that Wolin criticizes illustrates the contemporary ethical 
turn, which is characterized by the proliferation of conceptual categories and themes, which 
are designed to turn us towards a form of democratic politics, or illuminate where such 
democratic possibilities exist. Within contemporary political theory there is a call to a form 
of democratic political action that somehow moves us closer to a form of democratic 
politics. Wolin is right to point out that some political thinkers have turned towards the 
work of loss and mourning in order to call for new forms of political action in the name of 
democracy. In the movement from vocation to invocation Wolin is calling into question the 
rhetoric of democracy itself within political theory. 
Wolin is critical of those who try to reduce politics to a form of what he calls “vapid 
morality,” but his own work demands a political center and expresses a kind of metaphysical 
longing. The Foucaultian identity politics that Wolin critiques has done away with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208  Ibid., 13. Wolin goes on to say that the “Although at the time the war was understood to be connected to 
other conflicts, such as those over civil rights and racism, and to the revolts taking place in the inner cities, the 
fact that there was a center lent an intensity to politics as well as to theorizing. The essay accused political 
science of complicity by its uncritical, accommodative relationship to power, and of beings so focused on 
methodological applications as to be unaware that it was merely producing a simulacrum of the existing 
political order.”    
209 Ibid. 
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collective center of democratic politics — in the sense that Wolin talks about democratic 
politics — and the grandeur of political theory, which requires a different temporality (leisure 
time) and spatial positioning, the political theorist as outsider and wanderer. Wolin’s late turn 
towards Adorno is another step towards critiquing normative conceptions of political action 
that rely upon narratives of wins and losses, the moralization of ethics, and neo-Kantianism 
that denies metaphysical understanding of the world in favor of reasoning. This critique 
comes through most clearly in Tocqueville: Between Two Worlds, where Wolin contrasts 
Tocqueville’s reading of Pascal’s Descartes and Tocqueville’s own epic theory that imitates 
the eye of God.   
Wolin reveals an affinity between Tocqueville’s project and his own in describing 
Democracy as framed by loss — caught between a world that was passing away and a new one 
that was beginning to emerge. Continuity through the construction of a tradition is meant to 
give ear to the work of the political theorist. It is meant as a form of counter-argument to 
the systematizing tendencies that Enlightenment thought ushered in. Here in his careful 
study of Tocqueville, Wolin composes a critique of the moralization of ethics that has come 
to define the American post-modern liberal definition of identity politics, which are defined 
in Tocqueville’s terms as “individualism” and “privatization”.  
As a counter to “managed democracy” Wolin conceptualizes a democratic 
temporality and conception of democratic moments that are more in line with Tocqueville’s 
conception of how democracy functioned in New England. Leisure as a temporal category is 
central to Wolin’s conception of democracy and political theory, and signifies the mode of 
vita contemplative: the space where political thinkers go to think, that quiet sounding wall of 
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inner-reflection that creates space, and an Aristotelian sense of wonder.210 Wolin’s emphasis 
on leisure can also be read as a political argument to refrain from action. To stand apart 
from the world of politics, a ‘pausing for breath’ as Benjamin might say. The sharp dividing 
line that was laid down between theory and action is complicated by Wolin’s portrait of 
Tocqueville.211 
And yet, Wolin is calling upon the rhetoric of democracy; his work presupposes a 
kind of tradition that must be attained to, and one to which we must be attuned.212 It is itself 
a methodology for doing the work of political theory that straddles a line between 
practicality, addressing specific political problems, and what he calls the creation of the 
mytheme. It is the rapid pace of change that characterizes modernity that immobilizes the 
political theorist into inaction. At the same time, in a quieter voice, Wolin’s work possesses a 
sense of metaphysical certainty. Biblical metaphors, passages, and references pepper his 
works, but beyond his instrumentalization of the Old Testament, through Tocqueville, 
Wolin draws a direct parallel between God and the work of the political theorist.213 Wolin is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Through Wolin’s rendering, we can picture Tocqueville wandering through the great northern territory 
confronted with the expanse of wilderness beholden by the phenomenon of the New World. As Wolin 
describes, he experiences what political theorists had only imagined “the state of nature complete with noble 
savage.” Wolin also makes notes of Tocqueville’s journals, which he often returns to in offering an account of 
his journey. “The life of the theorist cannot be untied from the personal life .. .” This is not reductionist. It 
implies that there is a necessary relationship between the interior workings of the life of the mind and the work 
political theory. 
211As it was by Arendt as well, when she notes at the beginning of the Life of the Mind that her original 
intention had been to address that ancient question between theory and action. To think and to act are two 
conflicting sentiments that require one another—to act in the world and to live the life of the philosopher—
and rely upon the tension and anxieties produced by too much or too little movement (action). 
212 Wolin doesn’t offer an oration for the work of political theory, perhaps because he always seems to fall back 
upon a kind of melancholic, not out of hope but commitment. There is an unwillingness to let go of the 
possibility of the future. Arendt might have called this natality or promise. For Wolin there is something even 
more precious here. There’s an insistence and fidelity to the work of political theory as a vocation and the work 
of democracy. The changing definitions he offers reflect perhaps his own changing relationship to the field of 
political theory. 
213 Wolin writes, “Where, then, was a theoretical model for such a feat to be found? From the same note cited 
in the preceding epigraph Tocqueville concludes with an injunction to himself, ‘See as much as possible 
through the thought of God and judge from there.’ The archetypical theorist was God and the paradigm of 
perfect theoretical knowledge was embodied in God’s way of thinking. God sees ‘the resemblances that make 
[an individual] like his fellows’ just as he see ‘the differences which isolate him from them.’ To see as God 
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not just calling the theorist back to the vocation of political theory, he is calling us back to a 
center that requires a shift in our metaphysical premises that reject Descartian and Kantian 
logic. 
 This critique of modern methodological discourse that requires standards of 
knowledge cannot be separated from the metaphysics underlying Wolin’s writing. Here we 
can easily situate Adorno next to Wolin. The primary lament of modernity is methodologies 
stripping the world of mythology and wonder. The metaphysical demand is a turn away from 
the primacy science, relativism, and positivism. The turn towards positivism is a 
displacement of the objects and prioritization of the subject. The elevation of the self over 
all object relationships forecloses the possibility of “returning to the object of 
contemplation” to create new meanings, as Benjamin might say. The self is thrown back 
upon the self, foreclosing the possibility of giving meaning.  
 If we take Wolin’s reading of Tocqueville seriously and follow his turn towards 
Adorno we have to return to a critique of Neo-Kantianism, which somehow seems to have 
been lost, and face what I want to call a vocative loss of we. Democracy as a conceptual 
category alone cannot stand at the center of contemporary political theory and neither can 
forms of humanisms derived from Neo-Kantian principles.214 The tragic tradition relies upon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
would see, to think as God would think, would meant being able not only to see into the future, but to grasp at 
one and the same moment the particular and the general, the individual and the collectivity, aristocratic 
singularity and democratic generality/equality. It would mean not sacrificing the particular to the general, as 
was the wont of democracy, or the general to the particular as was the vice of aristocracy. In an astonishing 
passage toward the close of Democracy, Tocqueville wrote, ‘I strive to penetrate into the viewpoint of God, and 
it is from there that I seek to consider and to judge human things.” 
214 I think it’s worthwhile to note the importance of conceptual categories to the work of political theory and to 
call their utility and function into question. Wolin points out the number of turns and ideological shifts within 
contemporary political theory, emphasizing the idea that theorists mimic capitalist forms of production and 
consumption. The proliferation of and reliance upon conceptual categories illustrates his argument. In Between 
Two Worlds, Wolin points out that generalizable conceptual categories like the ones Tocqueville relied upon 
have the power to undermine or at the very least pose a challenge to Cartesian logic. However, as Wolin points 
out there is an “affinity between generalization, abstraction, and systematic, logical thinking . . .”. So the 
question becomes: “How, then, to employ generalization yet avoid its political pitfalls and historical 
association?” Sheldon S. Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds: The Making of a Political and Theoretical Life / 
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a narrative of great deeds and great men, and ultimately upon demise. This is a mournful 
thing, and creates a wallowing that echoes Wolin’s lament, “perhaps it is too late in the day.” 
Not too late in the day for some form of democracy to emerge, but too late to take the time 
to do the work of political theory; to return to the tradition of critical theory that was 
fractured by the turn towards Post-structuralism. Too late if we are somehow committed to 
the tragic narrative and emphasis on democracy, which demands a moral center and yet 
continues to refuse a metaphysics that displaces the Subject from the center of reasoning and 
logic, thus reifying the modalities of domination that have forsaken a collective we in favor 
of a we masked with a subjective I.  
III. The Lost Object, Mourning, and Melancholia 
Mourning, construed politically is bound to loss, and assumes a kind of opening occurs. 
Something that once took up space no longer is, and so we can form new attachments. The 
politicization of mourning in this way is also a spatial rendering. To create space, rhetorically, 
does not perform the same function as, for example, Benjamin’s notion of Messianism — 
busting open the historical continuum. While Benjamin’s conception of Messianism might 
require a loss it demands a break. Space is not opened up within, the way forth is cleared and 
the past is left behind. When Tocqueville talks about historical loss or Wolin moves between 
two worlds, we are given a temporal and spatial account of how to think about both past and 
present, and the loss of meaning. 
This is important because it shapes the conceptual categories that theorists use, 
which can lead to understanding, meaning, and sometimes action. Certain conceptual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Sheldon S. Wolin. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 92–93. Wolin emphasizes the quality of 
loneliness and solitude that accompanied Tocqueville on his journey, noting that his solitude was not a question 
for Cartesian certainty, but rather “the setting for recollecting loss.” Ibid., 91. Conceptual categories are 
instruments developed by political theorists to aid in understanding, not an end in themselves.    
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categories like abyss, catastrophe, crisis, mourning, and melancholia are metaphors for loss 
and signify different aesthetic senses of disconnectedness and loss of meaning. 
Disconnectedness, a lack of rootedness, is part of what Wolin in Between Two Worlds terms as 
contemporary Cartesianism, which demands a subjective I. This Cartesianism, that Wolin 
emphasizes in Tocqueville’s theoretical perception of America is related to the neo-
Kantianism that has guided the ethical turn, emphasizing — even demanding — the 
subjective I and forms of democratic political action.215 For Wolin, this comes at the cost of 
collectivity, which is essential to his conception of democracy. What is lost is the collective 
We.216  
In thinking about the relationship between loss, mourning, and politics Judith Butler, 
Slavoj Žižek, Wendy Brown, Thomas Dumm, and Jodi Dean, to name a few, all turn to 
Freud’s 1917 essay  “Melancholia and Mourning.”217 In doing so they prioritize the 
conception of mourning over melancholia, or treat melancholia as a pathological symptom 
that can be mobilized for political action. This allows them to systematize loss as an 
opportunity for democratic political action through the work of mourning that is available to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 Kant modeled his metaphysics on Descartes schema, which stripped metaphysics of the senses and left all 
knowledge to reason. It was a way to systematize knowledge, and Descartes’ physics required a new 
metaphysics that separated the mind from the body. Cogito ergo sum reduces being to the I in thinking, which 
logically deduces and depends upon intellectual faculties. As a side note, metaphysics were the roots of the tree 
and morality was a branch of Descartes’ pictograph of his devised worldview in Principles. The roots nourish the 
tree and Descartes stripped the tree of bodily senses and crafted a science of knowledge. Pascal once 
commented: "I cannot forgive Descartes; in all his philosophy, Descartes did his best to dispense with God. 
But Descartes could not avoid prodding God to set the world in motion with a snap of his lordly fingers; after 
that, he had no more use for God." 
216 “Democracy would be Cartesianism operationalized, a political society that had traded meaning for 
uniformity, the political analogue to reductionism. In place of genuine diversity, it substitutes mere 
subjectivism, its version of Descarte’s cogito principle, ‘I think, therefor I am.’ Democracy, like Cartesians, would 
seem the realized condition that Pascalian void opened up by modern revolution and carried to extremes in 
American, a society without a common identity.” Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds, 89. 
217 Sigmund Freud, On Murder, Mourning, and Melancholia (London; New York: Penguin Books, Limited, 2007); 
See: Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, Reprint edition (London  ; New York: 
Verso, 2006); Judith Butler, Antigone’s Claim (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Slavoj Žižek, 
“Melancholy and the Act,” Critical Inquiry 26, no. 4 (July 1, 2000): 657–81; Wendy Brown, “Resisting Left 
Melancholy,” Boundary 2 26, no. 3 (October 1, 1999): 19–27; Thomas Dumm, Loneliness as a Way of Life, 1st ed. 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008); Jodi Dean, The Communist Horizon, 1 edition (London  ; 
New York: Verso, 2012). 
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the polity. Despite their somewhat different readings of Freud, each treats mourning as an 
experience that can be overcome, in some way, through politicization. 
In Freud’s seminal essay, “Mourning and Melancholia,” he attempts to offer a 
definition of melancholy against what he calls the normal affect of mourning. Freud begins 
by offering a definition of mourning, writing that “mourning is regularly the reaction to the 
loss of a loved person, or the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, 
such as fatherland, liberty, an ideal, and so on.”218 When the loss of a loved-object produces 
a state of melancholia instead of mourning, Freud concedes that the subject is suspected of a 
pathological disposition. Mourning, on the other hand, is not considered pathological 
because “we rely on it being overcome after a certain lapse of time.” Melancholia is 
characterized by “painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the 
capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a 
degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, and culminates in a 
delusional expectation of punishment.”219 Freud argues that with the exception of 
“disturbance of self-regard,” the same traits are found in the mourning state. Profound 
mourning of a lost loved-object such as a person causes a turning away from the world, 
where the world cannot recall the mourner. The person is unable to adopt a new loved-
object, which would mean replacing the one that was lost. Freud admits that it is only 
because we are so familiar with mourning that it does not seem pathological. Mourning is 
characterized by a deep sense of aloneness, where the individual is still mentally and 
emotionally bound to the lost object; and it is only when a person has fully mourned the loss 
of the loved-object that they are able to “become free and uninhibited again.”  This form of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Freud, On Murder, Mourning, and Melancholia, 311. 
219 Ibid., 243. 
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grieving is drawn out and forces the individual to relive each memory and hope that bound 
their libido to the lost object.   
For Freud, melancholia may or may not be the reaction to the loss of a loved-object. 
Where the exciting causes are different one can recognize that there is a loss of a more ideal 
kind. The object has not actually died, but has been lost as an object of love. In yet other 
cases, one feels justified in maintaining the belief that a loss of this kind has occurred, but 
one cannot see clearly what it is that has been lost, and it is all the more reasonable to 
suppose that the patient cannot consciously perceive what he has lost either. For Freud, 
melancholia like mourning is brought on by a lost loved-object, but it is withdrawn from 
consciousness, “in contradistinction from mourning, in which there is nothing about the loss 
that is unconscious.”220 
Freud’s essay is an attempt to understand melancholia with and against common 
psychoanalytic understandings of mourning. Contemporary political theory’s emphasis on 
Freud’s understanding of mourning as a social category opens it up for political possibility. It 
is by nature a collective concept to which each individual has access. Melancholia, on the 
other hand, appears more individual in nature. It is not necessarily something that each 
person experiences as a part of the human condition. It is however bound to loss like 
mourning, which is the point from which Freud began and returns to in The Ego and The Id. 
If we think back for a moment to Wolin’s introduction from “Vocation to Invocation” we 
are reminded of the construction of political subjectivity through experiences dominated by 
loss. The losses that give form to political subjectivity are experienced by each individual and 
can be set aside from those real and psychosomatic losses that Freud returns to in 
understanding the dynamics of mourning. What, politically, collectively, is our lost-loved-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Ibid., 244.  
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object? Does it exist? What does it mean if the melancholic has no reserve of good loved-
objects to which she can re-attach, re-pair the harmony of the self? Or, what does it mean if 
the melancholic willfully refuses attachment to the so-called “good loved-object”, because 
they’re not desirable? 
Unlike the successful and productive process of mourning, the melancholic lives in a 
constant state of dissociation, subject to waves of mania and depression, constantly being 
thrown back upon oneself in anxiety; the inner world is always one of chaos and one is 
incapable of experiencing trust. The internal world is prioritized over the external world 
because reality always fails testing, and there is no affirmation of good. Instead, each time the 
subject tests reality she is surrounded by bad objects. As such the melancholic cannot love 
the world as it appears. The melancholic lives in a perpetual state of loss according to those 
who are able to attach to the world, but their loss is only the lost possibility of good love-
objects that never existed in the first place. Consequently, the melancholic exists in a state of 
hyper-subjectivity because the only loved-object is the lover herself and the internal world 
that is created against the external one. Politically, theorists are drawn towards mourning 
over melancholia because mourning is hopeful; mourning carries with it the promise of 
renewed existence in the world, melancholia seen as such does not. Melancholia forces us to 
break with the trusted reality of the world and challenge it as illusion. How can it be real if it 
consistently fails the reality test?  The work of mourning is the work of retrieval in the sense 
that we must retrieve the good from the lost loved-object if we are to move forward and 
attach to another, to free up space in our capacity to love (what Freud calls the libido). The 
question in reattachment is whether or not we insist upon replicating the lost loved-object in 
some form, or whether or not we can release the libidinal desire altogether and attach to a 
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new object. The prior is a form of melancholic mourning that is attached to the form, 
without, or at best with, different content.  
Freud alludes to, but fails to explicate, the critical capacity of melancholia. 
Melancholia doesn’t seem productive in the same way that mourning does, because it doesn’t 
offer us an ability to re-attach to the world to re-pair oneself as whole, because there was 
never any whole to begin with. Melancholia is a fragmentation of being that refuses the 
conceptions of wholeness, which in part explains Adorno’s critique of Hegel in his 
reflections on a damaged life. Wolin and Adorno are both undertaking a kind of melancholy 
work, thinking about the future of a democratic political life that breaks free from the 
dominant narratives of homogenous time and historicity. 
III.I Melancholy and the Vocative Loss of We  
“In melancholy truth presents itself, and the movement of melancholy is one toward the 
deliverance of lost ‘meaning.’ A truly dialectical motion. For if truth presents itself in 
melancholy, it indeed presents itself to pure inwardness exclusively in semblance. Truth is, in 
the pure imagination of inwardness, comparable to the pleasure of the melancholic: ‘The 
essence of the pleasure does not lie in pleasure itself, but in the accompanying 
consciousness.’”        
                     — Theodor Adorno, Kierkegaard: Construction 
of the Aesthetic  
 
 Mourning and melancholy are two different affects, although they share many 
commonalities, and are sometimes subsumed within one another. At bottom, both are 
caused by the experience of loss. It is sometimes possible to say what has been lost, 
sometimes not. While the identification of loss is always possible in mourning, it is not in 
melancholy. Instead, it becomes a trace, mimetically reproduced in the subject’s psyche. To 
say that we as theorists have become numb to the experiences of loss is not quite accurate, 
because it would assume that we have consciously lost the ability to experience moments of 
	   123	  
loss. Instead, the terms of our power struggles have shifted, and we have nothing we are 
consciously trying to retrieve. If power struggles produce losses, and the terms of struggles 
have shifted from the public sphere of civic engagement to the private sphere of subjective 
interests, then what is at stake has changed. The loss that Wolin turns us to in invoking 
theorists to democracy is the vocative loss of We, it is the identity of democracy that has 
been fragmented by the production of private interests. The privatization of the political 
sphere has meant the privatization of political theory coupled with the persistent idea that 
there must be a Left and that the Left must act. The proliferation of private interests are 
mirrored in the proliferation of philosophical turns, in schools of thought, the most 
damaging of which, for Wolin, is the turn towards ethics. Instead of recalling democracy, we 
have to first recall the collective we, a sense of collectivity. 
 Wolin turns to Adorno in thinking about loss and contemporary political theory in 
order to address the “rectilinear succession” of victory and defeat, which ignores the 
defeated, and celebrates the victor, because Adorno looks outside the linear narratives of 
history to find what survives. The dominant cultural mode, which hails the victor and 
ignores the defeated, furthers the drive to move past loss. In order for Adorno to escape the 
linear temporalization of victory and defeat, he must escape the perceived dialectical 
movement of history. In doing so, he turns to what he calls “the cross-grained, opaque, 
unassimilated material [which] . . . Is not wholly obsolete since it has outwitted the historical 
dynamic.”221 It is the defeated that is cast outside the linear narrative of history, which hails 
the victor, which theory must address. 
 The loss of vocation for Wolin is illustrated by the loss of a collective sense of politics. 
It is the loss of a collective we to the subjective I, or what he calls subjective individualism. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 Wolin, “Political Theory: From Vocation to Invocation,” 4. 
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The melancholic state that Adorno emphasizes is illustrated in the vocative shift that Wolin 
points to in this loss of collectivity. It is the prioritization of the self over the world, and the 
prioritization of the ego over all others that moves us to think about politics today as a way 
to act in the world, but also to treat mourning as an opportunity for political action. 
‘Systematized’ for Wolin becomes another word for methodology, and it is in some ways the 
same problem for theory that he addressed in his original essay on vocation. 
 Adorno and Wolin are both concerned with the turn towards ethics, and the 
moralization of ethics in political theory. Whereas Wolin calls for a clear form of political 
work, Adorno recalls us to the activity of thinking in itself. In many ways, Wolin’s essay on 
invocation is recalling us to thinking, to what he calls “leisure time.” Adorno is more wary of 
the need for direct political action than Wolin, although both are reaching for a form of 
resignation from the dystopic reality of our contemporary political situation.  
 In Adorno’s lectures “Problems of Moral Philosophy” he expresses great dis-ease at 
the outset at sitting in the comfort of a classroom with students offering to discuss morality 
at all. He tells them that the “good life” is no longer possible, and makes clear that what is at 
stake in moral philosophy is thinking about moral questions and not guidance for action. He 
has no intentions of laying down a set of ‘norms or values’ that ought regulate behavior. 
Here Adorno’s is consistent with his dedication in Minima Moralia, which asserts that wrong 
life cannot be rightly lived. “The melancholy science from which I make this offering to my 
friend relates to a region that from time immemorial was regarded as the true field of 
philosophy, but which since the latter’s conversion into method, has lapsed into intellectual 
neglect, sententious whimsy and finally oblivious: the teaching of the good life.”222 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 “Moral philosophy in this sense means making a sustained effort - without anxieties or reservations - to 
achieve a true, conscious understanding of the categories of morality and of the questions that relate to the 
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According to Adorno, moral philosophy has no direct connection with lived reality, 
but does have a “necessary connection with practical action.” Citing Kant, Adorno makes 
clear that the question “What shall we do?” is the critical problem of contemporary thought. 
According to Kant . . . this question “What shall we do?” is the crucial question of moral philosophy. 
And I would like to add that it is the crucial question of philosophy in general . . . Today, this question 
has undergone a strange modification. I have found again and again that when carrying out theoretical 
analyses - and theoretical analyses are essentially critical in nature - that I have been met by the 
question: “Yes, but what shall we do?”, and this question has been conveyed with a certain undertone 
of impatience, and undertone that proclaims: “All right, what is the point of all this theory?”223  
 
Adorno argues that the dialectical relation between theory and practice that was developed 
by Lenin eliminated theoretical thinking altogether. He urges us to pause and question our 
reliance upon the unity of theory and practice, lest we become what “Americans call a joiner, 
that is to say, a man who always has to join in, who has to have a cause for which he can 
fight. Such a person is driven by his sheer enthusiasm for the idea that something or other 
must be done and some movement has to be joined about which he is deluded enough to 
believe that it will bring about significant changes.”224 Adorno argues, “this impatience can 
very easily become linked with a certain resentment towards thinking in general, with a 
tendency to denounce theory as such.”225 The impatience with theory, which Adorno likens 
to critical thinking, is tied to a general drive towards actions and the need to do something. 
Adorno urges us to be patient with the relations between theory and practice, and not to give 
way to a hasty desire for action.226 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
good life and practice in the higher sense…”  Theodor Adorno, Problems of Moral Philosophy (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2002), 34. 
223 Ibid., 3. 
224 Ibid., 5. 
225 Adorno takes it a step further and argues that from here it is not long before people denounce intellectuals.  
226 Adorno acknowledges that practice has “made great inroads into theory . . . Into the realm of new thought 
in which right behavior can be reformulated.” He writes, “This idea is not as paradoxical and irritating as it may 
sound, for in the final analysis thinking is itself a form of behavior. In its origins thinking is no more than the 
form in which we have attempted to master our environment and come to terms with it - testing reality is the 
name given by analytical psychology to this function of the go and of thought - and it is perfectly possible that 
in certain situations practice will be referred back to theory far more frequently than at other times and in other 
situations.” Adorno, Problems of Moral Philosophy, 4. 
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Adorno argues that it is necessary to retain the concept of morality, albeit critically, 
in part so that morality is not replaced with the “sentimental concept of ethics.”227 The 
reduction of morality to ethics disappears the relation of the individual to the collective, and 
all that is left is the idea that each should live in accordance with one’s own nature.  
Collective moments of loss are treated like opportunities for political action, and when 
movement fails to take hold, lost opportunities are folded into lamentation. The modernist 
rut of production and consumption that Wolin characterizes as “endless change” does not 
cease. 
For Both Wolin and Adorno the ethical turn in theory signifies the desire for action 
over thinking. Mourning is an attractive political category because it is by definition a process 
that re-pairs what has been lost through reattachment to the world. It requires action and a 
feeling of resolve. Melancholy as a disposition, set against and placed within mourning, does 
not appeal to those determined to find a way to act democratically in the world, or render 
the world more democratic. Melancholy is discontent with reality as it is perceived, it is 
paranoid and untrusting of the world in its manic state and does not believe that it can attach 
to good loved-objects outside itself, because each always fails the testing of reality. For the 
melancholic there is nothing to re-pair, there was never anything to be had in the first place. 
For Adorno, this melancholic state is illustrated in narratives of crisis and catastrophe, it 
offers its own aesthetic that refuses hopefulness in action, which he links to the reduction of 
morality to ethics and our impatience to act. Melancholy and despair serve as an affective 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227  “...There has long since been a tendency to smuggle in the notion of ethics as a substitute for the concept 
of morality, and I once suggested that the concept of ethics was actually the bad conscience of morality, or that 
ethics is a sort of morality that is ashamed of its own moralizing with consequence that it behaves as if it were 
morality, but at the same time not a moralizing morality. . .  In other words, to reduce the problem of morality 
to ethics is to perform a sort of conjuring trick by means of which the decisive problem of moral philosophy, 
namely the relation of the individual to the general, is made to disappear. What is implied in all this is the idea 
that if I live in accordance with my own ethos, my own nature, or if, to use the fine phrase of our own time, I 
realize myself, then this will be enough to bring about the good life. And this is nothing but pure illusion and 
ideology. . . .” Ibid., 10. 
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counterweight to our impatient desire to act in the world, or better yet, be told how to act in 
the world.   
Melancholy as a form of contemplative inwardness is not necessarily a depressive 
affect. Melancholy creates an interstice between inwardness and the semblance of an external 
reality. In this way, it necessitates a form of plurality, of being in the world. In turning 
inwards upon one’s self a space is created not only between the self and the world, but also 
between the Self and the subjective self that is formed by the world. Melancholy is deceitful 
of the so-called world and reality, and refuses placement within the linear narrative of 
worldly existence. This interstice, or liminal space, allows the melancholic to disrupt the 
linear temporal narratives and refrains of everydayness. Here, we find the difference between 
“resignation from” and “refusal to go on.” The melancholic’s resignation from the world is 
not necessarily refusal of the world, but is instead an act of resistance to the semblance of 
reality that claims authority and truth through ordered narratives and tempered dispositions 
that are considered suitable for living in the world. 
 In Adorno’s study of Kierkegaard he further explicates a concept of melancholy drawn 
from Kierkegaard’s reading of Benjamin’s study of Trauerspiel.   
Thus it is in the nature of melancholy to be deceitful.” As semblance, however, mythical melancholy is 
not depraved but dialectical in itself. “Providence” is concealed in it. Providence “endows an individual 
with uncommon powers of dealing with reality.” “But then,” says providence, “lest he occasion too 
much harm I have confined this power in melancholy and thereby hide it from him” — Just as “truth” 
itself, according to Kierkegaard, is hidden from inwardness. “What he is capable of he shall never learn 
to know, but I want to make use of him. He shall not be humbled by any reality, to that extent he is 
treated with more partiality than other men, but in himself he shall feel shattered such as has no other 
man. Then and only then shall he understand me, but then he shall also be certain that it is I he 
understands.” Thus truth subordinates itself to melancholic semblance through semblance’s own 
dialectic. In its semblance melancholy is, dialectically, the image of an other.228  
 
Providence is hidden in melancholy. Adorno writes that Kierkegaard identified with the 
counter-image of the Baroque tyrant, the martyr. It is the martyr-side of the tyrant who is the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Theodor W. Adorno, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 
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witness to truth, he who has the gift of providence, the ability to attain to providence 
through melancholia, but is never given access to it. The tyrant cannot gain mastery over 
historical time, the movement of history; he shall never “learn to know” the truth that is 
within his melancholic state. The presence of historical time and providence is the shattering 
force that fractures the subject — The attunement to “truth”, but inability to capture it.229 
Melancholy, Adorno writes, is the self’s spiritual body “harrowingly divided up into its 
affective impulses as though they were its limbs.”230 The interior life is likened to the 
Baroque graveyard, forcing the question of what constitutes living? Similar to Adorno’s own 
problematic in Minima Moralia, which “bears witness to a dialogue interior”, that asks: is the 
good life possible today, while simultaneously positing, “Our perspective of life has passed 
into ideology which conceals the fact that there is life no longer.” 231  
 The question of the good life or bearable life that we find in Adorno resounds in 
Wolin’s lament that perhaps it is “too late in the day,” and his turn back to Plato in situating 
the work of political theory within the tradition of political philosophy. Wolin’s move from 
vocation to invocation is a gesture that wants to say maybe something can be saved. It leaves 
space, because it’s unwilling to completely let go. That holding on, though, is not so much a 
gasp of hope as it is what Benjamin calls the “continual pausing for breath.” The space 
allows for return to the object of contemplation, which for Wolin, I would argue, is 
democracy of a more ideal kind. Wolin, much like Adorno, is interested in redeeming the 
work of political theory, which refuses to cheer on the narrative plot twists contemporary 
theory has bended to in its tragic form. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 “Kierkegaard himself identified with the dialectical counterimage of the tyrant, the martyr, whose concept so 
thoroughly rules his later theology that in his final polemic Martensen, with justice, accused Kierkegaard of 
simply equating the ‘witness of truth’ with the ‘martyr.’” Ibid., 62. 
230 Ibid., 63. 
231 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London  ; New York: 
Verso, 2006), 15. 
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  In Minima Moralia, in “Over the hills,” Adorno retells the story of Snow White, writing 
that it is the perfect image of melancholy. “As the granting of her wish is death, so the saving 
remains illusion.” This sentiment perfectly expresses the disposition of a melancholy that 
refuses saving. If she were to die or remain in the coffin, the audience would have to mourn 
her departure from the world, but this idea of losing implies that the world was somehow 
desirable in the first place. The hopeful breath drawn in vain articulates our attachment to 
the idea of rescue, but this mournful rescue is not a messianic one. It redeems nothing of 
existence. Adorno writes, “All contemplation can do no more than patiently trace the 
ambiguity of melancholy in ever new configurations. Truth is inseparable from the illusory 
belief that from the figure of the unreal one day, in spite of all, real deliverance will come.”232 
Consciously or unconsciously in repetition of Benjamin, Adorno brings melancholy as an 
affective disposition together with contemplation and thinking. The illusory belief is that one 
day real deliverance will come from the unreal. Truth here becomes the figure of deliverance, 
and the object of contemplation. This story represents melancholy because it understands 
the play between life and death. How can one be brought back to life, to the world, if they 
were never alive? “Everyone is asleep; only the dead rise at this hour from the grave revived. 
But I, I am not dead, and so I cannot be revived; and if I were dead, I could not be revived 
for indeed I have never lived.”233 
 The metaphysical world has withered away along  with the turn from the good life. 
Ethics demands commitment to living, but not political action. And certainly not a 
‘sentimental’ or ‘vapid’ morality. The sentimental moralization of ethics responds to answer 
Adorno’s axiom that the good life is no longer possible. ‘Possible’ should not be rendered as 
‘hopeful.’ To re-pair the relationship between the subject proper and the ideal of the good 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 Ibid., 121–122. 
233  Adorno, Kierkegaard, 63. 
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life is a form of romanticism that throws us back upon a tradition of neo-Kantian idealism. 
In turning us back towards Adorno, Wolin is rejecting the contemporary desire for 
reparation or retrieval, which pushes us forward demanding political action. This push past 
loss forgoes the essential question of addressing the subjective I.   
Conclusion 
In Minima Moralia Adorno writes “Dialectical thought is an attempt to break through 
the coercion of logic by its own means. But since it must use these means, it is at every 
moment in danger of itself acquiring a coercive character: the ruse of reason would like to 
hold sway over the dialectic too.”234 The danger of the coercion of logic is systematization, 
which looks like a form of critical dialectic, but functions like a methodology reinforcing the 
logic of domination. The logic of domination and the instruments of reason cannot be 
separated from our understanding of the movement of history and our understanding of 
temporality, which frames and gives form to our own subject position in and/or against the 
world.   
 The systematization of loss within political theory undermines the work of theory as a 
vocation. Wolin’s turn towards Adorno’s Minima Moralia brings together vocation and 
invocation: He writes, “Theory must needs deal with the cross-grained, opaque, 
unassimilated material, which as such has admittedly from the start an anachronistic quality, 
but is not wholly obsolete since it has outwitted the historical dynamic.” Wolin is invoking 
the political thinker back to the vocation of political theory, but it is not that simple. For 
Wolin and Adorno it is the work of theory to collect the debris cast aside by the forces of 
change and recover them through the work of memory. In this sense, Wolin’s use of Adorno 
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allows him to think about the relationship between loss and politics, and the relationship 
between post-modernity and loss which leaves precious time for understanding experiences 
of loss or crisis. Wolin and Adorno are concerned with political understanding — for leisure 
in thinking, deliberation, and consideration. If political theory is vocation then it must be 
attuned and sensitive to the world; resistant to domination of the world by change while 
remaining open and dynamic. 
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CONCLUSION 
  
 
  Adorno’s rejection of the good life is a useful political critique for conceiving new 
forms of political action. His premise necessarily rejects a Freudian conception of mourning. 
There is nothing to mourn for, because to do so would mean that the world could somehow 
be redeemed. Adorno demands that we acknowledge the distinction between moral 
judgment and ethical action; and that thinking is necessary for determining the relationship 
between these philosophical categories. If we accept certain ethical axioms for acting, 
because we are determined to act, and fail to think about the moral claims supporting them, 
then we are responsible for our actions and their outcomes. 
 Adorno and Benjamin’s portraits of Melancholy in modernity, through the Trauerspiel 
and various vignettes, give voice if not meaning to a sense of displacement. The melancholic 
state expresses discontent with the order of things, with the world as it is, or appears to be. 
Fidelity to one another and the world as a principle of promise has been broken, and is 
continually being broken.  For Benjamin and Adorno, melancholy is an affective framework 
for political analysis. Thinking about how we think about politics, and the position the 
political theorist occupies in the world, poses a question of space. That is, what space do we 
occupy, what vantage point do we assume, what frame do we look through when we look at 
the world? Adorno’s Minima Moralia offers one answer, placing the political thinker is a state 
of melancholy, a position of sorrowful meditation at once removed from the world and 
firmly rooted in it. Instead of a will to act paralyzed by melancholy, though, Adorno argues 
for a form of political withdrawal. Action becomes inverted and placed within the realm of 
thinking. Similarly, for Arendt critical thinking becomes a form of political action. 
Characterized by a critical vantage point and distance from experience in the world, Arendt’s 
	   133	  
conception of thinking is grounded in temporal terms. How can we find to the time to stop 
and think about what we are doing? For Arendt, a form of present politics demands thinking 
and accountability if we are to understand and address the events of the twentieth century 
and now twenty-first. 
 For these thinkers, there is a consistent turn away from action towards thinking. In 
contrast, for contemporary theorists today there is a drive towards action, and so to a turn 
towards ethics, and how to act in the world. The paradigmatic impulse today is: But what can 
I do? Not, “to stop and think what we are doing.” In this move towards action there is a 
conflation that occurs between morality and ethics, which pushes us towards righting wrongs 
and injustices, without considering their moral premises. There is a sentimental morality that 
seems to guide what it is we mean by acting. A morality that often seems to replicate the 
dominant norms and ethos of the empty, homogenous time Benjamin describes. 
 The drive towards action, and conflation of a sentimental morality with ethics, is seen 
in the contemporary turn towards aesthetics. Many political thinkers writing within this turn 
focus on the relationship between mourning and politics, and in so doing rely upon a 
Freudian understanding of loss that leads towards mourning. Mourning as a productive 
category contains the promise of renewal. The promise of mourning is the promise of 
change. It is the promise that despite our losses, real and or imaginary, the world will go on, 
we will form new relationships; we will overcome. That there might be a happy ending. 
Contained within this logic is an acceptance that anything can be redeemed through time, 
that if we submit ourselves to the process of mourning, the past will recede and the future 
will open up new possibilities. For Arendt, Benjamin, and Adorno, though, this “vain hope” 
is a kind of catharsis that rejects thinking, understanding, and the possibility of resistance.  
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